African and western moral theories in a bioethical context

Developing World Bioethics

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 49-58

  Metz, Thaddeus ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG   (South Africa)

Author keywords

Animal experimentation; Clinical trials; Health priorities; Informed consent; Special obligations; Sub Saharan Africa

Indexed keywords

ANIMALIA;

AFRICA; ANIMAL; ANIMAL EXPERIMENT; ARTICLE; BIOETHICS; CLINICAL TRIAL; CULTURAL FACTOR; ETHICAL THEORY; ETHICS; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HUMAN; INFORMED CONSENT; MORALITY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; STANDARD;

AFRICA; ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION; ANIMALS; BIOETHICAL ISSUES; CLINICAL TRIALS AS TOPIC; CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS; ETHICAL THEORY; HUMANS; INFORMED CONSENT; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; MORALS; QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY; SOCIAL VALUES;

EID: 77953377714     PISSN: 14718731     EISSN: 14718847     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1471-8847.2009.00273.x     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. For just one example, to act beneficently for a utilitarian means actually raising another's quality of life, whereas, for a Kantian, it involves doing what is likely to realise the other's particular ends or general ability to realise them.
2. See L.D. Manda. 2008. Africa's Healing Wisdom: Spiritual and Ethical Values of Traditional African Healthcare Practices. In Persons in Community: African Ethics in a Global Culture. R. Nicolson, ed. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press: 125-139.
3. For examples, see the bioethical application of ideas from the Nso' in Cameroon and the Igbo in Nigeria, respectively, in G. Tangwa. Bioethics: An African Perspective. Bioethics 1996; 10: 183-200, and C. Onuoha. 2007. Bioethics Across Borders: An African Perspective. Uppsala Studies in Social Ethics, Volume 34. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
4. In particular, the moral theory I advance makes no essential reference to supernatural entities or forces. For examples of those who place spiritual elements at the bottom of an African moral worldview, see B. Bujo. 2001. Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality. New York, NY: Crossroad Publishers; and N. Mkhize. 2008. Ubuntu and Harmony: An African Approach to Morality and Ethics. In Nicolson, op. cit. note 2, pp. 35-44.
5. I first developed this moral theory in some detail and argued that it best captures a wide array of recurrent intuitions in sub-Saharan Africa in T. Metz. Toward an African Moral Theory. J Polit Philos 2007; 15: 321-341. Much of the rest of this section is drawn from this article as well as from T. Metz. The Final Ends of Higher Education in Light of an African Moral Theory. J Philos Educ 2009; 43: 179-201: 182-184.
6. For a classic statement of these ubiquitous phrases, see J. Mbiti. 1969. African Religions and Philosophy. Oxford, UK: Heinemann Educational Books: 108-109.
7. As is made clear in K. Wiredu, 1992. The African Concept of Personhood. In African-American Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics. H.E. Flack & E.E. Pellegrino, eds. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press: 104-117; and I. Menkiti. 2004. On the Normative Conception of a Person. In A Companion to African Philosophy. K. Wiredu, ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd: 324-331.
8. H. Verhoef & C. Michel. Studying Morality Within the African Context. J Moral Educ 1997; 26: 389-407: 397. For the similar remark that 'in African societies, immorality is the word or deed which undermines fellowship', see P. Kasenene. 1998. Religious Ethics in Africa. Kampala: Fountain Publishers: 21.
9. S. Biko. 1971. Some African Cultural Concepts. Repr. in his I Write What I Like. Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2004: 44-53: 46.
10. D. Tutu. 1999. No Future Without Forgiveness. New York, NY: Random House: 35.
11. For another representative comment, consider this remark about the practices of the G/wi people of Botswana: '(T)here was another value being pursued, namely the establishing and maintaining of harmonious relationships. Again and again in discussion and in general conversation this stood out as a desired and enjoyed end in itself, often as the ultimate rationale for action.' G. Silberbauer. 1991. Ethics in Small-Scale Societies. In A Companion to Ethics. Peter Singer, ed. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell: 14-28: 20. See also Mkhize, op. cit. note 4.
12. I lack the space to address thoroughly the differences between this moral theory and similar ones in western thought. I point out, however, that this theory differs from the classic, feminist ethic of care in at least two ways: it prescribes sharing a way life, which goes beyond caring for others, and it is more impartial for not making reciprocity from the other necessary for having a duty to care for her. And whereas much communitarianism deems one's duties to be relativistically determined by norms that happen to be held by one's particular community, the African moral theory here is more universalist; it is the view that everyone's basic duty is to esteem communal relationship, conceived in part as sharing a way of life with others (which will vary), but also as caring about their quality of life.
13. As discussed by A. Appiah. 1998. Ethical systems, African. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. Craig, ed. London, UK: Routledge.
14. For recent discussion of the typically communal nature of traditional African societies by one of the leading African philosophers in the world, see K.Wiredu. Social Philosophy in Postcolonial Africa: Some Preliminaries Concerning Communalism and Communitarianism. S Afr J Philos 2008; 27: 332-339.
15. I qualify this principle in several respects in T. Metz. Human Dignity, Capital Punishment, and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights. J Hum Rights 2010 (forthcoming).
16. For discussion, see D. Louw, Ubuntu and the Challenges of Multiculturalism in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Quest 2001; 15: 15-36.
17. Some in the West have argued that a researcher develops a relationship of 'entrustment' with the patient, creating a duty to aid her beyond contractual obligations. The locus classicus for this idea is H. Richardson & L. Belsky. The Ancillary Care Responsibilities of Medical Researchers. Hastings Cent Rep 2004; 34: 25-33. However, this principle is 'free-floating', i.e. left hanging without a basic and comprehensive foundation, and I present an African moral theory as an attractive way to ground something like it. In future work, it would be of interest to compare the entrustment model, which invokes authorisation and vulnerability as central explanatory elements, with the rationale offered here, which does not.
18. I have discussed some of the major institutional implications of this African moral theory in T. Metz. 2009. African Moral Theory and Public Governance. In African Ethics: An Anthology for Comparative and Applied Ethics. M.F. Murove, ed. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press: 335-356.