Group selection: The quest for social preferences

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 264, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 737-746

  Salomonsson, Marcus ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Altruism; Conformity; Externalities; Fixation; Signalling; Spite

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; SIGNALING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; GROUP DYNAMICS; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REPRODUCTION; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL NETWORK; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;

ANIMALS; ECOSYSTEM; FEMALE; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MALE; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, ANIMAL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SPECIES SPECIFICITY;

EID: 77952670049     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.02.035     Document Type: Article

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