Responsibility and free will in dworkin's justice for hedgehogs

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 90, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 611-619

  Kane, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77954321273     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (26)

1. RONALD DWORHN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010) (Apr. 17, 2009 manuscript at 146-58, on file with the Boston University Law Review).
2. See id. (manuscript at 147).
3. See id. (manuscript at 154).
4. See id. (manuscript at 152).
5. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 7).
6. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, at 48-78 (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson eds., David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (c. 384-322 B.C.E.).
7. See DWORHN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 155) ("Someone cannot lead a life if he has not formed a normative personality - a reasonably stable system of desires, preferences, tastes, convictions, attachments, loyalties, ideals, and the rest - and if he cannot make decisions that exhibit that personality.").
8. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 137).
9. David Widerker, Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look, in 14 PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES: ACTION AND FREEDOM 181, 191 (James E. Tomberlin ed., 2000).
10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 136 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1994) (1668).
12. See id. ("[N]o liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this: that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.").
13. IMMANUEL KANT, Critical Examination of Practical Reason, in KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 85, 189 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., Longmans, Green & Co. 1948) (1788).
14. WILLIAM JAMES, The Dilemma of Determinism, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 145,149 (Longmans, Green & Co. 1927) (1896).
15. See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 154).
16. See id. (manuscript at 146).
17. The ideas that follow have been developed at greater length in a number of my previous works. See generally, e.g., ROBERT KANE, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL (2005);
18. R. KANE, FREE WILL AND VALUES (1985);
19. ROBERT KANE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL (1996);
20. Robert Kane, Responsibility, Luck and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, 96 J. PHIL. 217 (1999) [hereinafter Kane, Responsibility];
21. Robert Kane, Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 406 (Robert Kane ed., 2002).
22. DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 152) (rejecting the hydraulic control principle as "popular as an interpretation of the more abstract idea that people are not judgmentally responsible for their acts when they are not in control," yet ultimately "implausible").
23. See, e.g., Alison B. Wismer Fries & Seth D. Pollack, Emotion Processing and the Developing Brain, in HUMAN BEHAVIOR, LEARNING, AND THE DEVELOPING BRAIN: TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT 329,331 (Donna Coch et al. eds., 2007).
24. Much of the subsequent discussion, including the examples that follow, are also discussed in Kane, Responsibility, supra note 17, at 224-27.
25. See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 142).
26. See generally, e.g., DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001) (arguing that persons can live sensibly and humanely without a belief in free will of the genuine kind that is incompatible with determinism).