Post-disaster reconfiguration of property rights in a transition economy

Post-Communist Economies

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 193-206

  Deng, Feng ^a  

^a CHONGQING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECENTRALIZATION; DISASTER MANAGEMENT; PROPERTY RIGHTS; SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE 2008; TRADE-OFF; TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY; URBAN HOUSING;

EID: 77952840184     PISSN: 14631377     EISSN: 14653958     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14631371003740688     Document Type: Article

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