The Power Relationship between the Prime Minister and Ruling Party Legislators: The Postal Service Privatization Act of 2005 in Japan

Japanese Journal of Political Science

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 233-261

  Fujimura, Naofumi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953573660     PISSN: 14681099     EISSN: 14740060     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1468109907002642     Document Type: Article

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