Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map Or Building Sandcastles?

Middle East Policy

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 115-136

  Kardaş, Şaban ^a  

^a SAKARYA UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77954123091     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: 14754967     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2010.00430.x     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. The author would like to thank Murat Yeşiltaş, Burhanettin Duran, Ali Balci and Kristian Alexander for their invaluable feedback on the manuscript.
2. Ian O. Lesser, Turkey in a Changing Security Environment, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, p. 184
3. Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, No. 3, Summer 2004, pp. 51-64
4. F. Stephen Larrabee, Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, No. 4, July/August 2007, pp. 103-14.
5. See Alan O. Makovsky's contribution in Robert Chase, et.al., eds., The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999).
6. For a detailed review of different scholarly explanations of the causes of transformation in Turkish foreign policy, see: Kemal Kirişçi, The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, Spring 2009, pp. 29-57.
7. Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan, Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a New Geographic Imagination, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, Spring 2009, pp. 195-217.
8. İhsan Daǧlu: Davutoǧlu: Turkey's New Foreign Policy Chief, Today's Zaman, May 4, 2009.
9. Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 199-216.
10. Hüseyin Baǧci, Zoraki Siyasetçi: Ahmet Davutoǧlu, Stratejik Boyut, December 28, 2009.
11. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of domestic debate on the place of Middle East in Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of identity
12. see Meliha Benli Altunişik, Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, Spring 2009, pp. 171-94
13. On the differences between Kemalist and post-Kemalist approaches to the Middle East, see Ömer Taşpinar, Turkey's Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, Carnegie Papers, No. 10, Washington, DC, September 2008.
14. Soner Çaǧaptay, The AKP's Foreign Policy: The Misnomer of 'Neo-Ottomanism', Turkey Analyst, vol. 2, No. 8, April 24, 2009, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2009/090424B.html.
15. For extended scholarly treatments of the debate on Middle Easternization, see Tarik Oǧuzlu, Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West? Turkish Studies, vol. 9, No. 1 2008, pp. 3-20;
16. Burhanettin Duran, Türk Diş Politikasi Ortadoǧululaşiyor Mu? in Kemal İnat, et.al., eds., Ortadoǧu Yilliǧi 2008 (İstanbul: Küre Yayinlari, 2009), pp. 385-402.
17. E. Fuat Keyman, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil, SETA Policy Brief, No. 39, Ankara, December 2009, esp. pp. 6-8.
18. Ali L. Karaosmanoǧlu, Globalization and Its Impact on Turkey's Security, in Ali L. Karaosmanoǧlu and Seyfi Taşhan, eds., The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004), pp. 1-24.
19. İlhan Uzgel, Türkiye ve Balkanlar: Bölgesel Güç Yanilsamasinin Sonu, in Mustafa Aydin and Çaǧri Erhan, eds., Beş Deniz Havzasinda Türkiye (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006), pp. 219-55.
20. Turkey's active role in Afghanistan seems to be the exception but one has to consider it in the context of the American military presence there. Without U.S. intervention and its aftermath, it would have been hard to imagine Turkey playing an extended role in the region.
21. Soli Özel, Türkiye'nin Diş Politikasi, Gazete Habertürk, January 3, 2010.
22. This logic also applies to Turkey's opening to Northern Iraqi Kurds as well; since the latter view Turkey as their only feasible door to outside world, they are forced to normalize relations with Turkey.
23. Altunişik, Worldviews and, pp. 184-187; also, former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's attendance of Syrian leader Hafez Assad's funeral in 2000 was path-breaking for its time.
24. Ian O. Lesser, Decoding the Erdoǧan Visit, German Marshall Fund of the United States, On Turkey Series, Washington, DC, December 15, 2009.
25. Kirişçi, The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy.
26. Ziya Öniş, Turkey and the Middle East after September 11: The Importance of the EU Dimension, Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 2003, pp. 83-92.
27. An important mechanism through which Turkey's involvement in the Middle East gained pace was the foreign ministerial meetings among the countries bordering Iraq. This platform served Turkey's goal of addressing the challenges posed by the instability in Iraq, including the threat of the PKK. See Ali BalciandMurat
28. Yeşiltaş, Turkey's New Middle East Policy: The Case of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's Neighboring Countries, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 29, No. 4, Summer 2006, pp. 18-38.
29. See, Ahmet Davutoǧlu, Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, Insight Turkey, vol. 10, No. 1, January-March 2008, pp. 77-96
30. Bülent Aras, Davutoǧlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, SETA Policy Brief, No.32, Ankara, 2009; for a review of Davutoǧlu's book, Strategic Depth, in English, see: Hasan T. Kösebalaban Review of Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position Middle East Journal, vol. 55, No. 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 693-694.
31. For an argument that this civilizational approach plays a large role in recent Turkish foreign policy initiatives, see Duran, Türk Diş Politikasi.
32. Fulya Özerkan, Architect of 'Strategic Depth' Concept Unveils New Foreign Policy, Hürriyet Daily News, January 4, 2010.
33. See, among others, his May 2009 state of the Union address. Available at: http://www.bbm.gov.tr/Forms/p_NationAnouncemet.aspx.
34. See Gül's address outlining his foreign policy vision, delivered at the opening of an Ankara-based think-tank, dated November 4, 2009: http://www.tccb.gov.tr/basin/arama/aramaDetay.aspx?id=4002&tip=konus ma&dil=tr.
35. Steven A. Cook, Turkey's War at Home, Survival, vol. 51, No. 5, October-November 2009, p. 111.
36. Ibid., p. 116.
37. USAK, Türk Diş Politikasinda Yön Deǧişimi ve Komşular ile İlişkiler Algilama Anketi, December 2009, available at: http://www.usak.org.tr/haber.asp?id=295.
38. This assumption is largely predicated on the argument that Turkish society is becoming more conservative and less tolerant of diversity. Ali Çarkoǧlu and Ersin Kalaycioǧlu, The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
39. Şaban KardaşandNihat Ali Özcan, Turkey's PKK Responds to AKP Flirtation with the Kurdistan Regional Government, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 6, No. 23, December 8, 2008.
40. See, USAK, 4. USAK Diş Politika Algilama Anketi, Ankara, August 2009, available at: http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/TDPAnket4_TFP.pdf.
41. Most Western analyses are based on the Transatlantic Trends survey. The latest results, released in September 2009, identify a Turkish enigma, because, unlike the growing popularity of American policies in Europe under the Obama administration, Turks still remain skeptical of the U.S. role in international and regional affairs. Available at: http://www.gmfus.org/trends/index.html. These results corroborate the findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, released on July 23, 2009
42. which identified that although the election of Obama improved the U.S. image around the world, in Turkey along with other Muslim nations, U.S. favorability ratings still remained low. Available at: http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/264.pdf.
43. Ömer Taşpinar, Pragmatic Populism or Islamic Extremism? Today's Zaman, November 16, 2009.
44. This paragraph is based on USAK, 4. USAK Diş Politika.
45. This result also accords with the Turkish elite's sensitivity to the PKK threat.
46. USAK, Türk Diş Politikasinda.
47. These results corroborate earlier studies that identified an anomaly of sorts: despite their skepticism toward the West and their failure to identify with European values, Turks were in favor of EU membership because of the material benefits of European integration. Moreover, it is also worth noting that the impetus for opening to Syria and Iraq comes mainly from the business community in Southeastern Turkey, which stands to benefit from these engagements the most. Similarly, the business community in the Black Sea and Eastern Anatolia regions has increasingly become an advocate of Turkey's growing activism in the South Caucasian affairs.
48. Davutoǧlu even maintains that those who insist on using this concept are ill-intentioned as they spread this concept to undermine Turkey's new initiatives by presenting them as imperialistic moves. See his interview: Davutoǧlu Yeni Osmanli'ya Karşi, Sabah, December 4, 2009.
49. Davutoǧlu: Hatti Diplomasi Yoktur Sathi Diplomasi Vardir, Satih Ise Tüm Dünyadir, Radikal, January 5, 2010.
50. Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey, Turkey's Transformers: The AKP Sees Big, Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, No. 6, November/December 2009, p. 118.
51. See Davutoǧlu's interview to 24 TV, dated January 7, 2010, available at: http://www.yirmidort.tv/haber/politika/ahmet-davutoglu-24e-konustu-h1297 .htm.
52. The concept of regional power as understood here is based on Mohammed Ayoob, From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53, No. 3, November 1999, pp. 247-60
53. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
54. The concept is borrowed from Dmitri Trenin, Russia's Spheres of Interest, Not Influence, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, pp. 3-22.
55. What is interesting is that the opposition parties even charge the JDP with acting too much in line with the Western agenda in the region, as they view skeptically any involvement of international actors in the Middle East.
56. Yalim Eralp, Gazze'ye Yardim Konvoyu Ve Orta Doǧu Dengeleri, CNN Türk News Portal, January 7, 2010.
57. Aware of the strains placed on the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy by the recent expansive agenda, Davutoǧlu initiated a reform of the ministry in order to increase the number of personnel and improve the quality of training. He is also seeking to convince the Cabinet to increase the resources of the ministry drastically.
58. Indeed, a survey of Middle Eastern publics conducted by a Turkish think tank, TESEV, demonstrates that the people in the region welcome Turkey's growing role in the region. But just as Turkish society, they prioritize bread and butter issues over the Palestinian problem. See Mensur Akgün, et.al., Orta Doǧu'da Türkiye Algisi, TESEV Diş Politika Analiz Serisi No. 10, İstanbul, December 2009. Available at: http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/Orta%20Doǧu%20Rapo r_WEB18_12_09.pdf.
59. Another change in metaphors is the JDP leaders' rejection of Turkey's serving as model to Islamic countries. Instead, they highlight Turkey's role in the Islamic world. See İbrahim Kalin, The Turkish Role and the Aspirations of a Rising Global Power, Today's Zaman, July 31, 2009.
60. Davutoǧlu, Turkey's Foreign Policy, p. 78.
61. The discussion in this section draws on Şaban Kardaş, Geo-strategic Position As Leverage in EU Accession Process: The Case of Turkish-EU Negotiations on Nabucco Pipeline, unpublished manuscript.
62. For an early review, of the domestic debate on EU membership, see: Hasan Kösebalaban, Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures, Middle East Policy, vol. 9, No. 2, June 2002, pp. 130-46.
63. Davutoǧlu, Turkey's Foreign Policy, p. 92.
64. Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yilmaz, Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era, Turkish Studies, vol. 10, No. 1, March 2009, pp. 7-24.
65. For a provocative argument that Turkey and the United States lack a common strategic vision, see Graham Fuller's remarks delivered at a conference: Türkiye Artik ABD Müttefiǧi Deǧil, Sabah, October 30, 2008.
66. See the Forum Major Powers and the Middle East, Middle East Policy, vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 2009, pp. 1-26.
67. Şaban Kardaş, Turkish-American 'Strategic Partnership': On the Way to Rejuvenation? Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 6, No. 45, March 9, 2009.
68. See the debate during a recent hearing at the U.S. House of Representatives, which was also attended by some Turkish speakers: Turkey Hearing in U.S. Congress Sees Tension, Controversy, Today's Zaman, December 5, 2009.