Vacillating between Revolution and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy toward the United States, 1969-1976

Diplomatic History

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 395-423

  Yang, Kuisong ^a   Xia, Yafeng ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77953218003     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: 14677709     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00853.x     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. "CCP Central Committee: 'Notice on the Joint Sino-American Communiqué, March 7, 1972," cited in Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Archives and Manuscript Division], ed., Wenge shinian ziliao xuanbian [Selected Collection of Materials on the Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution], vol. 1(B) (Feng Pingshan Library, The University of Hong Kong, May 1981), 167-71.
2. For works praising Mao Zedong's realism in foreign policymaking, see Gong Li, Mao Zedong waijiao fengyunlu [A Record of Mao Zedong's Diplomacy] (Zhengzhou, 1996), 196-206; Qian Jian, Xiaoqiu zhuandong daqiu: Pingpang waijiao muhou [Little Ball Moves Big Ball: Behind Ping-Pong Diplomacy] (Beijing, 1997), chap. 8; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), chap. 28; Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford, CA 1995), chap. 1; John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1993), 74-81.
3. For more information on this, see "The Setbacks in the Normalization of Sino-American Relations," in Wang Taiping, chief ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1970-1978 [A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, 1970-1978] (Beijing, 1999), chap. 8, sec. v; "The Setbacks in Sino-American Negotiation on Establishing Diplomatic Relations and 'Communiqué on Establishing Diplomatic Relations'," in Qu Xing, chief ed., Zhongguo waijiao wushinian [Fifty Years of Chinese Diplomacy], chap. 11, sec. III (Nanjing, 2000). The first subtitle of this section is to the point: "The Falling Out of Office of Nixon and the Stagnation of the Sino-American Normalization Process."
4. Gong Li, "Tortuous Road to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations - The Evolution of China's U.S. Policy, 1972-1978," in Gong Li, William C. Kirby and Robert S. Ross, eds., Cong jiedong zouxiang jianjiao: Zhong Mei guanxi zhengchanghua jincheng zai tantao, 1969-1979 [From Rapprochement to the Establishment of Formal Diplomatic Relations: Re-exploring U.S.-China Normalization Process, 1969-1979] (Beijing, 2004), 129. For an English version of this book, see William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li, eds., Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History (Cambridge, MA, 2006).
5. For an English article on this topic, see Yafeng Xia, "China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 1969-February 1972," Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 3-28.
6. Gong Li, "China's High-level Decision-making and the Thaw of Sino-American Relations," in Jiang Changbin and Robert Ross, eds., Cong duizhi zouxiang huanhe - lengzhan shiqi de Zhong Mei guanxi zai tantao [From Confrontation to Détente - Re-examining Sino-American Relations during the Cold War] (Beijing, 2000), 711. For an English version of this book, see Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge, MA, 2001).
7. Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, The End of Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976 (Armonk, NY, 2007).
8. This article makes use of original documents from Zhongguo zhongyang dang'anguan [Central Archives of China, Beijing, hereafter cited as CAC] as well as collections of documents compiled and provided by CAC to selected party historians for internal use. Yang Kuisong worked at the Central Party School of the CCP for many years and has access to these original documents and internal editions.
9. As Michael M. Sheng pointed out a decade ago, the class-struggle ideology "became the foundation of the 'psychological self' " for Mao and his generation as individuals, "and the Party as a group." See Michael M. Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton, NJ, 1997), 192-93.
10. Michael M. Sheng, "Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Straits Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split," Modern China (October 2008): 477-507.
11. At the tenth plenary session of the Eighth Congress of the CCP in September 1962, Zhou Enlai declared, "The truth of Marxism-Leninism and the center of world revolution are now moving from Moscow to Beijing. . . . Now, we are not declining to shoulder the responsibility and are ready to take up the cudgels for the just cause." CAC.
12. In 1964, Mao Zedong summarized Wang Jiaxiang's suggestions as " 'three reconciliations and one reduction', that is to reconcile with the imperialists, the revisionists and the reactionaries, and to reduce assistance to the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This is a revisionist line. It is an 'international program' undermining socialism." See "Memorandum of Mao Zedong's Conversations with the Japanese Communist Party Delegation," March 23, 1964, CAC. Also see Cong Jin, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue [Years and Months of Tortuous Development] (Zhengzhou, 1989), 577.
13. For Wang Jiaxiang's suggestions, see the following documents. The first document "Our Views on Certain International Issues" and the second "Seeking Truth from Facts, and Acting According to One's Capability" are included in Editors of Wang Jiaxiang xuanji [Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang], Huiyi Wang Jiaxiang
14. [Recollections of Wang Jiaxiang] (Beijing, 1985), 444-45 and 446-60. Other documents include "Report Requesting Instructions (from the Central Committee) on Several Important Principles regarding Our Mass Organizations at International Conferences," and "How to Handle Miscalculating and Making Indiscreet Remarks in External Activities" in Xu Zehao, Wang Jiaxiang zhuan [A Biography of Wang Jiaxiang] (Beijing, 2006), 366-70; Xu Zehao, Wang Jiaxiang nianpu, 1906-1974 [The Chronology of Wang Jiaxiang, 1906-1974] (Beijing, 2001), 486-89.
15. Renmin ribao [People's Daily], April 28, 1969.
16. For four marshals' Study Group, see Xia, "China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement," 5-8.
17. Cited from Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai's Later Years] (Hong Kong, 2003), 414. For an English version of the book, see Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, A Biography, trans. Peter Rand and Lawrence R. Sullivan (New York, 2007), 310. The English version has been adapted for Western readers by adding the story of Zhou Enlai's earlier years prior to the Cultural Revolution and by elaborating the political context of the Cultural Revolution and the behavior of other actors.
18. "Mao Zedong's Conversation with the Chairman of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) Hill," November 28, 1968, CAC.
19. Xia, "China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement," 9-13.
20. "Mao Zedong's Conversation with Le Duan," May 11, 1970, and "Mao Zedong's Conversation with Kaysone Phomvihan," July 7, 1970, cited in Li Danhui, ed., Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina War] (Hong Kong, 2000), 317-24.
21. A Supreme People's Conference of delegates from three countries and four sides of Indochina, including delegates from North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and the exiled Cambodian government of Sihanouk was held in April 1970. All four sides were anti-America and supported by China.
22. Li Ping et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949-1976 [Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976], vol. 3 (Beijing, 1997), 367 (hereafter ZENP).
23. Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi & Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu [The Division of Central Archives and Manuscripts and the Foreign Ministry of the PRC], eds., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing, 1994), 584.
24. Cited in Kong Dongmei, Gaibian shijie de rizi - Yu Wang Hairong tan Mao Zedong waijiao wangshi [In the Era of a Changing World: Talking about Mao Zedong's Diplomatic Past with Wang Hairong] (Beijing, 2006), 63-64. For Snow's visit to China in 1970, see also Huang Hua, Qinli yu jianwen - Huang Hua huiyilu [Personal Experience and Eyewitness Account - Memoir of Huang Hua] (Beijing, 2007), 149-55.
25. "Mao Zedong's Conversation with the Burmese Communist Party Vice Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin," October 1, 1970, CAC.
26. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 350-51.
27. Kong, Gaibian shijie de rizi, 64-66.
28. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 592-94; Huang, Qinli yu jianwen, 154.
29. For an English discussion of the ping-pong diplomacy, see Xia, "China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement," 11-17.
30. Lin Ke, Xu Tao, and Wu Xujun, Lishi de zhenshi - Mao Zedong shenbian gongzuo renyuan de zhengyan [The True Life of Mao Zedong - Eyewitness Accounts by Mao's Staff] (Hong Kong, 1995), 308.
31. For the May 1971 CCP CC Politburo debate regarding Kissinger's secret visit, see Xia, "China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement," 17-21
32. "The Central Committee Politburo's Report on the Sino-American Negotiations" (drafted by Zhou Enlai), May 29, 1971, cited in Wenge shinian ziliao xuanbian, vol. 1 (B), 6.
33. Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972 (Bloomington, IN, 2006), 186-87.
34. Wei Shiyan, "Kissinger's Second Trip to China," in Pei Jianzhang, chief ed., Xin Zhongguo waijiao fengyun [Winds and Clouds in New China's Diplomacy], vol. 3 (Beijing, 1994), 67-69. Also Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, 179.
35. Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, 211.
36. "CCP Central Committee Circular on the Joint Sino-American Communiqué, 7 March 1972," cited in Wenge shinian ziliao xuanbian, vol. 1 (B), 167-71.
37. William Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York, 1998), 83-101; Gong Li, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo [Deng Xiaoping and the United States] (Beijing, 2004), 104-09. In the published minutes in English, which had been supplied by the Chinese, there is no mention of "China," but the word is in the Chinese record.
38. Mao Zedong, "On Policy," December 25, 1940, Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] (one-volume edition) (Beijing, 1964), 761-62.
39. "New Year Message," Renmin ribao, January 1, 1973. Huang Hua revealed in his memoir that the Chinese government, with Mao Zedong's approval, decided to retain all those anti-U.S. wall posters on the route from the airport to the Diaoyutai guesthouse during Kissinger's two trips to Beijing in 1971. John Holdridge, who was a National Security Council (NSC) staffer accompanying Kissinger on these trips and knew the Chinese language, was especially upset with wall posters such as "Down with U.S. imperialists and all reactionaries!" See Huang, Qinli yu jianwen, 162.
40. In May 1973, in an effort to build toward the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, the United States and the PRC established the United States Liaison Office in Beijing and a counterpart PRC office in Washington, DC. Huang Zhen, the director of the Chinese Liaison Office, arrived in Washington on May 29, 1973 (Figure 1).
41. Gong, "Tortuous Road to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations," 126.
42. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 423.
43. Ibid., 286.
44. Cited in Zong Daoyi, "The Beginning and the End of 'No. 153 Issue of New Information Incident' in the Foreign Ministry in 1973," Dangshi yanjiu ziliao [Materials on Party History Research], No. 5 (2001). Also see Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo, 116-17.
45. "Minutes of Mao Zedong's Talk with Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen," cited in Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 454. Also see ZENP, vol. 3, 604.
46. Li, Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng, 50.
47. For an English version of Zhou Enlai's setbacks on the foreign affairs front from May-July 1973, see Teiwes and Sun, The End of the Maoist Era, 85-93. Teiwes and Sun have suggested that Mao's furious reaction was simply an opportunity to get at Zhou, "in part due to the belief that Zhou was unreliable concerning the Cultural Revolution, but perhaps even more as a reflection of the jealousy" of Western reports praising Zhou Enlai's diplomacy. As the authors note, "The Chairman gave vent to his anger, and made clear that he was in charge of PRC foreign policy." See ibid., 90-91.
48. Zhou Enlai, "Report at the 10th Congress of the CCP," Renmin ribao, September 1, 1973.
49. Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts, 183-84. Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, chief eds., Mao Zedong zhuan, 1949-1976 [A Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976], vol. 2 (Beijing, 2003), 1669-70.
50. Wei Shiyan, "The Course of Haig's Advance Team to China in Preparation for Nixon's Visit to China," in Pei Jianzhang, ed., Xin Zhongguo waijiao fengyun, vol. 3, 78-79.
51. Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts, 204. However, the Chinese did not respond to Kissinger's offer. It was not until 1998 that they would sign a hot line agreement with the United States. Kissinger hints, "[S]ome voices in Peking may have asserted that China was 'tilting' too far toward the United States." He believed that Mao's policy was coming under great pressure. Whether his proposal and Zhou's interested response encouraged some influential Chinese to conclude that the leadership was going too far is not known. Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts, 206. We now know this is not the case. It was Mao himself who rejected the U.S. offer.
52. Ibid., 211.
53. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 463-64; Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo, 123-24.
54. This summary originated from what Qiao Guanhua transmitted to the Foreign Ministry officials after the Politburo meeting. Although Qiao did not state clearly that these were the opinions of the Politburo, we are certain that these were not Qiao's personal opinions and basically were an outline of Politburo decisions. See Wang Youping huiyilu [unpublished, Kuisong Yang's personal collection]. Wang Youping was a senior diplomat and China's ambassador to North Vietnam in early 1970s. Also see Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 466-67.
55. For an English version of the December 1973 Politburo meeting denouncing Zhou Enlai, see Teiwes and Sun, The End of the Maoist Era, 124-39. Teiwes and Sun offer a somewhat different interpretation of this event. They noted, the reasons "for Mao's strong reaction to Zhou's handling of the Kissinger talks remain relevant - a cumulative dissatisfaction with the Premier's performance since late 1972, a genuine, if unreasonable, perception of undignified behavior in negotiations with the US, and jealousy over Zhou's domestic and international prestige." They also mentioned Mao's long-held prejudice against Zhou. Mao believed, "[W]hatever Zhou's administrative abilities, and however much his loyalty could be relied on, he was ideologically weak." See ibid., 138. On the question of Mao's and Zhou's individual roles in Sino-American rapprochement and their real attitudes during this period, it is still a heatedly debated topic among scholars. We argue that Zhou Enlai is obviously a sponsor and promoter of the policy, but not an initiator and decision-maker.
56. Gao, Zhou Enlai, 243.
57. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 600-601. For an English article on the theory of "three worlds," see Herbert S. Yee, "The Three World Theory and Post-Mao China's Global Strategy," International Affairs
58. no. 2 (Spring 1983): 239-49.
59. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 469-71.
60. Gao Wenqian has suggested, "Zhou felt personal disappointment about this lost opportunity, undoubtedly his last, to represent the Chinese people to the world community at the UN, but he was even more concerned about the message that Mao's decision to send Deng in his stead conveyed to the Chinese nation." See Gao, Zhou Enlai, 258. We disagree with Gao's assertion on two counts. First, Zhou Enlai was an internationally known senior Chinese statesman. A chance to speak at the United Nations would not be crucial for him; second, Zhou was already too sick to travel abroad. To him, Deng Xiaoping was a good choice.
61. Teiwes and Sun note, "Jiang averred that she was not opposing Deng, but there was an MAC [Military Affairs Commission] conference on Li Desheng's case that Deng had to attend. What she expected of Deng at this meeting was left unstated, but she clearly believed he was indispensable." They have also suggested, "The Premier's reaction illuminates another aspect. Although party to Mao's deception, Zhou sought to limit Deng's time abroad, advocating to the Chairman a one-week trip rather than the three weeks in the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] proposal." See Teiwes and Sun, The End of the Maoist Era, 184.
62. Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo, 130-31.
63. Ibid., 129.
64. Renmin ribao, April 12, 1974.
65. Qu, Zhongguo waijiao wushinian, 373.
66. Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001), 5.
67. "Mao Zedong's Conversation with the Burmese Communist Party Vice Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin," October 1, 1970, CAC.
68. Cited in Wang Youping huiyilu.
69. "Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai's Conversations with Malaysian Prime Minister Razak," May 29, 1974, cited in Wenge shinian ziliao xuanbian, vol. 1 (C), 43-54.
70. "Mao Zedong's Conversations with Marien Ngouabi, the President of the Republic of the Congo," July 29, 1973," cited in Wenge shinian ziliao xuanbian, vol. 1 (B), 222-24.
71. Cited in Xu Dashen, chief ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu [A Factual Record of the People's Republic of China] (Changchun, China, 1994), 1159-60.