The hidden dialogue: When judicial competitors collaborate

Global Jurist

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2008, Pages

  Martinico, Giuseppe ^a   Fontanelli, Filippo ^a  

^a SCUOLA SUPERIORE SANT ANNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

comity; European Court of Justice; international tribunals; judicial dialogue; national constitutional courts

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953704756     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19342640     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1934-2640.1280     Document Type: Review

References (180)

1. This concept will be explained in Section V of this article.
2. V. Ferreres Comella, 'La Constitución española ante la clausola de primacia del Derecho de la Unión europea. Un comentario a la Declaración 1/2004 del Tribunal Constitucional 1/2004', in A. Lopez Castillo - A. Saiz Arnaiz - V. Ferreres Comella, Constitución española y constitución europea (Centro de estudios políticos y constitucionales, 2005) 77-100, 80-89.
3. This formula has been introduced in the Italian scholarly debate by Paolo Barile: P. Barile, 'Ancora su diritto comunitario e diritto interno' in Studi per il XX anniversario dell'Assemblea costituente, VI (Firenze, 1969) 49.
4. About the notion of contrepoids au pouvoir see: B. Manin, 'Frontières, freins et contrepoids - La séparation des pouvoirs dans le débat constitutionnel américain de 1787', (1994) Revue française de sciences politiques, 257-293;
5. T. Georgopoulos 'The checks and balances doctrine in member states as a rule of EC law: the cases of France and Germany', (2003) 9 European Law Journal, 530-548.
6. It is very interesting to notice that the notion of the counter-limits implies a sort of constitutional and moral superiority of the national legal orders with regard to the supranational level. This form of constitutional superiority is usually justified by the existence of the democratic deficit which characterizes the EU. See, for example, Solange I (see note below): 'the Community still lacks a democratically legitimated parliament directly elected by general suffrage which possesses legislative powers and to which the Community organs empowered to legislate are fully responsible on a political level.'
7. BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht. de/,
8. English translation available in 2 CMLR 540 (1974), Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel.
9. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 180/1974: 'Questo Collegio ha, nella sent. n. 183/73, già avvertito come la legge di esecuzione del Trattato possa andar soggetta al suo sindacato, in riferimento ai principi fondamentali del nostro ordinamento costituzionale e ai diritti inalienabili della persona umana'. On this point see M. Cartabia, Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea (Giuffrè, 1995).
10. But see also Conseil d'Etat, dec. Sarran, 30 October 1998;
11. Cour de Cassation, dec. Fraisse, 2 june 2000;
12. Conseil d'Etat, dec. SNIP, 3 December 2001.
13. In addition see: Conseil Constitutionnel 2004-496-497-498-499 DC 2004-505 DC, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
14. Tribunal Constitucional, declaracìon 1/2004. About this point, see V. Ferreres Comella, La Constitución española cit., 80-89,
15. and A. Saiz Arnaiz, 'De primacia, supremazia y derechos fundamentales en la Europa integrada: la Declaración del Tribunal Constitucional de 13 diciembre de 2004 y el Tratado por el que establece una Constitución para Europa',
16. A. Saiz Arnaiz, 'De primacia, supremazia y derechos fundamentales en la Europa integrada: la Declaración del Tribunal Constitucional de 13 diciembre de 2004 y el Tratado por el que establece una Constitución para Europa',ibidem, 51-75.
17. McWhirter and Gouriet v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, [2003], EWCA civ 384. On this point see A. Biondi, 'Principio di supremazia e "Costituzione" inglese. I due casi "Martiri del sistema metrico" e "Mc Whirter and Gouriet"', available at www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index3.php?option=com-content&task= view&id=101&Itemid=82.
18. Højesteret, Carlsen v Rasmussen, [1999] 3 CMLR 854.
19. According to the Carlsen doctrine if there is a doubt about the consistency of the EC act with the Constitution, the Constitutional Courts could raise the question by asking the Court of Justice to clarify the exact meaning of the norm. If the Court of Justice did not convince them of the compatibility, they could "apply" the counter-limits theory. Such a vision demonstrates that the Constitutional Courts have the last word even though they have accepted the preliminary ruling.
20. Trybunał konstytucyjny, P 1/05, available at www.trybunal.gov.pl/ eng/index.htm
21. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04 (EAW case), available at www. bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
22. 294/2005, available at www.cylaw.org
23. Ústavní Soud, Pl. ÚS 66/04, available at http://angl.concourt.cz/angl-verze/doc/pl-66-04.php.
24. In the paper we will focus on the first pillar because of the differences existing between Art. 234 ECT and 35 EUT. As for the role of the Court of Justice in this ambit see: J. Komarek, 'European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: in search of the limits of contrapunctual principles', Jean Monnet Working paper, 10/05, available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/ 05/051001.html.
25. The pillar structure is a helpful image reflecting the distribution of competences within the European order. The first pillar covers Community's policies. The second pillar concerns common foreign and security policy, whilst the third pillar covers police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
26. Reading, respectively: '[220] The Court of Justice [...] shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed'; '[234] The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB [...]'; '[292] Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein [i.e., before the Court of Justice]'. Despite the similarities existing between Art. 234 ECT and Art. 35 of EUT some differences, in fact, are evident: see for example the lack of distinction between supreme courts (i.e. 'a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law') and other courts in Art. 35 EUT as regards the duty ('shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice') or the faculty ('may request the Court of Justice') to raise the question to the Court of Justice.
27. BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986), English translation available in 3 CMLR 225 (1987), re the application of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft.
28. BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993), English translation available in 1 CMLR 57 (1994), Manfred Brunner et al v. The European Union Treaty.
29. BVerfGE 102, 147 (2000), available at http://www. bundesverfassungsgericht.de.
30. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 232/1989, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
31. See M. Cartabia - J. Weiler, L'Italia in Europa (Mulino, 2000), 171-172.
32. It is possible, indeed, to notice a strong evolution in the Italian Constitutional Court case-law: compare, for example, case No. 14/1964- where the Italian Constitutional Court interpreted the relationship between national and EC acts in the light of chronological criterion (on the basis of the fact that the enabling act of ratification of the European Treaties was an ordinary legislative act)- with cases No. 183/1973 - where the Constitutional Court recognized the constitutional basis of EC law supremacy in Art. 11 of the Italian Constitution - and 170/1984 (where the Italian Court entrusted such a control to the national ordinary judges). In Spain, the Tribunal Constitucional used Art. 93 of the Spanish Constitution as a basis to found the EC law supremacy without giving the EC law a constitutional degree in the legal sources system. Nevertheless, it is possible to notice a strong evolution in Tribunal Constitucional case-law from the judgment No. 28/1991 and Declaración No. 1/1992 up to the very recent declaration 1/2004. In this case the Spanish justices adopted a more substantial reading of Art. 93 of the Constitution, no longer conceiving it as a merely procedural clause. As we know, the German justices softened their argumentations after Solange I by conceiving a form of cooperation between courts for the protection of fundamental rights ("Kooperationverhältnis") although they have never completely abandoned the dualistic vision. Before 1992, then, they employed Art. 24 of Basic Law (on the participation to international organizations) to explain the penetration of the EC law.
33. 34/79 Henn and Derby [1979] ECR 3795.
34. 182/83 Fearon c. Irish Land Commission [1984] ECR 3677.
35. 348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I- 11.
36. 151/78 Sukkerfrabiken Nykobing [1979] ECR, 1147.
37. 172/99 Liikenne [2001] ECR 475.
38. Cour d'Arbitrage, 19 February 1997, No. 6/97, available at www.arbitrage.be/fr/common/home.html.
39. VfGH, 10 March 1999, B 2251/97, B 2594/97, available at www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-site.
40. Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas, Decision of 8 May 2007, available at www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/2007/d070508.htm.
41. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 102/2008 and ordinanza No. 103/2008, both available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
42. See Italian cases Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 206/1976; Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 168/1991 and Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 536/1995, all available at www.cortecostituzionale.it; Spanish case Tribunal Constitucional, sentencia No. 372/1993, available at www.tribunalconstitucional. es; French case Conseil Constitutionnel, 2006-540 DC, available at www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr.
43. 54/1996 Dorsch Consult Ingenieursgesellschaft / Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] ECR I- 4961.
44. A similar strategy was recently followed by the Italian Constitutional Court, that was called to rule on the status of treaty international law in the domestic hierarchy of sources of law. See Corte Costituzionale, sentenze No. 348 and 349 /2007. See also the comment by F. Biondi Dal Monte and F. Fontanelli, 'The Decisions No. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court: The Efficacy of the European Convention in the Italian Legal System', (2008) 9 German Law Journal, 889-932.
45. See Tribunal Constitucional, sentencia No. 28/1991, available at www.tribunalconstitucional.es. Concerning the terminology used by the Tribunal Constitucional see: C. Vidal Prado, El impacto del nuevo derecho europeo en los Tribunales Constitucionales (Madrid, 2004) 156-159.
46. High Court- Queen's Bench Division Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, CMLR, 50.
47. Tribunal Constitucional, declaración 1/2004, available at www.tribunalconstitucional.es.
48. Tribunal Constitucional, sentencia 58/2004, available at www.tribunalconstitucional.es.
49. A. Pizzorusso, 'Le fonti del diritto', in A. Scialoja - G. Branca (eds.), Commentario del codice civile, Disposizioni sulla legge in generale (Artt. 1-9) (Bologna-Roma) 1977, 15. Pizzorusso tried to look at the effects of a normative act or fact, finding in its erga omnes effects (conceived as the opposite of the inter partes effects which characterize, instead, a contract) the common feature of all the sources of law in order to overcome the critiques put forward towards the theory of the general and abstract act.
50. M. Cartabia, 'Il processo costituzionale: l'iniziativa. Considerazioni sulla posizione del giudice comune di fronte a casi di 'doppia pregiudizialità', comunitaria e costituzionale', (1997) 5 il Foro italiano, 222-225.
51. For a very similar point of view about the dual preliminarity see in English M. Cartabia, 'Taking Dialogue Seriously' The Renewed Need for a Judicial Dialogue at the Time of Constitutional Activism in the European Union', Jean Monnet Working paper, 12/07, available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/07/ 071201.html. See Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No.536/1995, and Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 319/1996, both available at www. cosrtecostituzionale.it.
52. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 113/1985, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
53. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 389/1989, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
54. Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 536/1995, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
55. Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 165/2004, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
56. Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 165/2004, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
57. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 102/2008 and ordinanza No. 103/2008, www.cortecostituzionale.it. As we wrote in the incidenter proceeding the principle of "mutual impermeability" between EC and national law: was applied; according to the decisions No. 384/1994 and 94/1995 the Italian Constitutional Court decided to "centralise" the questions of consistency between national and EC law and to solve them within the framework of the principaliter proceeding.
58. 106/77 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato /Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629.
59. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 170/1984, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
60. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 64/1990, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
61. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 113/1985, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
62. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 389/1989, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
63. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 168/91, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. Contra, see 104/86 Commission / Italy, [1988] ECR 1799.
64. The exceptions to this scheme are represented by the following: 1) the case of the "principaliter proceeding" (when the legislative act-which is supposed to be unconstitutional- is contested by a Region or the State on the basis of art. 127 of the Italian Constitution); 2) the case of contrast between national norms and non-directly effective or directly-applicable EC rules; 3) the case of violations of the national counter-limits; 4) within the control of admissibility of abrogative referendum (sentenze No.64/1990 and 41/2000); 5) the permanent contrast between internal norms and a fundamental principle of the European Community (sentenza No.286/1986). In these cases the Constitutional Court considered itself to be competent. See P. Costanzo - L. Mezzetti - A. Ruggeri, Lineamenti di diritto costituzionale dell'Unione europea (Torino, 2006) 284.
65. 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125.
66. T-231/02 Gonnelli e Aifo v. Commission [2004] ECR II-1051.
67. 6/64 Costa [1964] ECR 1141.
68. For example M. Cartabia - J .H. H. Weiler, L'Italia in Europa (Mulino, 2000) 73.
69. About the ambiguity of the notion of constitutionalisation in EC/EU Law see: F. Snyder, 'The unfinished constitution of the European Union', in J. H. H. Weiler - M. Wind (eds.), European constitutionalism beyond the state (Cambridge University Press, 2003);
70. B. Rittberger - F. Schimmelfennig, 'The Constitutionalization of the European Union. Explaining the Parliamentarization and Institutionalization of Human Rights', available at www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/ Rittberger&Schimmelfennig%20Princeton%20memo.pdf.
71. 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491.
72. 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419.
73. 387/02 Berlusconi and others [2005] ECR I-3565.
74. 36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, par. 41.
75. 387/02 Berlusconi and others [2005] ECR I-3565.
76. A. Ruggeri, '"Tradizioni costituzionali comuni" e "controlimiti", tra teoria delle fonti e teoria dell'interpretazione', (2003) 1 Diritto Pubblico Comparato e Europeo, 102-120, the best example of such a dynamic is provided by the EC principle of proportionality. It was clearly "extracted" from the German legal tradition, although the classic three-step partition (Geeignetheit, Erforderlichkeit, Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung im engeren Sinne) elaborated by the German judges is rarely respected by the Court of Justice. Moreover the translation of the German principle in the supranational context has been enriched by the French experience of the "bilan avantages- coûts'" as elaborated in the Conseil d'Etat case-law.
77. About this phenomenon see D. U. Galetta, 'Il principio di proporzionalità comunitario e il suo effetto di spill over? negli ordinamenti nazionali' (2005) Nuove Autonomie, 541-557.
78. About the common constitutional traditions as sources of EC Law see: A. Pizzorusso, 'Common Constitutional Traditions in Europe as a Source of Community Law' in A. Auer - J. D. Delley -M. Hottelier - G. Malinverni (eds.), Aux confins du droit - Essais en l'honneur du Professeur C.A Morand (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2001), 307-319.
79. 112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, par. 80.
80. See, to that effect, case 62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-2575, paragraph 23, and case 404/92 P X v Commission [1994] ECR I-4737, paragraph 18.
81. About Omega and Schmidberger see the wonderful piece by Alberto Alemanno 'À la recherche d'un juste équilibre entre libertés fondamentales et droits fondamentaux dans le cadre du marché intérieur. Quelques réflexions à propos des arrêts Schmidberger et Omega', (2004) 4 Revue du droit de l'Union Européenne, 709-751.
82. 341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd/Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet et a. [2007] ECR I-11767.
83. 438/05 The International Transport Workers' Federation and The Finnish Seamen's Union [2007] ECR I-10779.
84. G. Morbidelli, 'La tutela dei diritti tra la Corte del Lussemburgo e Corte Costituzionale', in G. Morbidelli - F. Donati (eds.), Una costituzione per l'Unione europea (Giappichelli, 2006), 9, 23-24.
85. 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR, 629.
86. 264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries [1998] ECR I-4695.
87. 6/64 Costa Enel [1964] ECR, 1141.
88. 14/68 Walt Wilhelm [1969] ECR 1.
89. 93/71 Leonesio [1972] ECR 287. See D. Piquani, 'Supremacy of European Law revisited: New developments in the context of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe', paper presented at the VII World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional law, Athens, 11-15 June 2007, available at www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w4/Paper%20by%20Darinka%20Piqani.pdf
90. But about this point see the language used by the French scholars with regard to the recent Arcelor judgment (Conseil d'Etat, Assemblée Société Arcelor et autres, 8 février 2007, available at www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index-ac-ld0706.shtml ).
91. In Bagehot's meaning: W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (Cambridge, 2001) 8.
92. J. H. H. Weiler, 'Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg' (2000) Harvard Jean Monnet Paper available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/ 00/001001.html
93. A. A. Ostrovsky, 'What's So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? How the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine Preserves Core Human Rights within Cultural Diversity and Legitimises International Human Rights Tribunals', (2005) 1 Hanse Law Review, 47-64.
94. 302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099.
95. 84 249/96 Grant c. South west trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-621.
96. 13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143. See O. Pollicino, 'Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle of Equality Between Judicial Activism and Self-restraint', (2004) 5 German Law Journal, 283-317.
97. 4/73 Nold 1973 [1975] ECR 491.
98. 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm, [1969] ECR 419.
99. 36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609.
100. O. Pollicino, 'Against the idea of "Americanization" of European judicature in the context of the new era of judicial globalization', (2007) 1 Panóptica, 407-440;
101. G. Martinico - O. Pollicino, 'Between constitutional tolerance and judicial activism: the "specificity" of the European judicial law' (2008) 1 European Journal of Law Reform, 97-125.
102. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 102/2008, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
103. The principaliter proceedings are related to claims lodged directly by the Central Government or by the Regions before the Constitutional Court. The incidenter proceedings, on the contrary, consist of claims filed by an ordinary judge (known as judge a quo, a Latin expression meaning "from which", referring to the fact that the question stems "from" the judge) who has a doubt on the constitutionality on a national provision he should apply. The former is a direct review of a piece of legislation which also entails an abstract nature, whereas the latter is a form of indirect review of the challenged provisions, that bears a concrete nature (i.e., the outcome of the constitutionality review is decisive for the settlement of the dispute pending before the referring judge).
104. See above in Section II.
105. The decision is also relevant as regards two other hidden techniques: whilst it seems to overlook the distinction between non-application and disapplication (the "disapplying" action was mentioned), it agrees upon the theoretical grounds of the separation between primacy and supremacy, when it gives a description of the domestic and supranational legal orders as being two autonomous systems, although integrated and coordinated.
106. On the concept of interpretive competition between judicial bodies, see K. Alter, 'Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration', in A. Slaughter - A .Stone Sweet - J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European Court and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in its Social Context (Oxford, 1997), 227-252
107. See extensively A. Gattini, 'Un regard procédural sur la fragmentation du droit international' (2006) 110 RGDIP, 303, and
108. A. Reinisch, 'The use and limits of res judicata and lis pendens as procedural tools to avoid conflicting dispute settlement outcomes', (2004) 3 Journal of Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 37.
109. Regarding the applicability of procedural principles drawn from private international law studies, we share P. M. Dupuy remarks, see 'L'Unité d'Application du Droit International à l'Echelle Globale et Responsabilité des Juges', (2008) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies, 21.
110. See on this point F. Snyder, 'Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and EU Law', (1999) 5 European Law Journal, 334, 374, where the Author refers to what we roughly define here 'systems' by using the lightening concept of 'sites of governance'. After describing their features, their functions and their somehow shapeless nature, the Author concludes by confirming the insufficiency of conflict of norms rules to discipline their mutual relationships: 'the various sites [of governance] are not all necessarily hierarchically ordered in relation to each other. Instead, they demonstrate many other types of interrelationships, sometimes hierarchical, sometimes not, sometimes competing, sometimes collaborating. In other words, even when viewed very broadly, they do not make up a legal system.' In our paper we investigate those interrelationships that places themselves on the borderline between legally bound praxes and collaborating behaviours, still trying to figure out the actual (strategic) motivations that cause them.
111. As P. M. Dupuy states (see L'Unité cit., 1): 'L'examen de la structure actuelle des relations entre juridiction internes et internationales d'une part, internationales entre elles d'autre part, conduit en tout cas à la conclusion qu'au-delà de toutes les institutions juridiques, c'est d'abord dans la tète des juges eux-mêmes que se résout la question.' Given the lack of specific provisions, it rests with the judge to choose whether to take care of the unity of international law, and of the consistency of its application.
112. As J. Allard and A. Garapon recalls, the word comity comes from the Latin "comitas gentium", an expression referring to the benevolence and generosity of the peoples, a sort of international courtesy, see Les juges dans la mondialisation - la nouvelle révolution du droit, (2005) Editions du Seuil.
113. See also M. Delmas Marty, Le relatif et l'universel. Les forces imaginantes du droit, (2004) Editions du Seuil, and
114. Le pluralisme ordonné, (2006) Editions du Seuil, Parigi, and
115. A. M. Slaugther, 'A Global Community of Courts', (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal, 191.
116. See Y. Shany, 'Jurisdictional Competition between National and International Courts: Could International Jurisdiction-Regulating Rules Apply?', (2006) Hebrew University International Law Research Paper No. 02-06, 54: 'the comity framework of analysis seems to provide [...] a more adequate method of balancing between the competing interests of the national and international legal system than rigid pro-integration rules, such as res judicata or lis alibi pendens.'
117. We will provide below narrower and more opportune definitions of comity, suffice it here to recall the first formulation Justice Gray gave in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 40 L. Ed. 95, 16 S. Ct. 139 (1895): 'Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation [...] nor of mere courtesy and good will [...]. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to both international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.' For an overview of the concept, see J. Paul, 'Comity in International Law', (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal, 1.
118. On the point, see M. Bronckers, 'The Relationship of EC Courts with Other International Tribunals: Non-committal, Respectful or Submissive?', (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review, 601.
119. I owe many of the ideas developed in this paragraph to E. U. Petersmann's teaching, see e.g. the recent essay 'Do Judges Meet their Constitutional Obligation to Settle Disputes in Conformity with 'Principles of Justice and International Law'?', (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies.
120. See BverfGE 73, 339, cit.
121. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v.Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 (30 June 2005).
122. See Council Regulation (EEC) No 990/93 of 26 April 1993 concerning trade between the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), OJ L 102, 28 April 1993, 14.
123. See UN Security Council resolution No. 820 of 17 April 1993.
124. The ECHR fails in addressing directly the imperative nature of the Security Council resolution to which the regulation conformed: the natural consequence of the reasoning held by the Strasbourg Court would have then been to verify whether the UN system itself could be deemed to offer an 'equivalent protection' of fundamental rights. See F. Hoffmeister, 'Comment to Bosphorous Hava Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirket v. Ireland. App. 45036/98', (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law, 442, 448.
125. This curiosity has also been noted by S. Douglas-Scott, in his comment on the decision 'Bosphorous Hava Yollari Turzim Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland', (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, 243, 246. It is not a case that the Author state, ibid, that the EctHR appears to desire a comity relationship between the courts, or at least a pattern of co-operation.
126. See also N. Lavranos, 'Das So-Lange-Prinzip im Verhältnis von EGMR und EuGH', (2006) 41 European Review, 79.
127. In para. 156 this presumption is explained: by merely implementing obligations flowing from the organization it is part of, a State is presumed to be complying the Convention's requirements. Such a presumption can be rebutted if the protection provided by the organization, and carried out by the State, were to be manifestly deficient. 'In such cases, the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a "constitutional instrument of European public order" in the field of human rights (Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, § 75).' This wording recalls the counter-limit rhetoric, in which reactions are foreseen just in case of patent infringement of fundamental values.
128. 110 As S. Douglas-Scott sharply concludes, see Bosphorous cit., 253.
129. According to E. U. Petersmann (see Do Judges cit., 21) the Solange mechanism that we have described 'should serve as a model for 'conditional cooperation' among international courts and national courts also in international economic law, environmental law and human rights law beyond Europe'. In addition, see the reasoning by N. Lavranos (quoted ibidem, 35 fn 99, from a forthcoming essay): the Author argues that the Solange method, and comity in general, could be conceived as the content of a peculiar obligation of the judge, that of settling a single dispute according to justice principles.
130. See J. Habermas, 'Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights' in id, The Postnational Constellation, (Cambridge, 2001), 113.
131. See C. Joerges, 'Rethinking European Law's Supremacy' (2005) EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2005/12, available at www.iue.it, 21: 'Deliberative Supranationalism II [based on governance rather than normative mechanisms] has to respect and to organize diversity, just as European conflict of laws does. Only then can it ensure the development of law-mediated governance practices and conflict resolutions which 'deserve recognition.' [Habermas formula]'.
132. See SPP v Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction I, 27 November 1985, 3 ICSID Reports 121, 129.
133. See S. Maljean Dubois and J.C. Martine, 'L'affaire de l'Usine Mox devant les tribunaux internationaux' (2007) 134, JDI, 438, 450.
134. See A.M. Brown, 'Comity in the Federal Courts', (1915) 28 Harvard Law Review, 589, 589: 'it is perhaps true that no more definite principle than caprice can be said, on the whole, to govern the attitude of the courts of one nation towards those of another.'
135. The abandonment of the hierarchical constitutional criterion to rule conflicts of laws and jurisdiction (in favour of proceduralisation and methodology) is sharply described in R. Nickel, 'The Riddle of Unitas in Diversitas: from Conflict of Laws to Administrative Constitutionalism?' (2005) EUI Working Paper cit., 45, 45.
136. Another model could be used, if we try to avoid the unreliability of comity as a prescriptive criterion, because of its discretionary and unforeseeable character. A. Rosas has built one in its article 'The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue', (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies. 15.
137. The Author makes a distinction, among those non bound behaviours inspired by comity, based to their different degree of compulsoriness: 'Sometimes a 'must' or a 'shall' becomes a 'should'. An example of a 'should' relationship exists in my view between the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights; especially in what I called horizontal judicial dialogue [...], it is at most a question of a 'may.'' The mention to the 'horizontal dialogue' refers to one of the category Rosas describes in this differentiation, which reflects the changeable obligatoriness of judges' action. J. Allard and A. Garapon, in their Les juges dans la mondialisation (Seuil, 2005),
138. give an effective description of the comity concept, referring as well to its etymologic origin (the comitas gentium of Roman Law), and put it halfway between information and coactions. Furthermore, they contrast comity with competitiveness, in accordance with a model that we use in this article, and that has been vastly described by A. M. Slaughter, in her A new world order (Princeton University Press, 2004).
139. After the signature of the Agreement Creating a European Economic Area, 2 May 1992.
140. For a detailed review of the facts we are describing, see extensively B. Brandtner, 'The 'Drama' of the EEA: Comments on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92', (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law, 300.
141. Art. 228(6) EC.
142. Opinion 1/91, 'Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area', O.J. (No. C110) 1.
143. See the recital No. 35 of the 1/91 Opinion, which clearly states how the EEA Court competence would be 'likely [...] to affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties and, hence, the autonomy of the Community legal order, respect of which must be assured by the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 164 of the EEC Treaty [now art. 239]. This exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confirmed by Article 219 [now art. 292] of the EEC Treaty, under which Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of that Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for in the Treaty.'
144. As B. Brandtner (The Drama cit., 309) notes. The decisions of the EEA Court would have had binding force on all EC institutions, including the Court of Justice, see recital 37 of the 1/91 Opinion. Moreover, the ECJ's opposition to the establishment of the EEA Court is less based on considerations of this latter's composition (as in Opinion 1/76, dealing on the establishment of a mixed Swiss - Court of Justice Tribunal) than on doubts about its very existence.
145. See the related webpage, accessible through the EFTA website at: http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/EuropeanEconomicArea/institutions/ EEAJointCommittee
146. See Opinion 1/92 of 10 April 1992, 'Draft agreement relating to the creation of the European Economic Area', O.J. (No. C136) 1.
147. 377/02 NV Firma Leon Van Parys v Belgisch Interventie - an Restitutiebureau [2005] ECR I- 1465, para. 42; 149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, para. 36-40.
148. See Art. 22 of DSU, in particular para. 2 and 8. Among the many contributions available on the WTO - EC issue, see M. Recanati, 'Sugli effetti delle decisioni dell'organo di conciliazione dell'OMC nell'ordinamento comunitario', (2007) 12 Diritto dell'Unione Europea, 437.
149. See the Opinion of Advocate General A. Tizzano, delivered on 18 November 2004 Case 377/02 cit., para. 106: 'since the DSB decision [...] found that the regime was not consistent with those [WTO] rules, it follows that the Court, which is required to determine the matter, has no alternative but to reach a negative conclusion, that is to say to declare that the acts on which the regime in question is based are invalid.'
150. And stated in Artt. 220 and 234 of the EC Treaty.
151. It is worth here to remind that Art. 23 of the DSU of the WTO provides for 'exclusive jurisdiction' of the DSB on WTO law disputes, as art. 292 CE provides for Court of Justice's 'exclusive jurisdiction' on EC law disputes. Although the Court has shown its tendency to misappropriate jurisdiction on mixed competences, we do not think that the DSB will easily back this trend, if asked to renounce is monopoly over WTO law. This scenario is similar to the German Constitutional Court - Court of Justice relationship, described by R. Stith, 'Securing the Rule of Law through Interpretive Pluralism: An Argument from Comparative Law' (2007) NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/07, 38: as neither court is certain in advance of its own victory in case of clash, 'no resistance has ever actually occurred, it has only been threatened.'
152. For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between WTO law and the EC legal order, see F. Snyder, 'The Gatekeepers: The European Courts and WTO Law', (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review, 313-367.
153. See how T.C. Hartley describes this process in The foundations of European Community Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 81: 'a common tactic by the Court is to introduce a new doctrine gradually: in the first case that comes before it, it will establish the doctrine as a general principle, and if there are not too many protests, it will be reaffirmed in later cases: the qualifications can then be whittled away and the whole of the doctrine revealed.'
154. See also O. Pollicino, Legal Reasoning cit., 311, and
155. K. Alter, 'Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice', (1998) 52 International Organizations, 121, 133, for further comments on this passage. For a description of a similar but symmetric tactic (consisting of the avoidance of the direct effect problem, allegedly due to the presence of specific circumstances, which concealed instead the nascent intent not to concede WTO decisions a direct effect in the EC system)
156. see F. Snyder, The Gatekeepers cit., 335-339.
157. In P. Egli, 'Leon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB). Case C-377/02', (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law, 449, 454 the Author recalls how the Court of Justice did not allow the WTO to set of standards on which EC acts could be reviewed: EC legality could not be set by non-EC actors;
158. see also A. Antoniadis, 'The European Union and WTO law, a nexus of reactive, coactive, and proactive approaches', (2007) 6 World Trade Review, 45, 82. The Author notes, recalling the Opinion 1/91 precedent, how the Court of Justice while treating the DSB issue has to 'perform between two competing considerations: the supremacy of international law and the supremacy of Community law.'
159. See N. Lavranos, 'The MOX Plant and IJzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court Is the Supreme Arbiter?', (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law, 223;
160. P. J. Cardwell and D. French, 'Who decides? The Court of Justice's judgment on jurisdiction in the MOX Plant case', (2007) 19 Journal of Environmental Law, 121, 123.
161. Namely the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), not to be confused with the arbitral tribunal established under the OSPAR Convention, that issued a decision the same facts, or the arbitral tribunal established under Annex VII (Art. 287.5) of UNCLOS, that decided instead to apply comity, and restrain from deciding the case.
162. 459/03 European Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635, para. 132.
163. See F. Casolari, 'La sentenza MOX: la Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee torna ad occuparsi dei rapporti tra ordinamento comunitario ed ordinamento internazionale', (2007) 12 Diritto dell'Unione Europea, 327, 355.
164. In a 'judiciary federalism' structure the specialization and the 'proximity' of a tribunal to the matter at stake and to the parties of the dispute could serve as a criterion to assign the jurisdiction to a particular tribunal, see P. M. Dupuy, L'Unité cit., 2. This simile with the federal system could lead to accept another image, that of judicial subsidiarity, a concept which is embodied, for instance, in the wording of Art. 1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, according to which the Court 'and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.' The system of protection of fundamental rights set out by the ECvHR is inspired by the subsidiarity principle as well, see the remarks made by the former president of the ECtHR L. Wildhaberl, in A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?', (2002) 23 Human Rights Law Journal, 30,
165. quoted in E. U. Petersmann, Do Judges cit., 10.
166. Court of Justice judges risk, before our eyes, to resemble those Legal Realism scholars described by R.M. Unger, that are 'like a priesthood that had lost their faith and kept their jobs. They [stay] in tedious embarrassment before cold altars', see 'The critical Legal Studies Movement', (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review, 561, 675.
167. This quote is borrowed from Harvard Law Review, R. Stith, cit., 15.
168. We can quote in this respect what R. Stith, cit., 17) says about interpretive monopolists, such as the Court of Justice: 'trust in a supreme or constitutional court to apply the law correctly is more and more misplaced. As belief in legal science fades, the only secular analogue to papal infallibility disappears. To grant any court binding power to interpret the law is thus to secure only order, not some preexisting law.'
169. Let us just note how the interpretive monopoly doctrine of the Court of Justice (ie the situation in which every EC actor is bound by the interpretation given by the Court of Justice, except for the Court of Justice itself) is similar to the 'judicial supremacy doctrine' of the US Supreme Court, established since the 1958 Cooper v Aaron case, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401.
170. See K. Alter, Who are the Masters cit., 121, and studies referred therein.
171. See also O. Pollicino, Legal Reasoning cit., 284.
172. Again, the similarity of the Court of Justice's attitude with the 'judicial supremacy' US Supreme Court doctrine could lead us to compare the current US situation (characterized by continuous attacks to the US SC independence and supremacy, see A.M. Martens, 'Reconsidering Judicial Supremacy: From the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty to Constitutional Transformations', (2007) 5 Perspectives on Politics, 447) with the actual and future state of the EC system.
173. See the decisions of the Court of First Instance Yusuf Al Barakaat International Foundation and Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission (306 and 315/01), para. 156 and para. 240 (Kadi).
174. See para. 224. For a comment, see C. Tomuschat, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, 537, 544. In particular, the Court of First Instance states that the possible infringement of a EC fundamental right can not affect the validity of a Security Council resolution, and suggests that an analogue relationship is to be found in EC law, where an EC act can not suffer from the possible violation of a nationally protected right.
175. See J. Allard and A. Garapon, La mondialisation cit.: the Authors recognize that often judicial cooperation must be set into an egoistic framework, given that it could well be that the reasons triggering comity are the same that, in other occasions, determine the rise of competition between courts.
176. See A. Rosas, The European Court of Justice cit., 10. The Author underlines how the consistent praxis followed by the ECJ is that of backing up the interpretation given by the Court of Human Rights, and supports this argument by referring to the case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I- 9011 (para. 29), where the Court disregarded a precedent of its own (see cases C-46 e 227/88 Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859), justifying its decision with the adoption of the interpretation given by the Court of Human Rights in the meanwhile.
177. To a certain extent, the Court of Justice will probably have to gradually retire from fields where other international tribunals seem to offer a better 'service'. In other words, the monopoly on interpretive action can be kept by shrinking the range of issues tackled. See J. K. Cogan, 'Competition and Control in International Adjudication', (2008) 48 Virginia Journal of International Law (forthcoming). See draft available at www.law.uga.edu/intl/Cogan.pdf, 25.
178. For a list of recent or pending cases, which shows the increase of the judicial competition, see A. Rosas, The European Court of Justice cit., 15.
179. Similar borderline situations (hovering between spontaneous recognition of outer values and legal obligation flowing from superior legal order) occurred in the WTO framework as well. Suffice it here to recall the Kimberley Diamonds waiver, by which the WTO waived free trade obligations that could favour the trade of "war diamonds". The act adopted (implementing the content of a UN Security Council) could be interpreted either as a mere clarification of how jus cogens can operate within the WTO legal system or as a gracious opening of this latter to otherwise irrelevant issues. See J. Pauwelyn, 'WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds"', (2003) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law, 1177.
180. See A. Biondi and R. Mastroianni, 'Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02, Berlusconi and others', (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, 553, 569.