Preventing bank insolvencies in the financial crisis: The German financial market stabilisation acts

European Business Organization Law Review

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 515-554

  Hopt, Klaus J ^a   Kumpan, Christoph ^a   Steffek, Felix ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE   (Germany)

Author keywords

bank rescue; constitution; expropriation; financial crisis; Financial Market Stabilisation Act; insolvency; Supplementary Financial Market Stabilisation Act; takeover

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954465347     PISSN: 15667529     EISSN: 17416205     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1566752909005151     Document Type: Article

References (311)

1. Gesetz zur Umsetzung eines Maßnahmenpakets zur Stabilisierung des Finanzmarktes [Act for the Implementation of Measures to Stabilise the Financial Market] (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz [Financial Market Stabilisation Act] - FMStG) of 17 October 2008, BGBl. I p. 1982.
2. Gesetz zur weiteren Stabilisierung des Finanzmarktes [Act for Supplementary Stabilisation of the Financial Market] (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungsgesetz [Supplementary Financial Market Stabilisation Act] - FMStErgG) of 7.4.2009, BGBl. I p. 725.
3. See also Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Finanzmarktstabilisierung [Act for the Continuing Development of the Stabilisation of the Financial Market] of 17 July 2009, BGBl. I p. 1980;
4. for an introduction to this Act, see B. Wolfers and M. Rau, 'Finanzmarktstabilisierung, 3. Akt: "Bad Banks" zur Entlastung der Bilanzen', 33 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) (2009) p. 2401 et seqq.
5. Placaet, 'Tegens het verkoopen ende transporteren der Actien inde Oost-Indische Compagnie' of 27 February 1610, Groot Placaet-Boeck, Volume I ('s-Gravenhage 1658), col. 553.
6. An Act for better securing certain Powers and Privileges intended to be granted by his Majesty by two Charters for Assurance of Ships and Merchandizes at Sea, and for lending Money upon Bottomry; and for restraining several extravagant and unwarrantable Practices therein mentioned, of 11 June 1720, 6 Geo. I., c. 18.
7. Especially the Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten über Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht und über eine Steueramnestie [Order of the President of the German Reich on Stock Corporation Law, Banking Supervision and a Tax Amnesty] of 19.9.1931, RGBl. I p. 493.
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
9. An Act to Make Provision about Banking (Banking Act 2009), 2009 c. 1, Royal Assent: 12 February 2009.
10. For an overview of the history of financial market regulation, see A.M. Fleckner and K.J. Hopt, 'Entwicklung des Börsenrechts', in Handelskammer Hamburg, ed., Die Hamburger Börse 1558-2008 (Hamburg, Murmann 2008), at p. 249 et seqq.
11. Translation of Art. 6(3) of the Directive of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority for the implementation and quality assurance of the continuous monitoring of credit and financial service providers by the German Federal Bank (Supervisory Directive) [der Richtlinie der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht zur Durchführung und Qualitätssicherung der laufenden Überwachung der Kredit-und Finanzdienstleistungsinstitute durch die Deutsche Bundesbank [AufsichtsRL]) as amended and promulgated on 21 February 2008, available at: http://www.bafin.de/cln-043/nn-722756/SharedDocs/ Aufsichtsrecht/DE/Richtlinien/rl-080221-aufsichtsrichtlinie.html (accessed on 18 November 2009).
12. BaFin, Jahresbericht 2007 (Frankfurt, 2008), at p. 39 (number of financial institutions) and p. 128 (systemic importance).
13. The question of whether the state should also intervene to rescue other corporations raises difficult regulatory and constitutional questions as well as issues related to European law that cannot be dealt with in detail in this article; for this set of problems, see J. Köndgen, 'Das FMStErgG aus der Sicht von Regulierungstheorie, Rechtsvergleichung, Europa-und Insolvenzrecht' Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft (ZBB) (2009) p. 144, at p. 144 et seqq.
14. Cf., B.M. Kübler, 'Too Big to Fail? Der lange Weg zur Bankinsolvenz', 62 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditwesen (ZKredW) (2009) p. 228 et. seqq.
15. For an overview of the proceeding regarding the takeover of Hypo Real Estate, see infra 3.5.
16. The procedural records are available at: http://www.lehmanbrothersestate. com/ (accessed on 18 November 2009);
17. Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code is available at: http://uscode. house.gov/download/title-11.shtml (accessed on 18 November 2009).
18. The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Chairman: J. de Larosière), Report of 25 February 2009, n. 36, at p. 12, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/ finances/docs/de-larosiere-report-en.pdf (accessed on 18 November 2009).
19. For an overview, see J. Nerlich, in J. Nerlich and G. Kreplin, eds., Sanierung und Insolvenz (München, Beck 2006) § 21 IV, at p. 520 et seqq.;
20. regarding the relevance of Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (OJ 2001 L 125, 5 May 2001, at p. 15);
21. on the restructuring of banks in Germany, see L. Westpfahl, U. Goetker and J. Wilkens, Grenzüberschreitende Insolvenzen (Köln, RWS 2008), at p. 211 et seqq.;
22. furthermore, E. Braun, 'Germany', in G. Moss and B. Wessels, eds., EU Banking and Insurance Insolvency (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006), at p. 229 et seqq.
23. The press release of Barclays Bank PLC dates from 17 September 2008, available at: http://www.newsroom.barclays.com/content/Detail.aspx?ReleaseID= 1435&NewsAreaID=2 (last accessed 18 November 2009).
24. Nomura Holdings Inc. announced the acquisition on 22 September 2008, available at: http://www.nomuraholdings.com/news/nr/holdings/20080922/20080922. html (accessed on 18 November 2009).
25. On problems of the current regulation of the insolvency plan procedure according to ss. 217 et seqq. Insolvenzordnung [German Insolvency Act], see L. Westpfahl and R.K. Janjuah, 'Zur Modernisierung des deutschen Sanierungsrechts', supplement to 3 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) (2008), at p. 12 et seqq.;
26. A. Jaffé and M. Friedrich, 'Verbesserung der Wettbewerbsfä higkeit des Insolvenzstandorts Deutschland', 29 ZIP (2008) p. 1849, at p. 1853 et seqq.;
27. H. Eidenmüller and A. Engert, 'Reformperspektiven einer Umwandlung von Fremdin Eigenkapital (Debt-Equity Swap) im Insolvenzplanverfahren', 30 ZIP (2009), at p. 541;
28. A. Amend, 'Das Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungsgesetz oder der Bedeutungsverlust des Insolvenzrechts', 30 ZIP (2009) p. 589, at p. 595 et seqq.;
29. J. Ekkenga, 'Sachkapitalerhöhung gegen Schuldbefreiung', 38 Zeitschrift für Unternehmens-und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) (2009), at p. 581;
30. for a case study (drugstore chain 'Ihr Platz') see L. Westpfahl and J. Wilkens, 'Comment: A German Chapter 11', 25 International Financial Law Review (2006) p. 22; in the latter case, eight months passed between the filing for bankruptcy (30 May 2005) and the termination of the insolvency proceedings (31 January 2006), a period which is too long for systemically important banks for the reasons mentioned above.
31. H. Huisman, in H.-P. Kirchhof, H.-J. Lwowski and R. Stürner, eds., Münchener Kommentar zu Insolvenzordnung, 2nd edn. (Munich, Beck 2008) USA, at n. 3;
32. particularly in the light of the Lehman Brothers proceeding, S. Madaus, 'Das Insolvenzverfahren der Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. - ein in jeder Hinsicht besonderes Reorganisationsverfahren', 11 Neue Zeitschrift für Insolvenz und Sanierung (NZI) (2008), at p. 715;
33. the empirical study of E. Warren and J.L. Westbrook, 'The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics', 107 Michigan Law Review (2009) p. 603 disproves common criticism of the Chapter 11 proceeding by documenting relatively short durations of proceedings and appealing success rates.
34. On this, see R.M. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 3rd edn. (London, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2005), at p. 327 et seqq. and p. 330 et seqq. (for England); Huisman, supra n. 21, USA, at n. 3 and n. 38 (for Germany).
35. For an overview of regulatory rescue measures under current law, see A. Ruzik, 'Bankenkrisen und-insolvenzen - Ein besonderes Phänomen', 4 Zeitschrift für Bank-und Kapitalmarktrecht (BKR) (2009) p. 133, at p. 136 et seqq.
36. Cf., Amend, supra n. 20, at p. 593 et seqq.
37. See especially 'Events of Default' and 'Termination Events' in the common 1992 ISDA Master Agreement (Multicurrency-Cross Border) of the International Swap Dealers Association (New York), reprinted by G. Reiner in R.A. Schütze and L. Weipert, eds., Münchener Vertragshandbuch, Volume 4, Wirtschaftsrecht III, 6th edn. (Munich, Beck 2007) VI.7, at p. 709 et seqq. (clause 5; see comment 14 at p. 763 et seqq. for the interpretation of the clause);
38. furthermore, Amend, supra n. 20, at p. 596 et seqq.;
39. Köndgen, supra n. 12, at p. 148 et seqq.; 'German Insolvency Plan Backfires', News Analysis, International Financial Law Review (September 2009) p. 8.
40. The filing for Chapter 11 by Lehman Brothers led to the termination of about 733,000 of a total of about 930,000 derivative contracts; see K. Ayotte and D.A. Skeel, Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, Working Paper, July 2009 (2009), at p. 31, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1362639 (accessed on 18 November 2009);
41. on this issue and possible solutions, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group (September 2009) p. 39 et seqq, available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs162.htm (accessed on 18 November 2009).
42. Reiner, supra n. 25, VI.7, at p. 766.
43. Despite its revision in 2002, the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement still seems to be most commonly used internationally; on the largely similar clauses of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement, cf., P. Clouth and C. Vollmuth, in K.J. Hopt, Vertrags-und Formularbuch zum Handels-, Gesellschafts-und Bankrecht (Munich, Beck 2007) IV.S.13.2, at p. 1402 et seqq.;
44. generally on the relevance of the financial crisis for ISDA Master Agreement contracts, U. Jahn, 'Die Finanzkrise und ihre rechtlichen Auswirkungen auf Rahmenverträge über OTCDerivategeschäfte', 1 BKR (2009) p. 25 et seqq.
45. S. 5(a)(vii)(3) 1992 ISDA Master Agreement, supra n. 25.
46. S. 5(a)(vii)(6) 1992 ISDA Master Agreement, supra n. 25.
47. S. 5(a)(vii)(8) 1992 ISDA Master Agreement, supra n. 25.
48. Gesetz zur Beschleunigung und Vereinfachung des Erwerbs von Anteilen an sowie Risikopositionen von Unternehmen des Finanzsektors durch den Fonds 'Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfonds - FMS' [Act for the Acceleration and Simplification of the Acquisition of Shares or Risk Positions of Companies of the Financial Sector by the Fund 'Financial Market Stabilisation Fund - FMS'] (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsbeschleunigungsgesetz [Financial Market Stabilisation Acceleration Act] - FMStBG) of 17.10.2008, BGBl. I p. 1986, amended by Art. 2 FMStErgG (n. 2), BGBl. I p. 725, at p. 726, and Art. 3 Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Finanzmarktstabilisierung [Act for the Continuing Development of the Stabilisation of the Financial Market] of 17.7.2009, BGBl. I p. 1980; the Financial Market Stabilisation Acceleration Act is part of the Financial Market Stabilisation Act of 2008.
49. In detail, see Reiner, supra n. 25, VI.7 s. 13, at p. 722, and comments 30 et seqq., p. 792 et seqq.; Amend, supra n. 20, at p. 597.
50. For first contributions see D. Mayes, 'Some Rules for Cross-Border Banks in Europe', 2 European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) (2009) p. 213 et seqq.;
51. E. Hüpkes, '"Form Follows Function" - A New Architecture for Regulating and Resolving Global Financial Institutions', 10 EBOR p. 369 et seqq.; Köndgen, supra n. 12, at p. 148 et seqq.;
52. and U. Noack, 'Das Aktienrecht der Krise - das Aktienrecht in der Krise?', 54 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) (2009) p. 227, at p. 228;
53. for the approach of the UK Banking Act 2009, see M. Bake, S. Walsh and K. Hawken, 'The Banking Act: The New "Special Resolution Regime" for Dealing with Failing Banks and Its Legal Consequences', 126 The Banking Law Journal (2009) p. 343, at p. 344 et seqq.;
54. A. McKnight, 'The Banking Act 2009', 3 Law and Financial Markets Review (2009) p. 325 et seqq.;
55. for further reforms in the UK, see J. Marshall and B. Penn, 'Dealing with Investment Bank Failure - Potential UK Reforms', Corporate Rescue and Insolvency (2009) p. 147 et seqq.
56. For an overview, see Handelsblatt of 1 April 2009, at p. 19, and the Press Release of the German Federal Ministry of Justice of 26 August 2009; according to this, the Federal Ministry of Justice considers a private rescue model along the lines of the insolvency plan, while the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology has been planning an administrative rescue proceeding. A first draft of a new act on the reorganisation of systemically important banks has been published by the Federal Ministry of Justice: http://www.bmj.bund.de/ files/-/3891/DiskE %20KredReorgG.pdf (accessed on 18 November 2009).
57. Even Amend, supra n. 20, at p. 596, as an insolvency administrator agrees that in addition to the considerable need for a reform of the insolvency plan procedure (p. 595), this procedure has to be coordinated long before the occurrence of the imminent inability to pay debts or overindebtness respectively; the regulatory background of the FMStErgG, however, applies to situations in which these preconditions (in view of the risk of failure of negotiations) are not given.
58. On the complications of the rescue of the IKB Deutsche Industriekreditbank AG caused by actions for annulment by minority shareholders, see U. Goll and F. Schwörer, 'Beschlussmängelrecht: Reförmchen oder Reform?', 41 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik mit Rechtspolitischer Umschau (ZRP) (2008), at p. 245.
59. On the duties of loyalty and their development in jurisprudence, see especially BGHZ 103, 184 (Linotype) and BGHZ 129, 136 (Girmes);
60. for literature on this, see A. Fillmann, Treuepflichten der Aktionäre (Frankfurt a.M., Lang 1991);
61. S. Grundmann, Commentary on s. 136 AktG, in H. Wiedemann and K.J. Hopt, eds., Großkommentar Aktiengesetz, 4th edn. (Berlin, de Gruyter 2006) at n. 47 et seqq.;
62. M. Weber, Vormitgliedschaftliche Treubindungen (Munich, Beck 1999), esp. at p. 53 et seqq.;
63. M. Dreher, 'Treuepflichten zwischen Aktionären und Verhaltenspflichten bei der Stimmrechtsbündelung', 157 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels-und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) (1993), at p. 150 et seqq.;
64. H. Henze, 'Treupflichten der Gesellschafter im Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht', 162 ZHR (1998), at p. 186 et seqq.;
65. C. Kumpan and M. Mittermeier, 'Risikoentleerte Stimmrechte - Auswirkungen von Wertpapierdarlehen im Gesellschaftsrecht', 30 ZIP (2009) p. 404, at p. 410 et seqq.;
66. M. Lutter, 'Treupflichten und ihre Anwendungsprobleme', 162 ZHR (1998), at p. 164 et seqq.;
67. K. Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, 4th edn. (Cologne, Heymann 2002), at p. 587 et seqq.;
68. H. Wiedemann, 'Treuebindungen und Sachlichkeitsgebot', 63 Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM) (2009), at p. 1 et seqq.
69. Fundamentally BGHZ 129, 136 (Girmes);
70. on this, see U. Hüffer, Commentary on s. 179 AktG, in U. Hüffer, ed., Aktiengesetz, 8th edn. (Munich, Beck 2008), at n. 30 et seqq.;
71. C.H. Seibt, Commentary on s. 179 AktG, in K. Schmidt and M. Lutter, eds., Aktiengesetz, 8th edn. (Cologne, Otto Schmidt 2008), at n. 45.
72. On the procedural situation upon violation of the duty to cooperate, see Hüffer, supra n. 39, at n. 31.
73. Gesetz zur Errichtung eines Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfonds [Act for the Establishment of a Financial Market Stabilisation Fund] (Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz [Financial Market Stabilisation Fund Act] - FMStFG) of 17.10.2008, BGBl. I p. 1982, amended by Art. 1 FMStErgG (n. 2), BGBl. I p. 725, and Art. 1 Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Finanzmarktstabilisierung [Act for the Continuing Development of the Stabilisation of the Financial Market] of 17.7.2009, BGBl. I p. 1980;
74. the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund Act is part of the Financial Market Stabilisation Act of 2008; on the preconditions and the realisation of recapitalisation measures, see S. Mock, Commentary on s. 7 FMStFG, in F. Becker and S. Mock, FMStG (Cologne, Heymann 2009), at n. 22 et seqq.
75. For an empirical analysis of the potential to obstruct through actions for annulment, see T. Baums, A. Keinath and D. Gajek, 'Fortschritte bei Klagen gegen Hauptversammlungsbeschlüsse? Eine empirische Studie', 28 ZIP (2007), at p. 1629 et seqq.
76. Regarding the decrease to 90 per cent by the FMStErgG, see infra 3.3.3.
77. See s. 39a Wertpapiererwerbs-und Übernahmegesetz (WpÜG) [Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act].
78. See esp. European Commission, State Aid Scheme No. N 512/2008 - Germany (Rescue package for banks in Germany), K(2008) 6422, 27 October 2008 p. 3, available at: http://www. soffin.de/downloads/eu-schreiben.pdf (accessed on 18 November 2009).
79. In the context of the financial crisis, see also European Commission, Commission Communication, 'The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis', OJ 2008 C 270 of 25 October 2008, p. 8;
80. European Commission, Commission Communication, 'The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition', OJ 2009 C 10 of 15 January 2009, p. 2;
81. European Commission, Commission Communication, 'Temporary Community framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis', OJ 2009 C 16 of 22 January 2009, p. 1;
82. in the German literature, see, e.g., J. Horn, 'Einfluss der EU-Vorgaben bei Anwendung des Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetzes', 64 Betriebs-Berater (2009) p. 450;
83. in the Austrian literature, see H. Wollmann, 'Staatliche Hilfsmaßnahmen in der Finanzkrise - Beihilfenrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen', 20 ECOLEX (2009) p. 109;
84. in the English literature, see C. Vajda, 'The Banking Crisis and the EC State Aid Rules', 24 Butterworths Journal of International Banking & Financial Law (2009) p. 67;
85. E. Gibson-Bolton and M. Reiss
86. As the capital increase is a company law measure, the subsequent squeeze-out would have to adhere to the company law squeeze-out rules in ss. 327a et seqq. AktG.
87. On the necessity of justification, see especially the German Federal Supreme Court's decisions in BGHZ 71, 40, at p. 46;
88. BGHZ 120, 141, at p. 145 et seqq.;
89. BGHZ 125, 239, at p. 241;
90. BGHZ 136, 133, at p. 135;
91. BGHZ 144, 290, at p. 292;
92. U. Hüffer, Commentary on s. 186 AktG, in Hüffer, ed., supra n. 39, at n. 25 et seqq.;
93. H. Wiedemann, Commentary on s. 186 AktG, in Wiedemann and Hopt, eds., supra n. 50, at n. 134 et seqq.;
94. K.-N. Pfeifer, Commentary on s. 186 AktG, in Kropff and Semler, eds., infra n. 50 at n. 71;
95. M. Lutter, Commentary on s. 186 AktG, in W. Zöllner and U. Noack, eds., Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 2nd edn. (Cologne, Heymanns 1995), at n. 59 et seqq.;
96. also M. Schockenhoff, Gesellschaftsinteresse und Gleichbehandlung beim Bezugsrechtsausschluss (Cologne, Heymann 1988), at p. 12 et seqq.
97. District Court (Landgericht) of Heidelberg, 9 ZIP (1988) p. 1257, at p. 1258;
98. Wiedemann, supra n. 47, at n. 142;
99. Lutter, supra n. 47, at n. 70.
100. See now s. 7(3) sent. 4 FMStBG.
101. Due to the special situation of saving banks, these criteria can dispel concerns over the equal treatment of shareholders. On the latter, see, e.g., Wiedemann supra n. 47, at n. 143;
102. M. Schockenhoff, 'Der rechtmäßige Bezugsrechtsausschluss', 39 Die Aktiengesellschaft (1994) p. 45, at p. 51.
103. S. 179(1) sent. 1 and s. 182(1) sent. 1 AktG. For the changes introduced by the FMStErgG, see infra 3.3.1.
104. On capital increases in general, see, e.g., U. Hüffer, Commentary on s. 182 AktG, in Hüffer, supra n. 39, at n. 6 et seqq.;
105. H. Wiedemann, Commentary on s. 182 AktG, in H. Wiedemann and K.J. Hopt, eds., Großkommentar Aktiengesetz, 4th edn. (Berlin, de Gruyter 2006), at n. 36 et seqq.;
106. K.-N. Pfeifer, Commentary on s. 182 AktG, in B. Kropff and J. Semler, eds., Münchener Kommentar zu Aktiengesetz, 2nd edn. (Munich, C.H. Beck/Franz Vahlen 2005), at n. 14 et seqq;
107. R. Veil, Commentary on s. 182 AktG, in K. Schmidt and M. Lutter, eds., Aktiengesetz (Köln, Schmidt 2008), at n. 9 et seqq. In the case of HRE, a threequarter majority was missed by only a very small margin, hence it was necessary for the state to rely on the newly introduced lowered threshold (see infra 3.5).
108. S. 186(3) sent. 2 AktG.
109. BGHZ 129, 136 (Girmes), at p. 151;
110. Wiedemann, supra n. 50, at n. 38;
111. Pfeifer, supra n. 50, at n. 5;
112. K. Schmidt, 'Die sanierende Kapitalerhöhung im Recht der Aktiengesellschaft, GmbH und Personengesellschaft', 11 ZGR (1982) p. 519, at p. 525;
113. H.-J. Priester, 'Körperschaftssteuerreform und Gewinnverwendung', 6 ZGR (1977) p. 445, at p. 465.
114. BGHZ 129, 136 (Girmes), at p. 151;
115. Wiedemann, supra n. 50, at n. 38;
116. Pfeifer, supra n. 50, at n. 5.
117. BGHZ 129, 136 (Girmes), at p. 137 and p. 152;
118. Wiedemann, supra n. 50, at n. 38;
119. Pfeifer, supra n. 50, at n. 5;
120. S. Würthwein, Commentary on s. 243 AktG, in G. Spindler and E. Stilz, eds., Aktiengesetz (München, Beck 2007), at n. 153;
121. Schmidt, supra n. 52, at p. 525.
122. Cf., Veil, supra n. 50, at n. 44.
123. On the duty of loyalty of shareholders under German law, see supra n. 38.
124. See ss. 21, 381 FamFG.
125. On the suspension and its prerequisites, U. Bumiller and K. Winkler, Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit, 8th edn. (Munich, Beck 2006), at s. 127, n. 8 et seqq.;
126. K. Winkler, Commentary on s. 127 FGG, in T. Keidel et al., eds., Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit, 15th edn. (Munich, Beck 2003), at n. 27 et seqq.
127. W. Niemeier, 'Im zweiten Anlauf ein Ende der missbräuchlichen Aktionärsklagen?', 29 ZIP (2008) p. 1148, at p. 1150.
128. On combating abusive strike suits through the FMStErgG, see infra 3.3.2.
129. S. 202(3) sent. 1 AktG. Regarding the repeal of this limitation by the FMStErgG, see infra 3.3.4.
130. In case of a capital increase of 50 per cent of the previous entire capital (i.e., one third of the new entire capital) where one shareholder takes all new shares, the increase in the shareholder's percentual fraction of the entire capital will be the smaller, the larger the shareholder's share was before the capital increase.
131. Regarding the decrease to 90 per cent by the FMStErgG, see infra 3.3.3.
132. With regard to the squeeze-out, only strike suits - actions for annulment - regarding the pursuit of special benefits (s. 243(2) AktG) and inappropriate compensation (s. 327f(1) AktG) are excluded by law. For more, see H. Fleischer, Commentary on s. 327f AktG, in H. Wiedemann and K.J. Hopt, eds., Großkommentar Aktiengesetz, 4th edn. (Berlin, de Gruyter 2006), at n. 1; on combating abusive lawsuits, see infra 3.3.2.
133. Regarding the assessment of compensation after the nationalisation of Northern Rock, see SRM Global Master Fund LP v. The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury [2009] EWCA Civ 788.
134. On the dilution effect, Pfeifer, supra n. 50, at n. 4.
135. About the details in regard to corporate valuations, see Fleischer, supra n. 61, at n. 13 et seqq.
136. Cf., BVerfGE 100, 289 (DAT/Altana), at p. 305 et seqq. ['volle Entschädigung'].
137. The Financial Market Stabilisation Fund Act - see supra n. 41 - is part of the Financial Market Stabilisation Act of 2008.
138. Regarding the decrease to 90 per cent by the FMStErgG, see infra 3.3.3.
139. S. 3 FMStBG.
140. Needing the approval of the supervisory board. See only P. Veranneman and M. Gärtner, Commentary on s. 3 BeschlG, in M. Jaletzke and P. Veranneman, eds., Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz (Munich, Beck 2008), at n. 7.
141. S. 3(3) FMStGB.
142. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976, OJ 1977 L 026, 31 January 1977, pp. 1-13 - the so-called Capital Directive.
143. G. Spindler, 'Finanzkrise und Gesetzgeber - das Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz', 45 Das deutsche Steuerrecht (DStR) (2008) p. 2268, at p. 2273 et seqq.;
144. H. Ziemons, 'Rekapitalisierung nach dem Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz - Die aktienrechtlichen Regelungen im Überblick', 71 Der Betrieb (DB) (2008) p. 2635, at p. 2637 et seqq.;
145. differentiating, J.-H. Binder, 'Krisenbewältigung im Spannungsfeld zwischen Aufsichts-, Kapitalmarkt-und Gesellschaftsrecht', 62 WM (2008) p. 2340, at p. 2346 et seqq.;
146. O. Seiler and J. Wittgens, 'Sonderaktienrecht für den Finanzsektor - Kapitalerhöhungen nach dem Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz', 29 ZIP (2008) p. 2245, at p. 2248 et seqq.;
147. in detail, S. Mock, Commentary on s. 3 FMStBG, in Becker and Mock, eds., supra 41, at n. 10 et seqq.; Veranneman and Gärtner, supra n. 69, at n. 8 et seqq.
148. ECJ Cases C-19/90 and C-20/90 Karella and Karellas [1991] ECR I-2691, at 2718 et seqq., n. 27 et seqq.;
149. ECJ Case C-441/93 Pafitis [1996] ECR I-1347, at 1375 et seqq., n. 38 et seqq.;
150. ECJ Case C-367/96 Kefalas [1998] ECR I-2843, at 2870 et seqq., n. 23 et seqq.
151. ECJ Case C-441/93 Pafitis [1996] ECR I-1347, at 1375 et seqq., n. 38 et seqq.;
152. see Binder, supra n. 72, at p. 2346;
153. Seiler and Wittgens, supra n. 72, at p. 2248 et seqq.
154. Art. 19(2) and (3), Art. 40(2), Art. 41(2) and Art. 43(2) of the Capital Directive.
155. There is no implied reservation of statutory powers 'for safeguarding the rescue and the continued operation of businesses that are of special importance for the national economy of a member state and which are in an extraordinary situation due to their level of debt'. See ECJ Case C-441/93 Pafitis [1996] ECR I-1347 at 1375, n. 40, in accordance with ECJ Cases C-19/90 and C-20/90 Karella and Karellas [1991] ECR I-2691, at 2719, n. 31.
156. Binder, supra n. 72, at p. 2346 et seqq.;
157. Seiler and Wittgens, supra n. 72, at p. 2248 et seqq.;
158. Spindler, supra n. 72, at p. 2273 et seqq.;
159. Ziemons, supra n. 72, at p. 2637 et seqq.;
160. in detail, Mock, supra n. 72;
161. Veranneman and Gärtner, supra n. 69, at n. 8 et seqq.;
162. more reluctant, Noack, supra n. 34, at p. 230 et seqq.
163. Pursuant to s. 3(5) sent. 3 and 4 FMStG, the capital increase has to be recorded in the commercial register without undue delay and with no judicial review. Moreover, by referencing s. 246a(4) sent. 2 AktG, s. 3(5) sent. 5 FMStG prescribes that in case of claims for damages in respect of a flawed discretionary decision of the board regarding the capital increase, reversing the effects of that capital increase will be precluded. If, however, the ECJ would decide that s. 3 FMStG is incompatible with Community law, the registration would not constitute a remedy. See Seiler and Wittgens, supra n. 72, at p. 2250; L. Wienecke and T. Fett, 'Das neue Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der aktienrechtlichen Sonderregelungen', 12 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) (2009) p. 8, at p. 13 et seqq.; Ziemons, supra n. 72, at p. 2637 et seqq.
164. Also, Köndgen, supra n. 12, at p. 147;
165. Noack, supra n. 34, at p. 230 et seqq.
166. The Financial Market Stabilisation Acceleration Act (FMStBG), see supra n. 32, is part of the Financial Market Stabilisation Act of 2008.
167. See N. Horn, 'Das Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz und das Risikomanagement zur globalen Finanzkrise', 8 BKR (2008) p. 452, at p. 454;
168. Seiler and Wittgens, supra n. 72, at p. 2250 et seqq.;
169. Ziemons, supra n. 72, at p. 2638 et seqq.;
170. in detail, Mock, supra n. 41, at n. 1 et seqq.;
171. P. Veranneman and H. Hofmeister, Commentary on s. 7 BeschlG, in Jaletzke and Veranneman, eds., supra n. 69, at n. 1 et seqq.
172. Translation, now s. 7 (3) sent. 4 FMStBG.
173. Art. 14(1) GG.
174. Similar, Spindler, supra n. 72, at 2274; differentiating considering the Capital Directive, Veranneman and Hofmeister, supra n. 81, at n. 13.
175. S. 7c FMStBG.
176. On the threat of strike suits in Germany, see 3.1.2.
177. S. 7 FMStFG.
178. S. 7(2) sent. 1 FMStBG.
179. S. 182(1) sent. 1 AktG.
180. S. 7(2) sent. 2 FMStBG; cf., s. 182(1) AktG.
181. S. 7(3) sent. 1 FMStBG.
182. S. 7(6) sent. 1 FMStBG.
183. S. 7(3) sent. 2, (6) FMStBG.
184. Art. 29(4) sent. 4 together with Art. 40 of the Capital Directive regarding the exclusion of subscription rights and Art. 30 sent. 1 together with Art. 40 of the Capital Directive on the reduction of share capital. Regarding the reduction of the majority threshold in s. 202(2) sent. 2 AktG according to s. 7b(1) sent. 1 FMStBG for authorised capital, see Art. 25(2) Capital Directive. For comparable proposals for debt-equity swaps during insolvency procedures, see Eidenmüller and Engert, supra n. 20, at p. 551. Critical of the three quarters majority in cases of restructuring, Veil, supra n. 50, at n. 28.
185. S. 7(7) sent. 1 FMStBG. In the light of ECJ jurisprudence in Case C-441/93 Pafitis [1996] ECR I-1347, it cannot be completely ruled out that the ECJ would see such an 'abuse clause' as violating the Capital Directive. See Köndgen, supra n. 12, at p. 147;
186. G. Bachmann, 'Der beschleunigte Anteilserwerb nach dem Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungsgesetz vor dem Hintergrund des Verfassungs-und Europarechts', 30 ZIP (2009) p. 1249, at p. 1253.
187. Regarding the legal consequences (preferring a loss of voting rights), Noack, supra n. 34, at p. 232.
188. S. 7c FMStBG. See also Eidenmüller and Engert, supra n. 20, at p. 551. Critical, Bachmann, supra n. 95, at p. 1254 et seqq. With these provisions aimed at curtailing abusive strike suits, the Supplementary Financial Market Stabilisation Act implements recent reform proposals (limited, however, to cases of rescue recapitalisation).
189. See esp. Resolution no. D.14 of the 67th German Jurists Forum 2008 and the Working Group on the Law Regarding Deficient Shareholder Resolutions, 53 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) (2008) p. 617;
190. K. Schmidt, 'Reflexionen über das Beschlussmängelrecht', 54 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) (2009) p. 248;
191. on the abuse of strike suits, see, e.g., T. Baums and F. Drinhausen, 'Weitere Reform des Rechts der Anfechtung von Hauptversammlungsbeschlü ssen', 29 ZIP (2008) p. 145;
192. T. Baums, A. Keinath and D. Gajek, 'Fortschritte bei Klagen gegen Hauptversammlungsbeschlüsse? Eine empirische Studie', 28 ZIP (2007) p. 1629;
193. W. Niemeier, 'Im zweiten Anlauf ein Ende der missbräuchlichen Aktionärsklagen?', 29 ZIP (2008) p. 1148.
194. S. 186(4) sent. 2 AktG.
195. Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, OJ 2004 L 142, 30 April 2004, at p. 12.
196. S. 39a(1) WpÜG.
197. S. 12(3) No.1 FMStGB. Cf., Art. 7(1) and Art. 15(2) lit. a Takeover Directive.
198. The simplifications in s. 12(3) No.2 FMStBG (no obligation to list all persons formally acting together with the bidder in the offer documents) aim at facilitation, since otherwise all affiliated companies of the state would have to be included in the offer documents. The goal and purpose of the respective provision in the Takeover Directive (Art. 6(3) lit. m) do not require such representations which appear to be unnecessary for the market.
199. S. 12(3) No.3 FMStBG.
200. S. 12(2) FMStBG.
201. See recital no. 6, Art. 4(2) lit. e sent. 2 and Art. 4(5)(II) Takeover Directive.
202. S. 12(4) sent. 2 FMStBG.
203. S. 7(1) sent. 2 FMStBG.
204. Directive 2007/36/EC of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, OJ 2007 L 184, 14 July 2007, at p. 17. See esp. its Art. 5(1)(I).
205. S. 7(1) sent. 3 FMStBG. Critical of the rule regarding the time before 3 August 2009, Bachmann, supra n 95, at p. 1250.
206. S. 202(3) sent. 1 AktG.
207. S. 7b(1) sent. 2 FMStBG.
208. Also critical, e.g., E. Gurlit, 'Finanzmarktstabilisierung und Eigentumsgarantie', 12 NZG (2009) p. 601, esp. at p. 604;
209. T. Böckenförde, 'Die getarnte Enteignung', 62 NJW (2009) p. 2484, esp. at p. 2488.
210. Against such a 'formal approach following the wording of the law', already T. Raiser, 'Anlegerschutz in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts', in J. Ekkenga, ed., Festschrift für Siegfried Kümpel (Berlin, Schmidt 2003) p. 437, at p. 450 et seqq.
211. Constant case law, see, for example, BVerfGE 14, 263 (Feldmühle), at p. 276 et seqq.;
212. BVerfGE 25, 371 (Rheinstahl), at p. 407;
213. BVerfGE 35, 377 (VW), at p. 378;
214. BVerfGE 50, 290 (Mitbestimmung), at p. 341 et seqq.;
215. BVerfGE 100, 289 (DAT/Altana), at p. 301 et seqq.;
216. BVerfG 54 WM (2000) p. 1948 (Moto Meter), at p. 1949;
217. BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 1329 (Squeeze-out I), at p. 1329 et seqq.;
218. BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 2199 (Squeeze-out II), at p. 2200.
219. In detail, Klöhn, Das System der aktien-und umwandlungsrechtlichen Abfindungsansprüche (Tübingen, Mohr 2009);
220. also, for example, J. Adolff, Unternehmensbewertung im Recht der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft (Munich, Beck 2007);
221. U. Hüffer, et al., Anteilseigentum, Unternehmenswert und Börsenkurs (Munich, Beck 2005);
222. Raiser, supra n. 112, at p. 437;
223. E. Schmidt-Aßmann, 'Der Schutz des Aktieneigentums durch Art. 14 GG', in M. Brenner, ed., Festschrift für Peter Badura (Tübingen, Mohr 2004) p. 1009;
224. W. Schön, 'Der Aktionär im Verfassungsrecht', in M. Habersack, ed., Festschrift für Peter Ulmer (Berlin, de Gruyter 2003) p. 1359;
225. M. Tonner, 'Die Maßgeblichkeit des Börsenkurses bei der Bewertung des Anteilseigentums - Konsequenzen aus der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts', in G. Bitter, et al., eds., Festschrift für Karsten Schmidt (Cologne, Schmidt 2009) p. 1581;
226. H. Wiedemann, 'Ist der Kleinaktionär kein Aktionär?', in Bitter, et al., eds., Festschrift für Karsten Schmidt, ibid., p. 1731.
227. BVerfGE 58, 300 (Nassauskiesung); more recently, e.g., BVerfGE 104, 1 (Baulandumlegung), at p. 9 et seqq.
228. BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 1329 (Squeeze-out I), at p. 1330; BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 2199 (Squeeze-out II), at p. 2200.
229. Translation of Art. 14(1)(2) GG.
230. Translation of BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 1329 (Squeeze-out I), at p. 1330, referring to BVerfGE 100, 289 (DAT/Altana), at p. 303, and BVerfG 54 WM (2000) p. 1948.
231. Translation of BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 2199 (Squeeze-out II), at p. 2200; correspondingly, already BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 1329 (Squeeze-out I), at p. 1330.
232. Translation of BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 1329 (Squeeze-out I), at p. 1330.
233. Also C. Möllers, 'Verfassungsrechtliche Bewertung des FMStErgG', 21 ZBB (2009) p. 149, at p. 152; Gurlit, supra n. 111, at p. 605.
234. Doubts (even with regard to higher thresholds) already in Raiser, supra n. 112, at p. 446; Schön, supra n. 114, at p. 1388; Wiedemann, supra n. 114, at p. 1735 et seqq.
235. S. 27a(1) Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG) [Securities Trading Act] introduced by the Financial Investments Risk Limitation Act (Gesetz zur Begrenzung der mit Finanzinvestitionen verbundenen Risiken - Risikobegrenzungsgesetz) of 12 August 2008, BGBl. I 2008, 1666.
236. BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 1329 (Squeeze-out I), at p. 1330. ('Whether something else applies, if a shareholder takes a noteworthy interest in the participation in a company, as can be imagined in the case of related shareholders in family businesses . . . can be left open here'; a 'noteworthy interest' is probably not only the affectionate interest in holding shares in the family business, but also the influence on corporate governance due to a larger stake).
237. See Möllers, supra n. 121, at p. 152.
238. Seeing an unconstitutional 'flight into private law' by the state, Böckenförde, supra n. 111, at p. 2488.
239. Constant case law, recently, e.g., BVerfGE 104, 1 (Baulandumlegung), at p. 9 et seqq., with reference to, among others, BVerfGE 38, 175 (Rückübertragung I), at p. 179 et seqq.
240. BVerfGE 100, 289 (DAT/Altana), at p. 305 et seqq.;
241. following this, BGHZ 147, 108 (DAT/Altana); in the context of a squeeze-out, BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 1329 (Squeeze-out I), at p. 1330 et seqq.;
242. BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 2199 (Squeeze-out II), at p. 2200.
243. This may not be relevant for a squeeze-out under takeover law due to Art. 15(5) Takeover Directive, regarding this problem, already K.J. Hopt, P.O. Mülbert and C. Kumpan, 'Reformbedarf im Übernahmerecht', 50 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) (2005) p. 109, at p. 117;
244. in detail now Klöhn, supra n. 114.
245. S.7(3) sent. 4 FMStBG states that the exclusion of subscription rights is 'in any case permitted and reasonable'; according to s. 7c sent. 3 FMStBG, actions and applications for the issue of interim injunctions do not bar registration.
246. The necessity of effective legal protection is emphasised in the context of a squeeze-out by BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 1329 (Squeeze-out I), at p. 1331 et seqq., and BVerfG 61 WM (2007) p. 2199 (Squeeze-out II), at p. 2200 et seqq.
247. Explicitly now BVerfGE 104, 1 (Baulandumlegung), at p. 9 et seqq.
248. Ss. 327a et seqq. AktG.
249. See supra n. 116.
250. S.12(3) no.1, (4) sent. 1 FMStBG. Cf., s. 7e FMStBG.
251. BVerfGE 58, 300 (Nassauskiesung).
252. For an economic study on the market reaction to bank rescue packages, inter alia, in Germany, see M.R. King, Time to Buy or Just Buying Time? The Market Reaction to Bank Rescue Packages, BIS Working Paper No. 288.
253. Available at: http://www.hyporealestate.com/pdf/GB2008-09-04-24-final-GL. pdf (accessed on 18 November 2009).
254. K. Ott, 'Institut soll Steinbrück getäuscht haben', Süddeutsche.de, 1 January 2009, available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ finanzen/414/453109/text/ (accessed on 18 November 2009).
255. HRE, Annual Report 2008 (supra n. 137), at p. 159.
256. '100 Milliarden Euro reichen nicht', manager-magazin.de, 29 March 2009, available at: http://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/artikel/0,2828,616129, 00.html (accessed on 18 November 2009).
257. SoFFin, Öffentliches Übernahmeangebot der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, handelnd durch den Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfonds, dieser vertreten durch die Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt, an die Aktionäre der Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, available at: http://w3.cantos. com/09/soffin-904-d71oz/index.php (accessed on 18 November 2009).
258. See HRE Press Release of 2 June 2009, available at: http://www. hyporealestate.com/ pdf/02062009-PI-HV-2009-deutsch-Endfassung.pdf (accessed on 18 November 2009).
259. EU Press Release, 'Mergers: Commission Approves Proposed Acquisition of Hypo Real Estate by Germany's Financial Market Stabilisation Fund', 15 May 2009, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/791 (accessed on 18 November 2009).
260. HRE Press Release of 2 June 2009, supra n. 142.
261. Constitutional complaints have been filed under docket numbers 1 BvR 2583/09 and 1 BvR 2663/09; see also H. Nagl, 'Flowers macht bei HRE mit Klage Ernst', Handelsblatt, 11 October 2009, available at: http://www.handelsblatt.com (last visited on 18 November 2009).
262. On the background and the essential content of the Act, see B. Wolfers and M. Rau, 'Enteignung zur Stabilisierung des Finanzmarktes: Das Rettungsübernahmegesetz', 62 NJW (2009), at p. 1297 et seqq.
263. But see J.P. Rinze and C. Ohler, 'Das Rettungsübernahmegesetz und Pfandrechte Dritter an den Enteignungsgegenständen', 26 NJW (2009) p. 1847, at p. 1850 et seqq.
264. With the same result Köndgen, supra n. 12, at p. 147; Möllers, supra n. 121, at p. 152; in general, see, e.g., M. Schweitzer, Commentary on Art. 195 EC, in M. Hilf, et al., eds., Das Recht der Europäischen Union, 28th update (Munich, Beck 2005), at n. 3 et seqq.;
265. more narrowly, C. Koenig and J. Kühling, Commentary on Art. 295 EC, in R. Streinz, ed., EUV/EGV (Munich, Beck 2003), at n. 12 et seqq.
266. differentiating, T. Kingreen, Commentary on Art. 295 EC, in C. Calliess and M. Ruffert, eds., EUV/EGV, 3rd edn. (Munich, Beck 2007), at n. 10 et seqq. A violation of the free movement of capital (Arts. 56-60 EC) is not possible because the four conditions test (recently ECJ, 61 WM (2007) p. 2060, at p. 2065, n. 72 et seqq. - Volkswagen Act) is met (explanations infra 4.3, which apply here as well).
267. See supra n. 113.
268. On the constitutional prerequisites in general, see especially BVerfGE 25, 371, at p. 395 et seqq. (Rheinstahl), and BVerfGE 99, 367, at p. 400 et seqq. (Mannesmann).
269. For an overview of the discussion, see H. Dreier, Commentary on Art. 19(1) GG, in H. Dreier, ed., Grundgesetz, 2nd edn. (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2004), at n. 13 et seqq;
270. W. Krebs, Commentary on Art. 19 GG, in P. Kunig, ed., Grundgesetz, 5th edn. (Munich, Beck 2000), at n. 6 et seqq.;
271. C.-F. Menger, Commentary on Art. 19 GG, in R. Dolzer, et al., eds., Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 40th update (1979), at n. 90 et seqq.;
272. K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol.III/2 (Munich, Beck 1994) p. 733 et seqq.
273. Contra BVerfGE 24, 367, at p. 395 et seqq. (Deichordnungsgesetz);
274. BVerfGE 25, 371, at p. 399 (Rheinstahl);
275. H. Jarass, Commentary on Art. 14 GG, in H. Jarass and B. Pieroth, eds., Grundgesetz, 10th edn. (Munich, Beck 2009), at n. 78;
276. R. Wendt, Commentary on Art. 14 GG, in M. Sachs, ed., Grundgesetz, 5th edn. (Munich, Beck 2009), at n. 158;
277. also Dreier, supra n. 150, at n. 9 et seqq., and Krebs, supra n. 150, at n. 13;
278. in detail, Menger, supra n. 150, at n. 82 et seqq.
279. Similarly, Möllers, supra n. 121, at p. 152.
280. See in general, Art. 6(3) AufsichtsRL of 21.2.2008 (supra n. 10);
281. with concerns, Möllers, supra n. 121, at p. 150, with references to BVerfGE 56, 249, at p. 261 et seqq. (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn).
282. B.-O. Bryde, Commentary on Art. 14 GG, in P. Kunig, ed., Grundgesetz, 5th edn. (Munich, Beck 2000), at n. 85;
283. see also J. Wieland, Commentary on Art. 14 GG, in H. Dreier, ed., Grundgesetz, 2nd edn. (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2004), at n. 128.
284. BVerfGE 24, 367, at p. 404 et seqq. (Deichordnungsgesetz).
285. BR-Drucks. 160/09 of 19 February 2009, p. 25 = BT-Drucks. 16/12100 of 3 March 2009, p. 14.
286. Especially BVerfG 54 WM 2000, 1948, 1949 (Moto Meter); similarly BVerfG 61 WM 2007, 1329, 1330 (Squeeze-out I) and BVerfG 61 WM 2007, 2199, 2200 (Squeeze-out II).
287. Differing, Möllers, supra n. 121, at p. 152 ('constitutionally not uncharted territory'); with a similar tendency, C. Kaserer, 'Ökonomische Überlegungen zum FMStErgG', 21 ZBB (2009) p. 142, at p. 143.
288. Differing, Möllers, supra n. 121, at p. 149, in translation: 'The Constitution does not differentiate between property in the form of shares of a bank and other kinds of property', and p. 152, in translation: 'Constitutionally, there is no difference between the property of a shareholder and the real estate property of a farmer who is expropriated in order to construct a road'; pointing out differences, Schmidt-Aßmann, supra n. 114, at p. 1011 et seqq.
289. Translation of BVerfGE 21, 73, at p. 82 et seqq.; similarly, BVerfGE 52, 1, at p. 33; BVerfGE 87, 114, at p. 146.
290. Translation of BVerfGE 104, 1, at p. 12 (Baulandumlegung, in the context of a provision regarding content and limits [Inhalts-und Schrankenbestimmung]).
291. Amend, supra n. 20, at p. 592 (in translation).
292. Amend, supra n. 20, ibid.
293. In general on a retransfer, Bryde, supra n. 154, at n. 86;
294. O. Depenheuer, Commentary on Art. 14 GG, in H. v. Mangoldt, F. Klein and C. Starck, eds., Grundgesetz, 5th edn. (Munich, Vahlen 2005), at n. 48, 87, 431 et seqq.;
295. Jarass, supra n. 151, at n. 81;
296. H.-J. Papier, Commentary on Art. 14 GG, in T. Maunz and G. Dürig, eds., Grundgesetz, 40th update (Munich, Beck 2002), at n. 591;
297. Wendt, supra n. 151, at n. 165; Wieland, supra n. 154, at n. 107.
298. Translation of BR-Drucks. 160/09 of 19 February 2009, p. 2 (cover page), 17, 33 = BTDrucks. 16/12100 of 3 March 2009, pp. 2, 10, 18.
299. BVerfGE 38, 175 (Rückübertragung I).
300. BVerfGE 97, 89, at p. 96 et seqq. (Rückübertragung II).
301. Contra Möllers, supra n. 121, at p. 151.
302. For a lesser protection of the status quo of shares in comparison with real estate property, however, Schmidt-Aßmann, supra n. 114, p. 1009, at p. 1019; in general, Schön, supra n. 114, at p. 1363 et seqq.
303. In general, the Federal Constitutional Court only recognises the protection of assets as opposed to the protection of the specific existence of shares in corporations (on this, in detail, Klöhn, supra n. 114; most recently, BVerfG WM 2009, 786, 789). The Court rendered related judgments (especially BVerfG 2000, 1948 - Moto Meter) in the context of the exclusion of minority shareholders to the benefit of private majority shareholders, thus reviewing the exclusion as a provision regarding content and limits [Inhalts-und Schrankenbestimmung] of the share property and not as an expropriation.
304. BVerfGE 38, 175, at p. 184 et seqq. (Rückübertragung I) in translation: 'The right to reclaim cannot be withheld on the grounds that the dispossessed received an indemnification and thus did not sustain a loss. The Federal Constitutional Court held that the idea that the guarantee of ownership is basically a guarantee of a property value . . . is a "misconception of the fundamental concept of the guarantee of ownership".' Similarly, BVerfGE 97, 89, at p. 96 et seqq. (Rückübertragung II).
305. Lastly, e.g., BGH NJW-Rechtsprechungs-Report 2008, 1186 (on the re-expropriation indemnification according to the Landbeschaffungsgesetz [Act on the Acquisition of Land]).
306. In contrast, it would not be appropriate to take the rescue effort of the state as a decisive figure instead of the increase in market price since the rationale behind the duty to compensate is to avoid enrichment and not to grant the state damages (both terms are to be understood in a non-technical way). Instructively on the relevance of state rescue measures and the level of knowledge of shareholders at the time of the transfer for the amount of the indemnification, see the English judgment on the nationalisation of Northern Rock, the Queen's Bench decision in R. (SRM Global Master Fund LP) v. Commissioners of HM Treasury [2009] BCC 251 and the Court of Appeal decision in SRM Global Master Fund LP v. The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury [2009] EWCA Civ 788.
307. Contra Möllers, supra n. 121, at p. 151 (the indemnification provision was valid without a doubt).
308. This complies with the Constitution since there is no requirement to 'fully' indemnify the dispossessed; sources supporting this requirement at n. 128.
309. All this is known from the trading of shares of an insolvent issuer (Chapter 11 cases); on this, A.M. Fleckner, WM 2009 (forthcoming) and - in the context of the financial market crisis - Köndgen, supra n. 12, at p. 148.
310. A large portion of the stock exchange price of a systemically important bank that is close to filing for insolvency proceedings is likely to be based on the expectation that the state will intervene. Whether this premium - which is solely due to the bank's systemic importance - has to be indemnified from a constitutional point of view, is questionable. One could argue that the 'systemic importance premium' is not part of the 'property represented by the share' which is the point of reference for including the interest in corporations in the guarantee of ownership according to the consistent practice of the courts (see n. 113).
311. On valuation problems in the nationalisation case of Northern Rock plc, cf., SRM Global Master Fund LP v. The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury [2009] EWCA Civ 788.