Lainfluencia de las relaciones laborales sobre la decisión de financiación de las empresas: Unanálisisteórico

Revista Espanola de Financiacion y Contabilidad

Volumn 31, Issue 112, 2002, Pages 529-543

  Alonso, Eduardo José Menéndez ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OVIEDO   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953640467     PISSN: 02102412     EISSN: 02102412     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2002.10779456     Document Type: Article

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