The paradoxes of pro bono

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 78, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 2443-2450

  Abel, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952718625     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. Richard L. Abel, State, Market, Philanthropy, and Self-Help as Legal Services Delivery Mechanisms, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 295, 297-99 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009).
2. See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 492-94 (1985).
3. Abel, supra note 1, at 296.
4. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. See Abel, supra note 2, at 475.
7. See JOEL F. HANDLER, ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH & HOWARD S. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 104-07 (1978);
8. Abel, supra note 1, at 296;
9. - Cf,..
10. Philip R. Lochner, Jr., The No Fee and Low Fee Legal Practice of Private Attorneys, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 431, 442-48 (1975).
11. Abel, supra note 2, at 532-33.
12. See generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: HOW CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY HALF A LAWYER (2000).
13. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18-25 (2004).
14. See NAT'L PRO BONO RES. CENTRE, SUBMISSION TO THE SENATE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO LEGAL AID AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2003), available at http://www.nationalprobono.org.au/ssl/CMS/files-cms/ senateinquiry.pdf.
15. See Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law World, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 1, 18-20 (Richard L. Abel & Phillip S. C. Lewis eds., Beard Books 2005) (1988) (describing the divergence in practice structure between the common-law world and the civil-law world).
16. Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2376 (2010)
17. (citing Aric Press, In-House at The American Lawyer, AM. LAW., July 2008, at 13).
18. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 215-23 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Library of America 2004) (1835);
19. 2 id. at 604-09.
20. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
21. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 2369-70.
22. See id. at 2369-72.
23. See id. at 2371-72.
24. DAVID WALLECHINSKY & AMY WALLACE, THE NEW BOOK OF LISTS, at xix (2005).
25. Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds, 113 AM. J. Soc. 1, 24-33 (2007);
26. Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Strength in Numbers? The Advantages of Multiple Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 205,210-12 (2006);
27. Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, The Discipline of Rankings: Tight Coupling and Organizational Change, 74 AM. Soc. REV. 63 (2009).
28. See Richard L. Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737, 749-50 (1994).
29. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 2377-79 & tbl.2.
30. See Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2070 (2008).
31. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 120-29 (2d ed., Univ. of III. Press 1993) (1981);
32. Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring: Deconstructing and Reconstructing Workplace Opportunities for Women Lawyers, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 923, 932 (2002);
33. Id.
34. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31, 44-45 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (describing research on the motivation of women who become cause lawyers).
35. Thomas Miguel Hilbink, Constructing Cause Lawyering: Professionalism, Politics, and Social Change in 1960s America 69-157 (May 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
36. The Death Penalty Project, http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
37. See generally THE GUANTANAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW (Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2009).
38. BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 9 (1977).
39. E.g., 1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1978);
40. JEREMY COOPER, PUBLIC LEGAL SERVICES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLICY, POLITICS AND PRACTICE (1983);
41. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A RESEARCH PROJECT ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR (1977);
42. G. G. MEREDITH, LEGAL AID: COST COMPARISON - SALARIED AND PRIVATE LAWYERS (1983);
43. DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, ROBERT A. KAGAN & DEBRA QUATRONE, VOLUNTEER ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: NEW YORK'S CLO PROGRAM (1971);
44. Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581 (1987).
45. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 2367-68.
46. See id. at 2391-92.
47. See id. at 2385-86 & tbl.5.
48. Id. at 2385.
49. See id. at 2393.
50. See id.
51. See ALLAN ASHMAN, THE NEW PRIVATE PRACTICE: A STUDY OF PIPER & MARBURY'S NEIGHBORHOOD LAW OFFICE 42-47 (1972);
52. SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE 166-68 (2002).
53. See ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT SCIENCE 22-25 (2002).
54. See Lochner, supra note 6, at 456.
55. DANIEL P. MOYNMAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY (1969).
56. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 2431-33.
57. See JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 26-33 (1982).