Integrating organisational culture into incident analyses: Extending the bow tie model

Society of Petroleum Engineers - SPE International Conference on Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 2010

Volumn 4, Issue , 2010, Pages 2662-2674

  Hudson, Patrick ^a  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEOLOGICAL SURVEYS; PETROLEUM PROSPECTING; SPACE SHUTTLES;

INCIDENT ANALYSIS; INCIDENT INVESTIGATION; ORGANISATIONAL; ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE; ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS; REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT; SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA; STRUCTURED APPROACH;

FACTOR ANALYSIS;

EID: 77954228703     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.2523/127180-ms     Document Type: Conference Paper

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