Structural separation versus vertical integration: Lessons for telecommunications from electricity reforms

Telecommunications Policy

Volumn 34, Issue 7, 2010, Pages 392-403

  Howell, Bronwyn ^a   Meade, Richard ^a   O'Connor, Seini ^a  

^a New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Electricity; Hold up risks; Investment; Market power; Structural separation; Telecommunications; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; HOLD UP; HOLD-UP RISKS; INVESTMENT MARKET; MARKET POWER; STRUCTURAL SEPARATION; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

COMMERCE; COMPETITION; ELECTRICITY; INVESTMENTS; RISK MANAGEMENT; SALES; TELECOMMUNICATION;

ELECTRIC GENERATORS;

EID: 77955416150     PISSN: 03085961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2010.05.003     Document Type: Article

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