Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence

Theoretical Economics

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 241-274

  Virág, Gábor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Competing auctions; Convergence; Finite markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955238738     PISSN: 19336837     EISSN: 15557561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/TE538     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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