Who's arguing? a call for reflexivity in bioethics

Bioethics

Volumn 24, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 256-265

  Ives, Jonathan ^a   Dunn, Michael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bioethics; Critical bioethics; Empirical bioethics; Moral assumption; Moral intuition; Reflexivity

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; BIOETHICS; CONFLICT; CONFLICT OF INTEREST; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; EPIDEMIOLOGY; ETHICAL THEORY; ETHICIST; ETHICS; HUMAN; METHODOLOGY; MORALITY; PHILOSOPHY; PROFESSIONAL STANDARD; PUBLIC OPINION; THINKING; VERBAL COMMUNICATION; PROCEDURES; STATISTICAL BIAS; TRENDS;

ANTHROPOLOGY, CULTURAL; BIAS (EPIDEMIOLOGY); BIOETHICS; CONFLICT OF INTEREST; DISSENT AND DISPUTES; ETHICAL ANALYSIS; ETHICAL THEORY; ETHICISTS; HUMANS; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; NARRATION; PHILOSOPHY; POWER (PSYCHOLOGY); PROFESSIONAL ROLE; PUBLIC OPINION; THINKING;

EID: 77954165499     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01809.x     Document Type: Article

References (54)

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7. We are unsure that 'private' is the right term to use here, and use it, therefore, in the absence of a better alternative. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this paper for pointing out the risk that 'private' might evoke 'feminist debates that tried to show that the private is also public' - and we would like to make clear that this is not our intention.
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