Heterogeneous institutional investors and CEO compensation

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 21-46

  Zheng, Yudan ^a  

^a LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Heterogeneity; Institutional investors; Pay performance sensitivity; Preference

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953540901     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-009-0142-y     Document Type: Article

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