The most popular tool: Tax increment financing and the political economy of local government

University of Chicago Law Review

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 65-95

  Briffaulff, Richard ^a  

^a School for International and Public Affairs   (United States)

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EID: 77955526356     PISSN: 00419494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (204)

1. See Council of Development Finance Agencies and International Council of Shopping Centers, Tux Increment Finance: Best Practices Reference Guide 1 (2007). online at http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/pages/documentpage.html/ $file/CDFATIFRefGuide2007.pdf (visited Oct 24,2009).
2. James Krohe, Jr. At the Tipping Point: Has Tax Increment Financing Become Too Much of a Good Thing?. Planning 20,21 (Mar 2007).
3. Office of Cook County Clerk David Orr, 2007 TIF Report Shows 11.5% Jump in Revenue: Taxpayers Contribute $892 Million to TIFs in 2007, online at http://www.cookctyclerk.com/sub/news-view.asp?NEWS-ID=222 (visited Oct 24,2009).
4. Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, Who Pays for the Only Game in Town? *3. online at http://www.ncbg.org/documents/IMPACT%20STUDY%20FINAL.doc (visited Oct 24,2009).
5. Council of Development Finance Agencies and International Council of Shopping Cen ters. Best Practices Reference Guide at 14 (cited in note 1).
6. See Kelo v New London, 545 US 469 (2005).
7. See generally George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TlP-Driven Economic Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests Empowering Property Owners and School Districts, S3 Tulane L Rev 45,67-73 (2009)
8. See, for example, Paul G. Lewis and Max Neiman, Custodians of Place: Governing the Growth and Development of Cities 126 (Georgetown 2009)
9. See. for example. Rachel Weber, Equity and Entrepreneurialism: The Impact of Tux Increment Financing on School Finance, 38 Urban Aff Rev 619, 619-20 (2003) (focusing on TIF as an entrepreneurial development technique).
10. See, for example, Jeffrey I. Chapman, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment, in Helen F. Ladd, ed. Local Government Tax and Land Use Policies in the United States: Understanding the Links 182,190 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 1998) (noting that in California 95 percent of the redevelopment agencies that operate TIFs are governed by city councils or county boards of supervisors).
11. Richard F. Dye and David F. Merriman, The Effect of Tax Increment Financing on Land Use, in Dick Netzer, ed, The Property Tax, Land Use and Land Use Regulation 37,49-51 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 2003) (illustrating the growth in equalized assessed value in TIF districts in the Chicago metropolitan area).
12. See, for example, J. Drew Klacik, Tax Increment Financing in Indiana, in Craig L. Johnson and Joyce Y. Man. eds, Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development 179, 183-84 (SUNY 2001) (reporting that nearly 40 percent of TIFs are created without specific development projects in mind)
13. David A. Reingold. Are TIFs Being Misused to Alter Patterns of Residential Segregation? The Case of Addison and Chicago, Illinois, in Johnson and Man, eds. Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development 209,223.
14. See John L. Mikesell, Nonproperty Tax Increment Programs for Economic Development: A Review of Alternative Programs, in Johnson and Man, eds, Tax Increment Financing and Eco nomic Development 58, 58-65 (cited in note 11). John Mikesell discusses ten jurisdictions which had at one time permitted the use of nonproperty taxes in TIF programs, noting that one - California-had repealed its authorization of the use of sales tax. A more recent study added eleven more states-Connecticut. Georgia, Kentucky. Mississippi, New Jersey. New Mexico, Oklahoma. Pennsylvania. Texas. Utah, and Washington-to the list of states using some nonpro perty taxes to finance TIF programs, while indicating that at least two of the states on Mikesell's list-Maine and Wyoming-no longer did so. See Council of Development Finance Agencies. 2008 TIF State-by-State Report 6, 10. 17, 19. 24, 30, 31, 36, 38, 43, 44, 47, 50, online at http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/ cdfaweb.nsf/pages/TIFStatebyState.html/$file/CDFA-2008-TIF-State-By- State-Report.pdf (visited Oct 18,2009).
15. See, for example. Michael P. Kelsay. Uneven Patchwork: Tax Increment Financing in Kansas City 4 (ReclaimDemocracy.org, Jan 2007). online at http://reclaimdemocracy.org/rdc/kc/tif-report-l.07.pdf (visited Oct 18.2009).
16. See Rachel Weber, Tax Incremental Financing in Theory and Practice, in Sammis B. White, Richard D. Bingham, and Edward W. Hill, eds, Financing Economic Development in the 21st Century 53.60-61 (M.E. Sharpe 2003).
17. Housing Act of 1949, Pub L No 111-21, 63 Stat 413 (1949), codified at 42 USC § 1441 et seq (expanding homeowners' insurance and financing, with the stated purpose of developing slum-clearing projects).
18. See Jonathan M. Davidson. Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Community Redeve lopment. 56 U Det J Urban L 405,406 n 5 (1979).
19. Id at 423 n 133.
20. Id at 423.
21. See Chapman. Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment at 191 (cited in note 9).
22. Craig L. Johnson and Kenneth A. Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws, in Johnson and Man, eds, Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development 31, 31 (cited innote 11) (noting that, by 1970. only Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming had followed California's lead).
23. See. for example. South Bend Public Transportation Corp v City of South Bend, 428 NE2d 217, 219 (Ind 1981) ("The legislature passed the tax allocation financing statutes at this time to provide redevelopment commissions with a necessary means to promote development when local governments are facing massive cutbacks in federal assistance and increasingly tight fiscal constraints attributable to the property tax freeze.").
24. See also Weber, Equity & Entrepre-neurialism, 38 Urban Aff Rev at 622 (cited in note 8)
25. Joyce Y. Man, Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax Increment Financing, in Johnson and Man, eds. Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development 87, 90-93 (cited in note 11) (noting that the TIF boom of the 1970s and 1980s coincided with the decrease in federal intergovernmental aid in this period).
26. Michael J. Wolkoff, Economic Development Financing Policy: A State and Local Perspective, in Richard D. Bingham, Edward W. Hill, and Sammis B. White, Financing Economic Development: An Institutional Response 29,37 (Sage 1990).
27. Chapman, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment at 191 table 9.1 (cited in note 9).
28. J. Drew Klacik and Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in Johnson and Man, eds, Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development 15,18 (cited in note 11).
29. Id at 18
30. See note 1 and accompanying text.
31. David Merriman. Does TIF Make It More Difficult to Manage Municipal Budgets? A Simulation Model and Directions for Future Research? *4 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy un published manuscript. May 1,2009).
32. Id at *2.
33. David Swenson and Liesl Eathington, Do Tax Increment Finance Districts in Iowa Spur Regional Economic and Demographic Growth? *4. 7 table 4 (June 2002), online at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper-4094- N0138.pdf (visited Oct 24,2009)
34. Merriman, Does TIF Make It More Difficult to Manage Municipal Budgets? at 2 (cited in note 26).
35. Orr, 2007 TIF Report Shows 11.5% Jump in Revenue (cited in note 3). Looking at a scattering of other major metropolitan areas, there appear to be twenty-two TIF districts in Houston, see City of Houston, Tax Increment Redevelopment Zones, online at http://www.houstontx.gov/finance/ecodev/tirz.html (visited Aug 30, 2009) ten in Atlanta, see Atlanta Development Authority, Tax Allocation Districts, online at http://www.atlantada.com/buildDev/tadFAQs.jsp (visited Oct 24, 2009)and thirty-three in Indianapolis, see Marion County Auditor's Office, Tax Increment Finance District Cross-Walk Table, online at http://www.indy.gov/eGov/County/Auditor/Tax-Rates/Pages/TIF-crosswalk-table. aspx (visited Oct 24,2009
36. See, for example, Castel Properties, Ltd v City of Marion, 631 NE2d 459,465 (111 App 1994)
37. See. for example, Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 Fordham Urban L J 305,306-07 (2004) (criticizing the continuing lack of specificity as to what constitutes "blight").
38. See Johnson and Kriz. A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws at 38 (cited in note 20).
39. See Klacik, Tax Increment Financing in Indiana at 185-86 (cited in note 11) (contrasting the original purpose of TIFs to resurrect blighted areas and the now-frequent use of TIFs to develop vacant land).
40. Iowa Code § 403.5(1) (1999). See also McMurray v City Council of the City of West Des Moines, 642 NW2d 273,278-79 (Iowa 2002).
41. See Good Jobs First, Straying from Good Intentions: How States Are Weakening Enter prise Zone and Tax Increment Financing Programs 23 (2003), online at http://www.goodjobstirst.org/pdt/straying.pdf (visited Oct 18,2009).
42. See Anne Marie Pippin. Note, Community Involvement in Brownfield Redevelopment Makes Cents: A Study of Brownfield Redevelopment Initiatives in the United States and Central and Eastern Europe. 37 Ga J Intl & Comp L 589, 596 (2009) (defining "greenfields" as "pristine, underdeveloped land typically located in low density suburban areas").
43. Klacik, Tax Increment Financing in Indiana at 186 (cited in note 11).
44. Greg LeRoy. TIF, Greenfields, and Sprawl: How an Incentive Created to Alleviate Slums Has Come to Subsidize Upscale Malls and New Urbanist Developments, 60 Planning & Envir L 3, 11 (2008).
45. Council of Development Finance Agencies and International Council of Shopping Centers. Best Practices Reference Guide (cited in note 1).
46. See Daley Letting Huge Loop TIF Die, Grain's Chi Bus (Sept 24, 2008), online at http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/printStory.pl?news-id=31140 (visited Oct 24,2009).
47. Mike Quigley, A Tale of Two Cities: Reinventing Tax Increment Financing iii (Heartland Institute, Apr 2007), online at http://www.heartland.org/ policybot/results/21830/A-Tale-of-Two-Cities-Reinventing-Tax-Increment- Financing.html (visited Oct 18.2009).
48. Id.
49. TIF funds are often used in tandem with these other tools. See, for example. Mark S. Rosentraub. City-County Consolidation and the Rebuilding of Image: The Fiscal Lessons from Indianapolis's UniGov Program. 32 State & Local Govt Rev 180. 185-89 (2000) (discussing revitalization tools implemented in Indianapolis)
50. John E. Anderson and Mark W. Wassmer, Bidding for Business: The Efficacy of Local Economic Development Incentives in a Metropolitan Area 84-86 (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 2000) (discussing use of multiple programs intended to redevelop Detroit)
51. See Richard Briffault. The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance. 82 Minn L Rev 503.509-21 (1997).
52. See, for example. Gary P. Winter, Tax Increment Financing: A Potential Redevelopment Financing Mechanism for New York Municipalities, 18 Fordham Urban L J 655,692 (1991).
53. Klacik, Tax Increment Financing in Indiana at 188 (cited in note 11).
54. Man, Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt TIF at 97 (cited in note 21).
55. Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 Rutgers L J 907, 910 & n 17 (2003), citing Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the Public Purpose Doctrine. 12 SLU Pub L Rev 143,143 & n 1 (1993).
56. See. for example. State v Unified Government ofWyandotte County/Kansas City, 962 P2d 543, 552-54 (Kan 1998)
57. In re Request for Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1986 PA 281, 422 NW2d 186,202-03 (Mich 1988).
58. See, for example, Request for Advisory Opinion, 422 NW2d at 202.
59. See also McMurray v City Council of City of West Des Moines, 642 NW2d 273, 283 (Iowa 2002) (ruling that a TIF program to pay for physical infrastructure necessary for a new shopping mall "advances a public purpose and will not be invalidated because it benefits not only the public, but also potentially benefits a private developer").
60. Board of Directors v All Taxpayers, 938 So 2d 11,17 (La 2006) (determining that benefits to the public at large and private interests need not be mutually exclusive).
61. See, for example, Delogu v State, 720 A2d 1153, 1155 (Me 1998) (arguing that the TIF project violated the equal assessment requirement of the Maine constitution)
62. Meierhenry v City of Huron, 354 NW2d 171.183 (SD 1984) (arguing that the TIF project violated the South Dakota Constitution, which required that taxes "be uniform on all property of the same class, and shall be levied and collected for public purposes only").
63. See, for example, Delogu, 720 A2d at 1156
64. Meierhenry, 354 NW2d at 177-78
65. South Bend Public Transportation Corp v City of South Bend, 428 NE2d 217,222-23 (Ind 1981)
66. City of Canton v Crouch, 403 NE2d 242, 249-50 (111 1980) (holding that the Illinois constitution allows tax revenues collected from one taxing district to be used by another taxing district)
67. Denver Urban Renewal Authority v Byrne. 618 P2d 1374,1386-87 (Colo 1980) (holding that the Colorado constitution's uniformity provision is satisfied as long as property is taxed on a uniform basis and does not preclude the allocation of incremental revenues to TIF)
68. Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v Leech, 591 SW2d 427, 429-30 (Tenn 1979) (holding that the Tennessee constitution's uniformity clause is not violated when a portion of county property tax revenue is diverted to TIF redevelopment project).
69. See also Tribe v Salt Lake City Corp. 540 P2d 499, 504 (Utah 1975)
70. Richards v City of Muscatine, 237 NW2d 48, 60-62 (Iowa 1975) (rejecting uniformity clause challenge to TIF by finding that landowner in a TIF district is taxed on the same basis as other landowners and that the diversion of revenues to the TIF "has a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental purpose of having the urban renewal project pay for itself)
71. An additional state tax issue has been whether incremental revenues can be redirected to a TIF when the state constitution authorizes a tax for certain purposes, such as schools, or when a tax has been authorized by the voters for a specific purpose. Some state courts have said redirection is not barred, while others have taken the opposite position. Compare Request for Advisory Opinion, 422 NW2d at 193-97 (noting that while the Michigan constitution does place a limit on tax rate, it does not do so for use. "leav[ing] the Legislature free to alter the purposes to which tax revenues are put")
72. City of El Paso v El Paso Community College District, 729 SW2d 296,299 (Tex 1986) (allowing school district ad valorem tax revenue to be used for non-educational purposes as part of a TIF plan) with Denham Springs Economic Development District v All Taxpayers, 894 So 2d 325, 331-35 (La 2005) (finding that the revenue from taxes approved for a particular purpose could not be redirected as part of a TIF plan)
73. Leonard v City of Spokane, 897 P2d 358,360-62 (Wash 1995)
74. Miller v Covington Development Authority, 539 SW2d 1,5 (Ky 1976).
75. See Johnson and Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Finance Laws at 45-46 (cited in note 20).
76. Craig L. Johnson, The Use of Debt in Tax Increment Financing, in Johnson and Man, Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development 71.71 (cited in note 11).
77. Compare Tax Increment Financing Commission of Kansas City v I.E. Dunn Construction Co, 781 SW2d 70. 74-75 (Mo 1989) (holding that limits on municipal debt do not apply to TIF debt)
78. South Bend Public Transportation Corp v City of South Bend. 428 NE2d 217. 222 (Ind 1981) (same)
79. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 618 P2d at 1382 (same): Tribe, 540 P2d at 503 (same) with Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority v Medical Technology and Research Au thority of Oklahoma. 4 P3d 677, 683-90 (Okla 2000) (requiring voter approval)
80. County Commission of Boone County v Cooke, 475 SE2d 483, 494 (W Va 1996) (same)
81. City of Hartford v Kirley, 493 NW2d 45,50-56 (Wis 1992) (holding that the municipal debt limit applies to TIF debt)
82. Strand v Escambia County, 992 So 2d 150, 156-61 (Fla 2008)
83. See also Bay County v Town of Cedar Grove. 992 So 2d 164.168-70 (Fla 2008).
84. See, for example, Board of Education, Pleasantdale School District No 107 v Village of Burr Ridge. 793 NE2d 856, 867-68 (111 App 2003)
85. Castel Properties, Ltd v City of Marion, 631 NE2d 459. 464-67 (111 App 1994)
86. See also Great Rivers Habitat Alliance v City of St Peters, 246 SW3d 556, 566-67 (Mo App 2008) (overturning a summary judgment allowing a TIF district to be created when there still remained issues of fact concerning whether the property would be developed without TIF).
87. Different surveys of the number of states imposing a but-for test as a precondition for TIF district creation have come up with different numbers, although this may reflect an increase in the number of states adopting the requirement over time. A book chapter published in 2001 found that fourteen states use a but-for test.
88. See Johnson and Kriz, A Review of State Tax Incre ment Financing Laws at 39 (cited in note 20). A 2006 law review note found that seventeen states require a showing that growth would not occur but for the TIF investment.
89. See John Grand. Note, Tax Increment Financing: Louisiana Goes Fishing for New Business, 66 La L Rev 851, 860 (2006). My review of a state-by-state survey of TIF laws by the Council of Development Finance Agencies published in 2008 found that nineteen states and the District of Columbia impose a "but-for" test as a precondition for TIF district creation. See Council of Development Finance Agencies, 2008 TIF State-by-State Report (cited in note 12). Even with that increased use of the but-for test, thirty states do not impose such a requirement.
90. Johnson and Kriz. A Review of Stale Tax Increment Financing Laws at 39 (cited in note 20).
91. See, for example, JG St. Louis West LLC v City of Des Peres, 41 SW3d 513. 520-21 (Mo App 2001).
92. Board of Education of Community High School District No 218 v Village of Robbins, 765 NE2d 449.458 (111 App 2002).
93. East-West Gateway Council of Governments, An Assessment of the Effectiveness and Fiscal Impacts of the Use of Local Development Incentives in the St. Louis Region: Interim Report 32 (Jan 2009), online at http://www.ewgateway.org/pdffiles/library/regdev/tifrpt-012609.pdf (visited Oct 18,2009).
94. LeRoy, TIF, Greenfields, and Sprawl, 60 Planning & Envir L at 4 (cited in note 39).
95. See Johnson and Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws at 38 (cited in note 20) (noting that thirty-three states require a finding of blight).
96. See also Council of Development Financing Agencies, 2008 TIF State-by-State Report (cited in note 12) (showing that sixteen states and the District of Columbia do not require a finding of blight).
97. See Gordon, Blighting the Way at 307, 315-16 (cited in note 32) (describing blight as "less an objective condition than it is a legal pretext").
98. 53 Pa Stat § 6930.2(a)(1) (1990). See also Mazur v Trinity Area School District, 961 A2d 96,106 (Pa 2008) (remarking that, under the statutory language, a property could meet the requirements for blight and still be considered "a prime location for shopping and entertainment").
99. Mo Rev Stat §99.805(1). See also JG St. Louis West, 41 SW3d at 517.
100. 65 ILCS 5/11-74.43. See also Castel Properties, 631 NE2d at 465.
101. 65 ILCS 5/11-74.43. See also Geisler v City of Wood River, 892 NE2d 543,547 (111 App 2008)
102. JG St. Louis West. 41 SW3d at 518.
103. Id.
104. Id at 519 (supporting the contention that the mall's platting and subdivision would be actual impediments to economic growth).
105. Gm/er,892NE2dat550.
106. Mazur, 961 A2d at 106-07.
107. WalserAuto Sales, Inc v City of Richfield, 635 NW2d 391.403 (Minn App 2001).
108. Henry County Board v Village of Orion, 663 NE2d 1076,1081 (111 App 1996).
109. Village of Burr Ridge, 793 NE2d at 863.
110. Meramec Valley R-III School District v City of Eureka, 281 SW3d 827,835-38 (Mo App 2009).
111. City of Parker v Slate, 992 So 2d 171,178 (Fla 2008).
112. Castel Properties, 631 NE2d at 467.
113. Man. Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax Increment Financing at 97 (cited in note 21).
114. John E. Anderson, Tax Increment Financing: Municipal Adoption and Growth, 43 Natl Tax J 155,160 (1990).
115. Dye and Merriman, The Effect of Tax Increment Financing on Land Use at 39-40 (cited in note 10).
116. Thomas Luce. Reclaiming the Intent: Tax Increment Finance in the Kansas City and St. Louis Metropolitan Areas *8-15 (Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy Discussion Paper, Apr 2003), online at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2003/04metropolitanpolicy- luce/luceti.pdf (visited Oct 25,2009).
117. Kelsay, Uneven Patchwork at 6-9 (cited in note 13).
118. Paul F. Byrne, Determinants of Property Value Growth for Tax Increment Financing Districts, 20 Econ Dev Q 317, 323 (2006). But see Man, Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax Increment Financing at 90 (cited in note 11).
119. Merriman, Does TIF Make It More Difficult to Manage Municipal Budgets? at * (cited in note 26), discussing Diane Gibson. Neighborhood Characteristics and the Targeting of Tax Increment Financing in Chicago, 54 J Urban Econ 309 (2003) (analyzing the census tract infor mation from Chicago and determining that TIF districts are more likely to benefit the "moderately disadvantaged" than the severely disadvantaged).
120. Paul F. Byrne, Strategic Interaction in the Adoption of Tax Increment Financing, 35 Regional Sci & Urban Econ 279,298 (2005).
121. Anderson and Wassmer, Bidding for Business at 67,153-54,167 (cited in note 44).
122. Kelsay, Uneven Patchwork at 19 (cited in note 13).
123. Enid Arvidson. Rod Hissong, and Richard L. Cole, Tax Increment Financing in Texas: Survey and Assessment, in Johnson and Man, eds, Tax Increment Financing and Economic Devel- opment 155,170 (cited in note 11).
124. Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, Chicago's TIF Encyclopedia: The First Compre hensive Report on the Stale of Tax Increment Financing in Chicago 16 (1999), online at http://www.ncbg.org/documents/tifreport.pdf (visited Oct 18.2009)
125. Johnson, The Use of Debt in Tax Increment Financing at 81 (cited in note 56).
126. Council of Development Finance Agencies and International Council of Shopping Cen ters. Best Practices Reference Guide at 9 (cited in note 1).
127. Id at 85 (noting that "[i]n some states, incremental assessed values have become larger than base values")
128. Joyce Y. Man, Effects of Tax Increment Financing on Economic Development, in Johnson and Man, eds. Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development at 102-05 (cited in note 11)
129. Byrne. 20 Econ Dev Q at 325 (cited in note 88) (displaying the results of a regression analysis done for Chicago-area TIF districts).
130. Quigley, A Tale of Two Cities at 30 (cited in note 42) (claiming that 40 percent of the growth in property value in Chicago's TIF districts would have occurred even without TIF).
131. Richard F. Dye and David F. Merriman, The Effects of Tax Increment Financing on Economic Development, 47 J Urban Econ 306, 319 (2000) (comparing pre- and post-adoption growth rates, and concluding that the implementation of a TIF plan has a "devastatingly negative impact on municipal growth").
132. Dye and Merriman, The Effect of Tax Increment Financing on Land Use at 57-59 (cited in note 10).
133. See also Dye and Merriman, 47 J Urban Econ at 322-24 (cited in note 101)
134. Joyce Y. Man and Mark S. Rosentraub, Tax Increment Financing: Municipal Adoption and Effects of Property Value Growth,26 Pub Fin Rev 523,541-42 (1998).
135. Byrne, 20 Econ Dev Q at 319 (cited in note 88)
136. See East-West Gateway Council of Governments, Use of Local Development Incentives in the St. Louis Region at 24-36 (cited in note 64)
137. Arvidson, Hissong, and Cole, Tax Increment Financing in Texas at 174 (cited in note 93) (explaining that TIF supported mall development in Grapevine, Texas, and remarking that Texas used "public money to support private investment that would have probably occurred anyway, although perhaps not within Grapevine city limits").
138. See Rachel Weber, Saurav Dev Bhatta, and David Merriman, Does Tax Increment Financing Raise Urban Industrial Property Values?, 40 Urban Stud 2001,2017-18 (2003).
139. Id at 2018.
140. A 2001 study found that only four states generally require state approval of local TIF plans. Johnson and Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws at 36 (cited in note 11). North Carolina, which did not authorize TIF until 2004, requires the approval of local projects by the state's Local Government Commission.
141. See Joseph Blocher and Jonathan Q. Morgan, Questions about Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina, Comm and Econ Dev Bull 3 (UNC School of Government, Aug 2008), online at http://eprints.law.duke.edU/1964/l/ Blocher5%C2%A0Community-&-Economic-Developmen t-Bulletin%C2%A01-15-(August- 2008)-.pdf (visited Oct 18. 2009).
142. State approval is required when the TIF plan uses state taxes in Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, and Vermont. Council of Development Finance Agencies, 2008 TIF State-by-State Report at 6, 16. 25, 31, 45 (cited in note 12)
143. See Johnson and Kriz, A Review of State. Tax Increment Financing Laws at 53 (cited in note 20)
144. East-West Gateway Council of Governments. Use of Local Development Incentives in the St. Louis Region at 20-22 (cited in note 64)
145. George Lefcoe, After Kelo. Curbing Opportunis tic TIF-Driven Economic Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests Empowering Property Owners and School Districts, 83 Tulane L Rev 46, 66-67 (2008) (remarking that enforcement of TIF requirements in most states is "random, sporadic, and ineffectual")
146. Weber, 38 Urban Aff Rev at 620 (cited in note 8).
147. Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, Chicago's TIF Encyclopedia at 68 (cited in note 94).
148. See Rosentraub, 32 State & Local Gov Rev at 183 (cited in note 44).
149. See Lefcoe, 83 Tulane L Rev at 88-89 (cited in note 109).
150. James R. Paetsch and Roger K. Dahlstrom, Tax Increment Financing: What It Is and How It Works in Bingham, Hill, and White, eds. Financing Economic Development 82, 96 (cited in note 21).
151. Council of Development Finance Agencies and International Council of Shopping Cen ters, Best Practices Reference Guide at 83 (cited in note 1).
152. Id at 84.
153. Board of Directors v All Taxpayers, 938 So 2d 11.14-15 (La 2006).
154. Chapman, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment at 184 (cited in note 9)
155. See Joyce Y. Man, Introduction, in Johnson and Man, eds, Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development at 4 (cited in note 11)
156. Paetsch and Dahlstrom. TIF: What It Is and How It Works at 92 (cited in note 114).
157. A handful of states limit TIF to commercial or industrial uses, and some mandate that a percentage of TIF funds be dedicated to affordable housing. See Johnson and Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws at 51 (cited in note 20).
158. See generally Jonathan Schwartz. Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S Cal L Rev 183 (1997)
159. See Helen F. Ladd, Introduction, in Ladd, ed. Local Government Tax and Land Use Policies in the United States 1,15 (cited in note 9) (noting that easy mobility among localities has a substantial effect upon budgetary and fiscal decisions).
160. Council of Development Finance Agencies and International Council of Shopping Centers, Best Practices Reference Guide at 4 (cited in note 1).
161. See Pippin, 37 Ga J Intl & Comp L at 596 (cited in note 37).
162. See, for example. Luce, Reclaiming the Intent at 7 (cited in note 86)
163. Kelsay, Uneven Patchwork at 29 (cited in note 13). See East-West Gateway Council of Governments, Use of Local Development Incentives in the St. Louis Region at *35 (cited in note 64).
164. See Good Jobs First. Straying from Good Intentions at 8-9 (cited in note 36)
165. Alyson Tomme. Note, Tax Increment Financing: Public Use or Private Abuse?, 90 Minn L Rev 213, 237-44 (2005).
166. Lefcoe. 83 Tulane L Rev at 80-83 (cited in note 109).
167. Only eleven of the forty-nine TIF states permit overlapping local governments to opt out of TIF. Weber, 38 Urban Aff Rev at 627 (cited in note 8).
168. Dye and Merriman, 47 J Urban Econ at 310 (cited in note 102).
169. Swenson and Eathington, Do Tax Increment Finance Districts in Iowa Spur Regional Economic and Demographic Growth? at 11 (cited in note 28)
170. See City of Parker v State. 992 So 2d 171,175-77 (Fla 2008).
171. See. for example, Meramec Valley R-III School District v City of Eureka, 281 SW3d 827, 834-35 (Mo App 2009)
172. Mazur v Trinity Area School District, 961 A2d 96, 99 (Pa 2008)
173. Board of Education, Pleasantville School District No 107 v Village of Burr Ridge, 793 NE2d 856, 859 (111 App 2003): Board of Education, Community High School District No 218 v Village of Robins, 765 NE2d 449, 449 (111 App 2001)
174. Sergeant Bluff-Luton School District v City of Sioux City, 562 NW2d 154,154 (Iowa 1997).
175. Weber, 38 Urban Aff Rev at 640 (cited in note 8).
176. Id.
177. See, for example. Lefcoe, 83 Tulane L Rev at 83-86 (cited in note 109). Requiring greater overlapping government participation in the TIF formation decision or consent to the diversion of their incremental revenues will not necessarily reduce TIF usage. Many local overlapping governments-perhaps agreeing with the municipalities that if the TIF succeeds the overlapping governments will benefit from the enhanced tax base too-are willing to commit all or most of their incremental revenues to TIF districts.
178. See also Arvidson, Hissong, and Cole, Tax Increment Financing in Texas at 165-68 (cited in note 93) (noting that consents were given to twenty-three TIF districts in Texas)
179. Council of Development Finance Agencies and International Council of Shopping Centers, Best Practices Reference Guide at 57 (cited in note 1) (describing voluntary participation of Cleveland Municipal School District in TIF project).
180. Jeff Chapman, Tax Increment Financing and Fiscal Stress: The California Genesis, in Johnson and Man, eds, Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development 113, 130 (cited in note 11) (discussing backfill in California and Indiana)
181. Robert G. Lehnen and Carlyn E. Johnson, The Impact of Tax Increment Financing on School Districts: An Indiana Case Study, in Johnson and Man, eds. Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development 137, 142 (cited in note 11) (discussing state reimbursement formulas in Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin)
182. Swenson and Eathington, Tax Increment Financing Districts in Iowa at *11 (cited in note 28)(explaining that, in Iowa, with state offsets for lost school revenues, much of the school district revenue loss caused by TIF is shifted to the state).
183. Weber. 38 Urban Aff Rev at 638 (cited in note 8) (noting that there is "little coordina tion between the state agencies responsible for education and economic development").
184. Byrne, 35 Regional Sci & Urban Econ at 280,297-98 (cited in note 90).
185. See Good Jobs First, Straying from Good Intentions at 1 (cited in note 36).
186. See LeRoy, TIF, Greenfields, and Sprawl. 60 Planning & Envir L at 6-7 (cited in note 39).
187. See, tor example. Lefcoe, 83 Tulane L Rev at 88-90 (cited in note 109).
188. See, for example, Michael A. Pagano and David Perry, Financing Infrastructure in the 21st Century City, 13 Pub Works Mgmt & Pol 22, 27 (2008).
189. Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, Chicago TIF Encyclopedia at 37 (cited in note 94).
190. Arvidson. Hissong, and Cole. Tax Increment Financing in Texas at 173-74 (cited in note 93).
191. Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, Chicago TIF Encyclopedia at 26 (cited in note 94).
192. Josh Reinert, Note, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is It Time for Blight and But for to Go?, 45 SLU L J 1019,1051 n 245 (2001).
193. Id at 1019,1021 & n 16.
194. Id at 1051 n 245.
195. John P. Blair and Rishi Kumar. Is Local Economic Development a Zero-Sum Game?, in Richard D. Bingham and Robert Mier, eds, Dilemmas of Urban Economic Development: Issues of Theory and Practice 1,15 (Sage 1997).
196. See note 54.
197. See. tor example. Kelsay, Uneven Patchwork at 26-28 (cited in note 13).
198. Gordon, 31 Fordham Urban L J at 334 (cited in note 32).
199. Catherine Michel, Note, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime: Tax Increment Financing in Indiana, 71 Ind L J 457,472-75 (1996).
200. See, tor example, East-West Gateway Council ot Governments, Use of Local
201. Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, Who Pays for the Only Game in Town at *30-34 (cited at note 4)
202. Quigley.A Tale of Two Cities at 41-45 (cited in note 42) (asserting that the "lack ot public information" about Chicago's TIF is "inexcusable," and suggesting the development of a website to provide information to the public).
203. See Quigley, A Tale of Two Cities at 34 (cited in note 42).
204. See id at 41-47.