Rational partisan theory, uncertainty, and spatial voting: Evidence for the bank of England's MPC

Economics and Politics

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 151-179

  Bhattacharjee, Arnab ^a   Holly, Sean ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; DECISION MAKING; INFLATION; INTEREST RATE; LABOR MARKET; MACROECONOMICS; MONETARY POLICY; POLICY MAKING; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

ENGLAND; UNITED KINGDOM;

EID: 77954641486     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00361.x     Document Type: Article

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