Bargaining in biology?

Journal of Evolutionary Biology

Volumn 23, Issue 7, 2010, Pages 1351-1363

  Binmore, K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bargaining theory; Cooperative game theory; Equilibrium selection problem; Nurturing behaviour

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; ECONOMIC THEORY; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; GENE;

COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; GENETIC SELECTION; REVIEW; STATISTICAL MODEL;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, ECONOMIC; SELECTION, GENETIC;

EID: 77954153102     PISSN: 1010061X     EISSN: 14209101     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2010.02011.x     Document Type: Review

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