Automating security analysis: Symbolic equivalence of constraint systems

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6173 LNAI, Issue , 2010, Pages 412-426

  Cheval, Vincent ^a   Comon Lundh, Hubert ^a   Delaune, Stéphanie ^a  

^a INRIA SACLAY   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION; CONSTRAINT SYSTEMS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; SECURITY ANALYSIS; SECURITY PROPERTIES; SYMBOLIC EQUIVALENCES; TRACE EQUIVALENCE;

ALGORITHMS; AUTOMATA THEORY; CRYPTOGRAPHY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 77955258016     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-14203-1_35     Document Type: Conference Paper

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