Giving the people what they want? The distribution of earmarks in the u.s. house of representatives

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 338-353

  Lazarus, Jeffrey ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954249123     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00434.x     Document Type: Article

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