The (Mis)categorization of sex in Anglo-American cases of transsexual marriage

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 108, Issue 8, 2010, Pages 1497-1526

  Parsi, John ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 77954428294     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (201)

1. For a strong argument on the human propensity for ordering, see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage Books 1994) (1966); Thomas L. Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment (1985).
2. Foucalt, supra note 1; Hankins, supra note 1.
3. th anniversary ed. 2006). Haney López outlines how Supreme Court decisions forge the definition of the White race. López traces the Justices' rationales for their decisions-ranging from scientific evidence and common knowledge to legal precedence and congressional decisions. López contends that classification as White or not White, particularly as related to the beneficiaries of immigration law, is a significant political determination with critical impacts on the agency of individuals based upon their White/not White categorization.
4. Gender (Carol C. Gould ed. 1999).
5. See Howard Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology 122-28 (1967). More credence is given to the view of race, ethnicity, and nationality as social categories. See e.g., Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (rev. ed. 2006) (describing the social construction of nationality). There is significant discussion on the performance and construction of sex. See e.g., Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (1993). Nonetheless, it appears that sex is considered more rigidly biological than social. See e.g., Sally Raskoff, Everyday Sociology Blog, The Social Construction of Race, Ethnicity, Sex, and Gender, http://nortonbooks.typepad.com/everydaysociology/2009/03/the-social-construction-of-race-ethnicity-sex-and-gender.html (Mar. 25, 2009).
6. Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality 51 (2000). The general medical practice for children who are intersex is surgical alteration at birth and assignment to one of the two sexes. Elizabeth Weil, What if It's (Sort of) a Boy and (Sort of) a Girl?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2006 (Magazine), at 48. This standard medical practice is generally necessitated by the need to provide sex identification on the birth certificate as a legal requirement. The decision to assign the sex of the child at birth has been challenged in court in the United Kingdom. A British court held that sex assignment surgery is preferable to non-surgery because not assigning a sex would leave the child in social and legal limbo. See W. v. W. (Physical Inter-sex) [2001] Fam. 111. In 2006, fifty international experts on intersex children signed The Consensus Statement on the Management of Intersex Disorders, contending that a child's sex should still be assigned as soon as possible, but discouraging doctors and families of intersex children from having surgery right away. Christopher P. Houk et al., Summary of Consensus Statement on Intersex Disorders and Their Management, 118 Pediatrics 755 (2006).
7. An estimate on the percentage of people who have gender identity disorder is difficult to attain. See, e.g., Jonathan V. Last, She ain't necessarily so: Jonathan V. Last takes us to the newest frontier in sexual politics-transgender chic, Women's Q., Summer 2002, at 4.
8. 1 World Health Org. (WHO), International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, ch. 5, § F64.0 (10th rev., 2007), http://apps.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10online/. Published by the World Health Organization, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems establishes a coding system for categorizing diseases and a wide variety of signs, symptoms, abnormal findings, complaints, social circumstances, and external causes of injury or disease. This system is designed to promote international comparability in the collection, processing, classification, and presentation of these statistics and to help in the diagnosis of diseases. The system is widely used for purposes of statistical comparability and standardized diagnosis. The International Statistical Classification includes a section classifying mental and behavioral disorders, which was developed alongside the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM"); the two manuals seek to use the same codes. They represent the primary mental health diagnosis systems worldwide. The DSM, which is the United States' separate diagnostic manual, is connected to the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems but uses slightly different standards that more closely approximate U.S. practices. The DSM provides four criteria for gender identity disorder: (1) "[S]trong and persistent cross-gender identification," (2) "[P]ersistent discomfort about one's assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex," (3) "The diagnosis is not made if the individual has a concurrent physical intersex condition," and (4) "[C]linically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning." Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 356 (4th ed. text rev. 2000). The criteria used by the two sources are sufficiently similar for purposes of this analysis.
9. WHO, supra note 9, at ch. 5, § F64.0.
10. Typically legal recognition comes in the form of official documents such as birth certificates, insurance, marriage documents, etc.
11. E.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
12. See infra Part III.
13. This Note will examine both the case law in the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights is a constitutional court established by the European Convention of Human Rights to monitor human rights in member states through application of the Convention. The United Kingdom is the primary focus of this Note for two reasons. First, the European Court of Human Rights case law on transsexuals' rights to gain recognition in their acquired sex deals with cases from the United Kingdom. Decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights interpret and apply either the European Convention on Human Rights, which binds all member states, or the law of member states directly. Accordingly, its decisions are binding on member states. The decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights with regard to the status of transsexuals in the United Kingdom are thus binding on the United Kingdom, adding to their case law, as these decisions both interpret the Convention, to which the United Kingdom is bound, and the law of the United Kingdom directly. Moreover, the United Kingdom, like the United States, is a common law nation. Given the historical links between the United Kingdom and the United States in terms of common law, the United Kingdom is the most relevant nation for comparison.
14. Birth certificates are the primary document used for the assignment of other legal documents, including driver's licenses, passports, etc. Thus, the sex listed on a birth certificate may be determinative of the sex listed on other legal documents.
15. Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can't Take It With You: Constitutional Cozsequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 819, 837 (2005).
16. E.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 144.23(3) (West 2009).
17. See Lambda Legal, Amending Birth Certificates to Reflect Your Correct Sex, http://lambdalegal.com (search for "Amended Birth Certificates" and then click "view the law in your state") (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
18. . Kansas Department of Health and Environment, How to Amend Birth Certificates for Adults, http://www.kdheks.gov/vital/amend_birth_adults.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). The Department also notes, "Taking hormones or breast reassignment surgery does not qualify as a sex or gender change." Id.
19. Becky Alison, Transgender Roadmap, http://www.tsroadmap.com/reality/name/newyork-birth-certificate.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
20. See Press Release, Lamda Legal, Refusals To Change Transgendered People's Birth Certificates Almost Always Conflict with State Laws (Nov. 12, 2002), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/birth-certificate-amend-male-female.html.
21. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
22. Id. (interpreting the Texas statute and codifying that sex reassignment surgery is not a mistake).
23. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-203(d) (2009) ("The sex of an individual shall not be changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.").
24. Greenberg & Herald, supra note 17, at 838.
25. See infra Section I.B.
26. If a state recognizes same-sex marriage, the need to change the sex on a birth certificate is less consequential because the sex of your spouse would not preclude you from getting married. Of course, there are other reasons a transsexual may want to change the sex listed on his/her birth certificate.
27. See, e.g., Transgender Ruling, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 26, 1997, at 1.
28. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
29. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
30. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999).
31. In re Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
32. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225.
33. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225.
34. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31.
35. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31.
36. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31.
37. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31.
38. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31.
39. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
40. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224.
41. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224.
42. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
43. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
44. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224-25.
45. 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002).
46. 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
47. 355 A.2d 204, 205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
48. M.T., 355 A.2d at 205.
49. M.T., 355 A.2d at 205.
50. M.T., 355 A.2d at 205.
51. M.T., 355 A.2d at 205.
52. M.T., 355 A.2d at 205.
53. M.T., 355 A.2d at 205.
54. M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
55. M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
56. M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
57. M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
58. One known case in California, Vecchione v. Vecchione, concurred with the court in M.T. v. J.T., but because there was no appeal there is no reported decision. Vecchione v. Vecchione, Civ. No. 96D003769 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1997); see Transgender Ruling, supra note 33, at 1.
59. Elizabeth Fee, et al. One Size Does Not Fit All in the Transgender Community, 93 Am. J. Pub. Health. 899 (2003).
60. Elizabeth Fee, et al. One Size Does Not Fit All in the Transgender Community, 93 Am. J. Pub. Health. 899 (2003).
61. Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
62. Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 at 268-69.
63. Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267at 272-73.
64. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, 88 (P.).
65. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, at 104.
66. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, at 104.
67. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, at 104.
68. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, at 100.
69. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, at 106.
70. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, at 106.
71. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, at 106.
72. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, at 106.
73. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, at 84.
74. Id. at 105 (acknowledging that there may be some difficulty in this determination if a person suffers from a congenital defect that makes full penetration impossible and indicating that under such circumstances an operation may enlarge the vagina or an argument may be made for incapacity).
75. App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1987).
76. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 12.
77. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 12.
78. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. paras. 13-14.
79. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 17.
80. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 16.
81. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 16.
82. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.").
83. Id. at art. 12 ("Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.").
84. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 31. The United Kingdom is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights.
85. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 35.
86. Id. para. 49. The ECHR is making two assumptions with this holding: first, that the goal of marriage is reproduction and the formation of a family, and second, that transsexual couples are incapable of forming a family.
87. Id. para. 50.
88. Id. para. 47.
89. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990).
90. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990). paras. 10-11.
91. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990). para. 14.
92. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990). para. 14.
93. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990). para. 44.
94. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990). para. 44.
95. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990). para. 40.
96. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990). para. 46.
97. X, Y, & Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 paras. 12-17 (1997).
98. X, Y, & Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 paras. 3.
99. Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 22885/93, 23390/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 163 paras. 36-37 (1998).
100. As in the previous cases, in Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom "the issue [raised by the applicants] before the court is not that the respondent State should abstain from acting to their detriment but that it has failed to take positive steps to modify a system which [they] claim operates to their detriment." Id. para. 51.
101. As in the previous cases, in Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom "the issue [raised by the applicants] before the court is not that the respondent State should abstain from acting to their detriment but that it has failed to take positive steps to modify a system which [they] claim operates to their detriment." para. 56.
102. As in the previous cases, in Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom "the issue [raised by the applicants] before the court is not that the respondent State should abstain from acting to their detriment but that it has failed to take positive steps to modify a system which [they] claim operates to their detriment." para. 60.
103. In addition, nine of the twenty justices dissented from the opinion in Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom on Article 8 grounds. Id. para. 80.
104. App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 (2002).
105. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447.
106. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447. para. 49.
107. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447. para. 50 (citation omitted).
108. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447. para. 50 (citation omitted).
109. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447. para. 76.
110. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447. para. 77.
111. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447. para. 77.
112. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447. para. 77.
113. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447. para. 78.
114. In the United Kingdom, gender identity disorder is often referred to as gender dysphoria. For purposes of clarity, this Note will use the term gender identity disorder rather than gender dysphoria.
115. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 78.
116. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 78.
117. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 78.
118. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 78.
119. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 81.
120. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 82.
121. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 82.
122. Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1987).
123. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1990).
124. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 101.
125. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 101.
126. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. at 483.
127. Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7.
128. See supra note 15 for a discussion of the connection between laws in the United Kingdom and the ECHR and their applicability to constitutional analysis.
129. Larsen looks to Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 166-67 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), to provide an illustration of the reason-borrowing framework. Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1283, 1292 (2004). Justice Frankfurter looked to the House of Commons debate in evaluating if a California statute making booksellers strictly liable for possession of obscene material violated the First Amendment. Smith, 361 U.S. at 166-67 (citing legislative history in Parliament regarding a similar provision in a British law about obscene publications).
130. See Larson, supra note 135, at 1291-92, for a general discussion of the reason-borrowing approach.
131. See Larson, supra note 135, at 1291-92, for a general discussion of the reason-borrowing approach.
132. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 2-5, 2003), in 97 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 265, 265 (2003).
133. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 13-16, 2002), in 96 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 348, 350 (2002).
134. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks, in Germany and its Basic Law: Past, Present and Future-A German-American Symposium 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
135. Leading scholars have similarly argued for reason-borrowing. See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 Ind. L.J. 819, 825-26 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality," Rights and Federalism, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 583, 601 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 Duke L.J. 223, 263 (2001); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999).
136. 361 U.S. 147, 166-67 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Smith dealt with issues arising under both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment.
137. 361 U.S. 147 (majority opinion).
138. 361 U.S. 148.
139. 361 U.S. 149.
140. 361 U.S. 149 (footnote omitted).
141. 361 U.S. 166 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing 597 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1958) 36).
142. 361 U.S. 165.
143. 361 U.S. 166.
144. 361 U.S. 166. (footnote and citation omitted).
145. Id. at 153 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted) (quoting R v. Ewart, [1905] 25 N.Z.L.R. 709, 729 (C.A.)).
146. Although borrowing reasoning from legislative bodies is not expressively advocated by Breyer, Rehnquist, or O'Connor, the Supreme Court has in practice borrowed from legislative bodies because legislatures also provide reasoning for laws.
147. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
148. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 718 n.16.
149. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702.
150. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702.
151. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702.
152. Id. at 718 n.16 (citing Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), [1993] 107 D.L.R. 342).
153. Id. (citing House of Lords, Session 1993-94 Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics, 12 Issues in Law & Med. 193, 202 (1996) ("We identify no circumstances in which assisted suicide should be permitted.")).
154. Id. (citing Graeme Lee, MPs Throw out Euthanasia Bill, The Dominion Post, Aug. 17, 1995, at 1).
155. E.g. Jackson, supra note 141, at 226. ("[E]ven when the Court has considered the constitutional experiences of other nations, it almost never has engaged the reasoning of other constitutional courts.").
156. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 88, t.32 ("The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 47.").
157. Id. art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.").
158. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
159. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). This very argument was restated verbatim in Lawrence v. Texas, further solidifying the position that privacy is protected by the Constitution. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
162. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
163. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 744 (1997) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)).
164. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 77 (2002).
165. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 77 (2002).
166. 505 U.S. at 851.
167. 539 U.S. at 573-74.
168. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
169. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
170. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
171. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
172. 518 U.S. 515, 532-533 (1996).
173. 518 U.S. 515 at 533.
174. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447, para. 76, 77 (2002).
175. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447, para. 76, 77 (2002).
176. This Note does not take up the issue, but it is possible to argue that transsexuals should be considered a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice O'Connor has indicated that targeting a group of people for disfavored treatment based upon a single characteristic could form an "underclass" status. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 584 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But even O'Connor has been unwilling to go as far as to claim that this constitutes a protected class requiring the constitutional protection of strict scrutiny.
177. It is important to note that the Seventh Circuit has previously indicated that transsexuals cannot claim sex discrimination in the Title VII employment context. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1017 (1985). But, the holding focused only on the definition of sex as used in Title VII. Id. at 1087. The Seventh Circuit held that including transsexuals was beyond Title VII's "common and traditional interpretation" and that if "the term 'sex' as it is used in Title VII is to mean more than biological male or biological female, the new definition must come from Congress." Id. at 1086-87. The argument discussed here is not similarly bound by the language of Title VII. It is important to note that after the holding in Ulane the Supreme Court has held that gender discrimination based on gender/sex stereotyping is not permitted. See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
178. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality 211(2d ed. 2007).
179. 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
180. 83 U.S. 130 at 141.
181. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
182. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258.
183. Id. at 251 (quoting L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978). Forms, Inc. is the most recent court to validate the Price Waterhouse holding. See 579 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009).
184. 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976).
185. 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14.
186. 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).
187. 518 U.S. 515, at 541.
188. MacKinnon, supra note 185, at 211.
189. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974) (holding "the [Florida] statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the classification 'widow' was based upon gender"); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that sex references both biological and social differences); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII protection against sex discrimination encompasses both sex and gender).
190. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 (2002).
191. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 (2002).
192. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 78.
193. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 78.
194. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 78.
195. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 101.
196. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 101.
197. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992).
198. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 paras. 45, 50-51 (2002) (citation omitted).
199. See id. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court has acknowledged conclusions of the ECHR as an indication of legal and legislative movement. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.
200. See supra Section I.A.
201. See supra notes 11 and 119-24.