A probabilistic relational model for security risk analysis

Computers and Security

Volumn 29, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 659-679

  Sommestad, Teodor ^a   Ekstedt, Mathias ^a   Johnson, Pontus ^a  

^a ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Architecture analysis; Architecture metamodel; Probabilistic relational model; Risk assessment; Security risk

Indexed keywords

ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS; ARCHITECTURE META-MODEL; PROBABILISTIC RELATIONAL MODEL; PROBABILISTIC RELATIONAL MODELS; SECURITY RISKS;

ABSTRACTING; ARCHITECTURE; INFORMATION SYSTEMS; RISK ANALYSIS; RISK MANAGEMENT; SAFETY FACTOR; UNIFIED MODELING LANGUAGE;

RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 77955417822     PISSN: 01674048     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2010.02.002     Document Type: Article

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