Democracy and Proportionality

Journal of Political Philosophy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 137-155

  Brighouse, Harry ^a   Fleurbaey, Marc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DESCARTES   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954803523     PISSN: 09638016     EISSN: 14679760     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00316.x     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Democratic elections are those which are based on universal, equal, free, and secret suffrage'; Hans Kelsen, 'Foundations of democracy', Ethics, 66 (1955), 1-101 at p. 3. 'Equal votes' is the first of the five democratic criteria in Robert A. Dahl, 'Procedural democracy', Philosophy, Politics, and Society, 5th series, ed. P. Laslett and J. Fishkin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979).
2. See, e.g., Philippe van Parijs, 'La justice et la démocratie sont-elles incompatibles?' Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, 31 (1993), 133-49; Keith Dowding, Robert Goodin, and Carole Pateman, eds, Justice and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
3. The principle of inclusion is largely advocated by democratic theorists. 'Everyone affected by the operation of a particular domain of civil society should be presumed to have a say in its governance', according to Ian Shapiro, Democracy's Place (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 232; see also his Democratic Justice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999) and The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Inclusion is the fifth criterion of democracy in Robert A. Dahl, 'Procedural democracy'. Robert Goodin, 'Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35 (2007), 40-68, also endorses inclusion, even with the alleged implication that the demos should be universal. Close to our approach is Gustaf Arrhenius, 'The boundary problem in democratic theory', Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations I, ed. F. Tersman (Stockholm: Filosofiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet, 2005). A critique of inclusion can be found in Carl Cohen, 'Have I a right to a voice in decisions that affect my life?' Noûs, 5 (1971), 63-79. Most of his argument, however, is against equality of power among all concerned rather than against giving some power to each of them.
4. The standard principle of subsidiarity is more complex, as it also involves a comparative evaluation of the ability of different decision bodies to cope with issues, and the idea that the most able should take over whenever possible. See Stefan Gosepath, 'The principle of subsidiarity', Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights, and Social Institutions, ed. A. Føllesdal and T. Pogge (Dordrecht: Kluwer and Berlin: Springer, forthcoming).
5. The two principles of inclusion and subsidiarity are jointly defended in G. Arrhenius, 'The boundary problem in democratic theory'.
6. This issue, highlighted by de Tocqueville, is examined in Hans Kelsen, 'Foundations of democracy'; R. A. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), ch. 1; Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987), vol. 1. In 'Democracy and social justice', British Journal of Political Science, 8 (1978), 1-19, David Miller analyzes the converse fact that democracy involves more egalitarian requirements than in the 'classical liberal' conception of social justice; this tension fosters the development of new, liberal-egalitarian, theories of justice.
7. William A. Galston, 'Democracy and value pluralism', Democracy, ed. E. Frankel Paul, F. D. Miller and J. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) quotes not only liberty but also truth as a value which overrides democracy. By this he means that 'the political sphere has no rightful authority over the internal processes that guide the quest for truth' (p. 260). He is obviously right, but notice that the proportionality principle actually vindicates the individual freedom of thought that underlies the method of scientific inquiry. In our opinion, letting the majority choose what any particular individual should believe implies a violation of democracy properly construed.
8. The Rule of the Many (Boulder CO: Westview, 1995).
9. There is a very interesting embarrassed discussion of the tension between autonomy and equal distribution of power in William N. Nelson, On Justifying Democracy (London: Routledge, 1980), p. 47: 'No doubt something like this - control over one's life, or 'self-government' - is one of the main aims behind the principle of equal participation. Consider this question: would people have more control over their lives if the general right of equal participation were instituted, or are they more in control in the present system in which they are able to gain complete control over some decisions that particularly concern them? The answer is surely not obvious.' For a similarly convoluted discussion of the relation between democracy and autonomy, see Carol C. Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 31
10. William Riker, in Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982), relies on such paradoxes to argue that constitutional constraints are necessary to prevent democratic procedures from going astray.
11. Syntheses on such paradoxes are in: Hanna Nurmi, Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them (Berlin: Springer, 1999); and Donald G. Saari, Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
12. Further explorations around this result can be found in Marc Fleurbaey, 'Weighted majority and democratic theory', mimeo. The link between majority rule and social welfare is usually examined with respect to the simple majority rule. Jonathan Riley, 'Utilitarian ethics and democratic government', Ethics, 100 (1990), 335-48, for instance, proposes an informal theorem according to which when interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be made, the simple majority rule is the best rendering of the utilitarian criterion. Sven Danielsson, 'Two papers on rationality and group preferences', Filosofiska Studier, 21 (Uppsala: Philosophy Department, University of Uppsala, 1974) proves that the (possibly intransitive) ranking produced by the simple majority rule maximizes the sum of utilities, when individual utility is defined as the proportion of pairs of options over which the individual's preferences agree with the social ranking.
13. The issue of giving different weights to representatives as a function of the utilities of their constituents is studied in Salvador Barberà and Matthew Jackson, 'On the weights of nations: assigning voting power to heterogeneous voters', Journal of Political Economy, 114 (2006), 317-39 and Claus Beisbart and Luc Bovens, 'Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives', Social Choice and Welfare, 29 (2007), 581-608 - where one finds references to related papers of these authors who have pioneered this approach.
14. An excellent synthesis on voting power is found in Dan Felsenthal and Moshe Machover, The Measurement of Voting Power (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998).
15. This issue is discussed by G. Arrhenius in 'Democracy and the measurement of influence', mimeo (2007).
16. This statement is true for simple voting games (in the two-voter case, a simple voting game is defined by the fact that each voter votes for one option and unanimity is respected). Other kinds of voting rules may allow for additional distributions of power.
17. Observe that once the weights are determined, the weighted majority rule is no more manipulable than the simple majority rule. It is a dominant strategy for voters to vote sincerely.
18. Obviously, in the different context of pure epistemic democracy (all voters having common interests but differential information or competence), it may be acceptable to grant more power to the more informed. In this context there are results similar to our theorem (see Ruth C. Ben Yashar and Shmuel I. Nitzan, 'The optimal decision rule for fixed-size committees in dichotomous choice situations: The general result', International Economic Review, 38 (1997), 175-186). But as soon as interests diverge, we tend to think that the legitimate extra influence of better informed voters should operate in the deliberation process rather than through unequal power in the decision itself.
19. Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many, ch. 4, has argued that all options should be given equal voice in the deliberation process, in a political democracy. This would in particular mitigate some illegitimate influences, for instance the association effect. This principle of equal voice is essentially independent from the proportionality principle. It could be combined with essentially any democratic sharing rule for power. Its purpose is simply to make the deliberation process as efficient as possible in order to help people shape their own preferences and compare the various options.
20. In the case of association, however, it is hard to imagine how this could be totally prevented without harming some basic interests of freedom of association. It appears nonetheless possible to counteract the other illegitimate sources of influence.
21. On the representation of future generations, see Gregory Kavka and Virginia Warren, 'Political representation for future generations', Environmental Philosophy, ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983) and Torbjörn Tännsjö, 'Future generations and the all affected principle', Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations I.
22. In this we follow David Estlund, 'Making truth safe for democracy', The Idea of Democracy, ed. D. Copp, J. Hampton, and J. E. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and 'Beyond fairness and deliberation: The epistemic dimension of democratic authority', Deliberative Democracy, ed. J. Bohman and W. Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
23. We concur in this case with Richard Arneson's view that 'rights to power over others are rights to serve as steward for interests of the affected parties' ('Defending the purely instrumental account of democratic legitimacy', The Journal of Political Philosophy, 11 (2003), 122-132, at p. 126).
24. For a similar viewpoint, see Willaim Nelson, On Justifying Democracy, and Charles R. Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). The opposite view is defended in G. Arrhenius, 'The boundary problem in democratic theory'.
25. The case of adaptive preferences is particularly difficult. When women expressly support decisions that confirm their dominated situation, what is the proper democratic attitude? See in particular: Jon Elster, Ulysses and The Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Cass Sunstein, The Partial Consitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
26. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
27. Richard Arneson, 'Democracy in national and workplace settings', The Idea of Democracy.
28. Starting from John Stuart Mill at least, there is a long tradition of advocacy for worker democracy. Very useful syntheses can be found in Drew Christie, 'Recent calls for economic democracy', Ethics, 95 (1984), 112-28, and Gregory K. Dow, Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also C. C. Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights.
29. In the case of the family, authoritarianism is not just a matter of consensual activities among adults, since children suffer directly from externalities there. Additionally, although it is less direct, what happens within private associations imposes externalities of this kind on relatives. Those who suffer from the stress of subordination generally impose a non-negligible cost on their relatives. Libertarians normally recognize externalities as a problem. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), ch. 2, for valuable comments on the coercive character of negative externalities.