Facial challenges and separation of powers

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 85, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1557-1598

  Meier, Luke ^a  

^a DRAKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 77954962020     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (281)

1. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) ("The considerations we have discussed support our further determination that these facial attacks should not have been entertained in the first instance. In these circumstances the proper means to consider exceptions is by as-applied challenge.");
2. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 551-52 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (expressing doubts about the Court's use of an as-applied analysis of the constitutional challenge).
3. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994);
4. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000);
5. David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41 (2006);
6. Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2005).
7. See David L. Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges and the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 697 (2009) ("In sum, then, the Court in recent years has repeatedly reaffirmed its fidelity to the traditional model with its strong preference for as-applied challenges.");
8. Doug Kmiec, Facing Consensus: The Importance of the "Facial" vs. "As Applied " Distinction in the Roberts Court, CONVICTIONS: SLATE'S BLOG ON LEGAL ISSUES, Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.slate.com/blog/logs/ convictions/archive/ 2008/04/29/facing-consensus-the-important-of-the-facial- versus-as-applied-distimc roberts-court.aspx ("The 'facial' vs. 'as applied' distinction animates the minimalism of the Roberts Court.");
9. Ed Whelan, The Roberts Court and Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 18, 2008, http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NDY3ZmJm YWFlYWVMzMDEzMDM2NmY5MWY0NTc2NmZjYmE= ("Chief Justice Roberts's strong interest in reviving attention to the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges.").
10. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (considering challenge to an Indiana state law as violating the constitutional "right to vote");
11. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (considering challenge to a Washington state law as violating associational rights protected by the First Amendment);
12. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 141-43 (considering challenge to Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 as violating constitutional right of privacy).
13. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
14. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
15. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
16. Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 391 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting).
17. A case involving this type of challenge is on its way to the Court. In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Mukasey, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia determined that a facial rather than an as-applied approach was appropriate for a challenge to Congress's authority to pass the 2006 extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 235-36 (D.D.C. 2008), rev 'dsub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
18. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 878-80 (describing the various scholars who have noted the "confusion" in this area and the " disconnect" between the Supreme Court's black-letter rules and actual practice in this area).
19. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 239 (attempting to clarify when facial challenges are appropriate); Fallon, supra note 2, at 1321 (same).
20. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
21. Id. at 745.
22. See, e.g., Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (labeling the Salerno standards as "dicta"and inaccurate).
23. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 2, at 238 ("This article argues that the Salerno principle is wrong.").
24. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
25. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2006).
27. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513. Although Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion, framed the issue as involving Congress's power to enact legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a compelling argument can be made from Court precedent that the issue in Lane should have been the closely related question of Congress's power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
28. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Supreme Court held that Title I of the ADA was not a valid abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, id. at 374 n.9. The Court determined that the abrogation analysis must be different than the analysis to determine whether Congress validly enacted the statute pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; the abrogation analysis must exclude evidence of Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violations by nonstate government actors, while the "power" question would presumably allow such evidence. See id. at 368-69;
29. see also Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1032 n.7 (10th Cir. 2001) (identifying the abrogation-power dichotomy established in Garrett). In Lane, however, the Court appeared to move away from the abrogation-power dichotomy, framing the issue in terms of Congress's power to enact Title II and considering evidence of constitutional violations by local actors as well as state actors.
30. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 513, 527 n.16. The Court, however, was not completely explicit about its rejection of the dichotomy approach used in Garrett as it noted that judicial branches of local governments have traditionally been treated as state actors for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id at 527 n.16. Thus, for purposes of this Article, I will take the Supreme Court at its word and assume that the issue in Lane was actually Congress's power to enact Title II rather than the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
31. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513-14.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
33. Lane, 541 U.S. at 514.
34. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-73 (1996) (holding that Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity only through its Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
35. In his Lane dissent, Justice Scalia explained that he would not continue to apply the "flabby" congruence and proportionality test 541 U.S. at 557-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. 521 US. 507 (1997).
37. See id. at 530-32 (explaining the congruence and proportionality test).
38. Lane, 541 U.S. at 551-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
39. See Seth A. Horvath, Note, Disentangling the Eleventh Amendment and the Americans With Disabilities Act: Alternative Remedies for State-Initiated Disability Discrimination Under Title I and Title II, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 248 n.155 (listing circuit court decisions examining the constitutionality of Title II of the ADA).
40. Lane, 541 U.S. at 553-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 530-31 (majority opinion).
42. Id.
43. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
44. Id. at 5, 7.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 6-7, 15.
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id. at 18-20.
49. Id. at 23 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
50. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
51. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
52. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1988), invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
54. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02.
55. See id. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
56. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 72-73 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
57. Tennesse v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-34 (2004).
58. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22-25.
59. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
60. Id. at 374.
61. Id. at 372-74.
62. Lane, 541 U.S. at 530-31.
63. 546 U.S. 151(2006).
64. Id. at 159.
65. Id.
66. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-74.
67. There is no indication in the Georgia opinion as to why the Court's analysis could not apply with equal force to claims seeking money damages under Title I for alleged constitutional discrimination.
68. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
69. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
70. Reese, 92 U.S. at 216.
71. See id at 221-22.
72. Id. at. 217.
73. Id. at 215.
74. Id. at 219-20 (reasoning that the statute could leave an election official open to punishment for reasons not contemplated by the statute).
75. Id. at 221.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (2006).
77. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 19 (1960).
78. Id. at 20.
79. Id.. at 25.
80. See Edward J. Sullivan, Emperors and Clothes: The Genealogy and Operation of the Agins' Tests, 33 URB. LAW. 343, 358 (2001) (suggesting that the facial and as-applied "nametags" can be manipulated depending on how a court feels about the merits of a case).
81. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
82. Id at 77-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Of course, even under this view of when the Court should entertain a facial challenge to a statute, there is still the separate but related question over what standard the litigant must meet to mount a successful facial challenge. This question was the primary issue addressed by Justice Scalia in his Morales dissent. See id.
84. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 8 (2005) (arguing the CSA did not apply because the marijuana was grown for a private medical use).
85. See id. at 17-20 (reasoning that a purpose of the CSA is to regulate the trafficking of illicit drugs and measuring any production and use, even a purely "private" use, as a legitimate congressional pursuit).
86. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667) (arguing that Title II is unconstitutional under either a facial or as-applied approach).
87. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (No. 02-1667) ("[W]hether the Court views the statute in its - in overall operation, or as focused narrowly on the courthouse access context, either analysis leads to the same conclusion. Having said that, I would say that the prohibition of Title II is a single, unitary, very elegant one-sentence prohibition in section 12132 of Title 42. It doesn't purport to subdivide the statute - the statute's prohibitions into particular subject matter areas. And as the United States points out in its brief, this Court's prior congruence and proportionality cases in - in the abrogation context suggest that the Court looks usually at the overall operation of the statute.").
88. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 530-31.
89. Recitation of the Salerno standard would presumably have disposed of Tennessee's facial challenge. If Title II of the ADA could be constitutionally applied to the facts of the case before the Court, then, under Salerno, the facial challenge was without validity. The Court never engaged in this analysis, probably wanting to avoid another dispute about the appropriateness of the Salerno standard. However, if a litigant can choose which type of challenge to assert to a statute, and if, as Justice Scalia seemed to maintain in Morales, the Court was compelled to respond to the litigant's pleading and framing of the case, it should have also considered the facial challenge put forward by Tennessee.
90. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (rejecting a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 because of the many constitutional applications of the statute).
91. See David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 651-62 (2008) (discussing facial and as-applied challenges and the desire to preserve as much of a statute as possible from invalidation).
92. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 73 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using an as-applied analysis to conclude that the constitutional challenge was valid in the case before the Court).
93. See id. at 22-24 (majority opinion).
94. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 551-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (applying a facial analysis and concluding that Title II was unconstitutional).
95. 546 U.S. 154 (2006).
96. Id. at 156.
97. Id. at 159.
98. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
99. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 73 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using an as-applied analysis to conclude that the constitutional challenge was valid in the case before the Court).
100. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
101. Id. at 367.
102. See Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159.
103. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-20;
104. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
105. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
106. Id. at 304-05.
107. 156 U.S. 1(1895).
108. Id. at 17.
109. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2000) (holding that a contrary outcome "would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment").
110. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
111. See id. at 726-27.
112. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text
113. 346 F. Supp. 2d 874 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
114. See id. at 875 (holding that Title II was not a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity as applied to claim for accommodation on Texas bar exam).
115. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (explaining that under the overbreadth doctrine litigants "are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression").
116. See Luke Meier, A Broad Attack on Overbreadth, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 113, 135-37 (2005) (explaining the various applications and limitations of the overbreadth doctrine).
117. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
118. Id. at 169.
119. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
120. Id. at 372.
121. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
122. Id. at 405-06.
123. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
124. Id. at 46-48.
125. Dorf, supra note 2, at 294.
126. Fallon, supra note 2, at 1341.
127. Metzger, supra note 2, at 880.
128. Id. at 887-88 (quoting Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3) (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
129. Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
130. See id. at 1-5; see also Dorf, supra note 2, at 243-44 (identifying both his and Professor Fallon's agreement with Monaghan's premise).
131. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 243-44.
132. See, e.g., id. at 238 ("[B]ecause no one may be judged by an unconstitutional rule of law, a statute that has unconstitutional applications cannot be constitutionally applied to anyone, even to those whose conduct is not constitutionally privileged, unless the court can sever the unconstitutional applications of the statute from the constitutionally permitted ones."); Fallon, supra note 2, at 1331-33 (describing the process of severing invalid "subrules" of a statute); Monaghan, supra note 117, at 1-4 (articulating the view that no person may be judged by an unconstitutional rule of law).
133. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 294 (discussing courts avoiding constitutional questions by, inter alia, severing unconstitutional provisions of statutes); Fallon, supra note 2, at 1333-34 (describing severing unconstitutional provisions without crossing the vague line of judicial lawmaking); Metzger, supra note 2, at 931-32 (concluding there is no reason to abandon the presumption of severability regarding Section 5 statutes).
134. Metzger, supra note 2, at 889-90.
135. Franklin, supra note 2.
136. Id. at 64.
137. See id. at 66 (commenting that "the severability and facial versus as-applied review question stand on distinct grounds").
138. Id. at 44.
139. Id. at 65 (quoting Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 365, 385 (1998)).
140. See Monaghan, supra note 117, at 9-10 (explaining the barroom-dancing hypothetical).
141. I have intended, in my hypothetical, for "barefoot" and "with shoes on" to be mutually exclusive categories. The "hard case" of flip-flops has been ignored.
142. Dorf, supra note 2, at 249.
143. See id. at 249-51.
144. Id. at 230 (discussing the Marbury Court's implicit analysis of severability).
145. Metzger, supra note 2, at 887. Metzger continues this defense of the conventional wisdom later in her article: "The Court rarely discusses severability when it upholds a statute's constitutionality, and thus the practice... is usually implicit." Id. at 892.
146. Id. at 917 (stating the Lane Court "applied the presumption of severability to avoid considering whether other applications of Title II were also constitutional").
147. This is the as-applied analysis essentially advocated for by Justice Thomas in his Raich dissent. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 72-73 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
148. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004).
149. See id.
150. Id. at 530-31.
151. See id. at 530 n.18.
152. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995).
153. See generally id. at 551-68 (assuming that the statute's constitutionality will be determined on the face of the statute).
154. Metzger, supra note 2, at 887.
155. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157-58 (2006).
156. Metzger, supra note 2, at 887.
157. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) ("Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.").
158. See id.
159. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 595 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("We will not topple a statute merely because we can conceive of a few impermissible applications.");
160. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984) ("It is clear, however, that the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.").
161. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987).
162. See Franklin, supra note 2, at 90 ("Ultimately, a judicial concern with permissible legislative purposes provides the most plausible explanation of the facial character of the Court's recent Commerce Clause cases.").
163. Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
164. Id. at 1108.
165. See id. at 1109-14.
166. Id. at 1117.
167. See id. at 1109-14.
168. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see Adler & Dorf, supra note 150, at 1109 (discussing the distinction between application and existence conditions with regard to Marbury).
169. Id. at 1170.
170. See Monaghan, supra note 117, at 8.
171. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 150, at 1114-15 (stating that existence conditions determine what counts as nonconstitutíonal law).
172. Id. at 1136-45.
173. Id. at 1151.
174. See id. at 1151-52 (describing the Court's historical jurisprudence in treating enumerated powers as existence conditions).
175. See Franklin, supra note 2, at 68-69 (noting that the Court has favored a valid-rule facial approach to Commerce Clause cases since the Lopez decision).
176. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
177. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 150, at 1154-55.
178. See id. at 1155 ("The Justices all regarded the enumerated powers as setting forth existence conditions.").
179. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
180. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
181. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 73 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 551-52 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 5) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
183. Id. at 551.
184. Id. at 552.
185. TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE, AM. BAR ASS'N, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT (2006), http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba-final-signing-statements- recommendation-report-7-24-06.pdf [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
186. 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983).
187. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244, 66 Stat. 163, 214-18 (1952).
188. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 924-25.
189. Id. at 924.
190. Id. at 925.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 927.
193. See id. at 930-44.
194. Id. at 959.
195. Id. at 951.
196. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
197. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 1.
198. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956.
199. See id. at 944.
200. Id. at 945.
201. See id at 958.
202. Id. at 944.
203. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
204. See id. at 448.
205. Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C.§§ 691-92 (Supp.II 1994), invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
206. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436.
207. See id. at 436-37.
208. See id. at 439.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 440.
213. See ABA REPORT, supra note 172, at 9, 18.
214. Ryan McManus, Note, Sitting in Congress and Standing in Court: How Presidential Signing Statements Open the Door to Legislator Lawsuits, 48 B.C. L. REV. 739, 758-59 (2007).
215. See ABA REPORT, supra note 172, at 7.
216. Id. at 6.
217. Id. at 10.
218. Id. at 6.
219. Id. at 3.
220. Id. at 5.
221. Id.
222. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438, 448-49 (1998).
223. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (citation omitted).
224. See ABA REPORT, supra note 172, at 5 (stating that a President's decision to "disregard or decline to enforce ... part of a law he has signed" is "contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers").
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. U.S. CONST, art. III, §2.
228. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438, 445-46 (1998).
229. See id. at 446-47 (finding the effect of a "cancellation" would result in an alteration of the legislation based on the President's own policy).
230. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
231. See Charlie Savage, Introduction: The Last Word? The Constitutional Implications of Presidential Signing Statements, 16 WM. &MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6-10 (2007) (summarizing recent academic literature on presidential signing statements, which tends to focus on whether the President has power to use a signing statement to avoid enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional law, but seemingly assuming that a signing statement used to indicate non-enforcement based solely on policy grounds would be impermissible).
232. Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 81 (2007). I borrow this phrase from Saikrishna Prakash.
233. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant, Presidential Signing Statements and Congressional Oversight, 16 WM. &MARY BILL RTS. J. 169, 181 (2007) ("The ABA Task Force correctly characterizes recent use of presidential signing statements as a threat to the rule of law.").
234. See id. at 85-86.
235. See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President (Nov. 3, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm.
236. See ABA REPORT, supra note 172, at app.
237. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (holding the Line Item Veto Act subverts the constitutional process);
238. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957 (1983) (determining the Immigration and Nationality Act would expand the limited role of Congress).
239. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447.
240. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
241. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
242. Id. at 216-17.
243. Id. at 215.
244. Id. at 218.
245. U.S. CONST, amend. XV, § 1.
246. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 218.
247. See id. at 219-21.
248. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
249. See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 432-33 (1999) (discussing Reese as part of the Supreme Court's attack on "democratic institutions" in the nineteenth century).
250. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 875-76.
251. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 551 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
252. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 59 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
253. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436-37 (1998) (describing the Line Item Veto Act).
254. Metzger, supra note 2, at 885.
255. Id.
256. See Adler & Dorf, supra note 150, at 1157 (stating, while discussing subject-matter limitations on Congressional power, that the Court rarely attempts to distinguish between unconstitutional and constitutional applications of a statute).
257. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 249 (explaining the severability doctrine).
258. 156 U.S. 1(1895).
259. See id. at 13.
260. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006).
261. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
262. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 62 (2000).
263. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
264. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
265. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000).
266. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 930 (discussing refusal to sever potentially unconstitutional applications of a statute and resort to invalidation in whole); but cf. Adler & Dorf, supra note 150, at 1156-57 (discussing the limited practice of application severability).
267. The few cases that would need to be overruled include Raines, E. C. Knight Co., Lane, and Georgia.
268. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (reasoning that the ADA can apply if it is found to be "appropriate... legislation").
269. Metzger, supra note 2, at 887 (thanking Dorf for this point).
270. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
271. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 551-52 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 538.
273. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006).
274. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34.
275. See Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159.
276. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (describing how legislative intent governs the textual severance analysis).
277. See, e.g., Clifton v. Ga. Merit Sys., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (finding that Title II was not a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in a case outside the "narrowly crafted" contours of the Lane opinion).
278. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 886 n.55.
279. See generally Adler & Dorf, supra note 150.
280. See id. at 1162 (suggesting that rights typically function as application conditions).
281. See id.