Dispatch from the supreme court archives: Vagrancy, abortion, and what links between them reveal about the history of fundamental rights

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 62, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 1361-1394

  Goluboff, Risa L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

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EID: 77952645648     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (238)

1. Draft Opinion, Papachristou V. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Dec. 28, 1971) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558) [hereinafter Papachristou Draft].
2. Memorandum from Justice William O. Douglas to Justice Potter Stewart, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Jan. 27, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558);
3. Memorandum from Justice William O. Douglas to Justice Potter Stewart, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Jan. 28, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558) (handwritten notations between Justices Douglas and Stewart);
4. Memorandum from Justice William Brennan to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: No. 70-5030-Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (Dec. 30, 1971) (Brennan Papers, Box I-285)
5. Memorandum from Justice William Brennan to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 30, 1971) (Brennan Papers, Box I-285).
6. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960)
7. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 189, 212 (1985).
8. Note, at 72, 75.
9. Id. at 75-85.
10. Note, at 72, 75.
11. See, e.g., David B. Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 236-37 (1972)
12. Leonard G. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1084-86;
13. Beverly C. Moore, Jr., Note, Vagrancy and Related Offenses, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291, 303-09 (1969);
14. Note, Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus, 80
15. YALE L.J. 1261, 1266 (1971); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 845 (1970)
16. Comment, Statutory Vagueness in Juvenile Law: The Supreme Court and Mattiello v. Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 143, 152 (1969)
17. 405 U.S. 156, 162, 165-68, 171 (1972). Papachristou remains frequently cited for vagueness in criminal law casebooks.
18. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 50-53 (1997);
19. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 76-83 (3d ed. 1985)
20. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 185-88 (3d ed. 1996);
21. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 81 (2d ed. 1988);
22. MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS, CASES, AND CONTROVERSIES 28 (2007);
23. ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 243-50 (6th ed. 1998);
24. JOHN M. SCHEB & JOHN M. SCHEB II, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 53 (2d ed. 1994). Even Canadian criminal law texts cite to the case.
25. See, e.g., KENT ROACH, PATRICK HEALY & GARY TROTTER, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (9th ed. 2004).
26. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965), quoted in Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156 n.1 (1972).
27. The opinion was unanimous, but only seven Justices signed onto it. William H. Rehnquist and Lewis Powell joined the Court after argument in the case but before it was decided. They accordingly took no part in the case. 405 U.S. at 156.
28. Id. at 162.
29. Id. at 164.
30. Id. This aspirational language drew on an essay by Douglas's friend Charles Reich that described Reich's many run-ins with the police over his own wanderings and urged protection for independence, boldness, creativity, high spirits. Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1172 (1966).
31. 405 U.S. at 164 & n.7.
32. Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REV. 491, 497 (1994).
33. Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REV. 491, 497 (1994)
34. Id. at 497-98.
35. Id. at 498.
36. Id.
37. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 619 (1997).
38. Papachristou Draft, supra note 1
39. see infra app. fig.1.
40. Griswold V. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-95 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 484.
42. 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
43. 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960).
44. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
45. 395 U.S. 621, 628, 630 (1969).
46. Papachristou Draft, supra note 1.
47. See infra app. fig.2.
48. Griswold.v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965);
49. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
50. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972) (relying on equal protection rather than substantive due process); id. at 467 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
52. see also DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 181-82 (1998) (discussing various Justices' hesitance to strike down a contraception statute in 1961 due to opposition to reintroducing substantive due process). The issue continued to trouble the Court until the Roe decision.
53. See id. at 238-55 (discussing Griswold).
54. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
55. The retirement and death of Justice Hugo Black just as the 1971 Term began may have had something to do with this shift. Black had been the Court's staunchest critic of substantive due process.
56. See, e.g. HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK, WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 194-95, 200-01 (1992)
57. HOWARD BALL, THE VISION AND THE DREAM OF JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK 16-78 (1975). Though the long friendship between Black and Douglas had undergone considerable strain by the time of Black's death, Black's absence may have freed Douglas somewhat to reconsider substantive due process as a doctrinal resource.
58. See infra app. fig.2.
59. Papachristou Draft, supra note 1, at 10.
60. Id. at 16.
61. 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
62. 382 U.S. 87, 96 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
63. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 256-57 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas's commitment to the freedom of locomotion was also implicated in the stop and frisk case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where he dissented alone.
64. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1972)
65. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 76-79 (1974)
66. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, OF MEN AND MOUNTAINS 9-16 (1950)
67. Letter from William O. Douglas to Edward L.R. Elson (Dec. 7, 1977), in THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 426 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987)
68. William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70
69. YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1960). For the argument that Douglas lacked credibility as a storyteller, see BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 118-23 (2003)
70. Indeed, physical mobility has long been central to the Anglo-American conception of liberty. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (14th ed. 1803)
71. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 339 (1st ed. 1868).
72. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 158-59
73. Brief of Petitioner at 5, Papachristou, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (No. 70-5030).
74. 405 U.S. at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 170.
76. Not all vagrancy cases involved public behavior, however. In the late 1960s, for example, hippies were sometimes arrested for vagrancy while sitting in their homes.
77. See, e.g., Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969). Ironically, in Griswold, Douglas did the opposite: he transformed the quintessentially public freedom of association into a private right by closely linking it to marriage.
78. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Notes on Oral Argument in Coates v. City of Cincinnati (Jan. 11, 1971) (Blackmun Papers, Box 125).
79. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971).
80. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972)
81. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 530 (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting) (1973).
82. Roe v. Wade, Doe v. Bolton, 401 U.S. 179, 214 (1973),(Douglas, J., dissenting). The other intervening use of the term was Chief Justice Burger's in Yoder v. Wisconsin. He was clearly less comfortable with it and less committed to its protection generally, though he did protect it in that case. He referred to what we would today call 'life style' in referring to the Amish's longstanding religious and cultural practices. 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972).
83. Douglas notably did not use the term a few years later in Belle Terre v. Boraas, when he rejected a lifestyle claim in the face of zoning authority, though Thurgood Marshall used it three times in his lone dissent. 416 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 563, 611 (1977).
85. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION (1969).
86. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality, in THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION? 83 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998)
87. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Burger Court's Grapplings with Sex Discrimination, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 132 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983)
88. Stephanie Seymour, Women as Constitutional Equals: The Burger Court's Overdue Evolution, in THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION?, supra, at 66.
89. RISA GOLUBOFF, PEOPLE OUT OF PLACE: THE SIXTIES, THE SUPREME COURT, AND VAGRANCY LAW (forthcoming 2012).
90. Indeed, historians have identified the regulation of public morals in the name of social order as the easy case for the exercise of the police power in the early United States.
91. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 149-89 (1996)
92. see also CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 47-48 (1993) (arguing that the maintenance of order. was dependent upon 'close attention to prescribed forms of public conduct').
93. GOLUBOFF, supra note 58.
94. United States v. Kilgen, 431 F.2d 627, 628 (5th Cir. 1970).
95. See, e.g., Phillips v. Municipal Court of L.A., 24 Cal. App. 2d 453 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938)
96. In re McCue, 7 Cal. App. 765 (Ct. App. 1908); City of New Orleans v. Postek, 180 La. 1048 (1934). But see Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931); People v. Belcastro, 190 N.E. 301 (Ill. 1934).
97. See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 123 A. 178, 178 (Me. 1924)
98. Pellman v. Valentine, 57 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
99. THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 568-69 (2d ed. 1904).
100. GOLUBOFF, supra note 58.
101. Id.
102. Coates v. City of Cincinnati alone emerged out of student protests against the Vietnam War, union pickets, and the Cincinnati riots of 1967.
103. See 402 U.S. 611, 612, 616 n.6 (1971); Jurisdictional Statement at app. E, Coates, 402 U.S. 611 (No. 69-117)
104. Brief of Appellant at 14-15, app. C, Coates, 402 U.S. 611 (No. 69-117).
105. See GOLUBOFF
106. supra note 58, at ch. 6 (discussing the relationship between vagrancy laws and stop-and-frisk laws generally, and the relationship between Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and the Court's vagrancy cases more specifically).
107. GOLUBOFF, supra note 58.
108. Post, supra note 17, at 497-98.
109. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
110. See, e.g., Timothy C. Gerking, Note, Alternatives to Vagrancy Laws for Arizona, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORDER 881, 889-901 (discussing Arizona's proposed replacement for its unconstitutional vagrancy law and canvassing alternatives);
111. see also GOLUBOFF, supra note 58.
112. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998z U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 215-17;
113. David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87
114. GEO L.J. 1059, 1083-87 (1999)
115. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105
116. YALE L.J. 1165 (1996); Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 2 (1996)
117. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 295-97 (1998)
118. Livingston, supra note 22; Tracey L. Meares & Dan
119. M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998
120. U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 198; Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89
121. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 780 (1999)
122. Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100
123. MICH. L. REV. 371, 372-73 (2001)
124. Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitutional Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REV. 285, 287, 322 (1993)
125. Donald E. Baker, Comment, 'Anti-Homeless' Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 437-38 (1991).
126. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
127. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poor people);
128. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1956) (same)
129. U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
130. U.S. 528 (1973) (hippies)
131. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
132. (illegitimate children); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate children);
133. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (women).
134. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to self at 5, Re: Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, No. 73-191 (Jan. 29, 1974) (Blackmun Papers, Box 186).
135. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Burger Court made noises toward applying heightened scrutiny for classifications based on illegitimacy, but it was not until the Rehnquist Court that the Court explicitly applied intermediate scrutiny. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
136. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12, 18-20 (1972).
137. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (disagreeing about whether to analyze pregnancy discrimination in employment as a due process or sex discrimination problem); see also Deborah Dinner, The Campaign Against Pregnancy Dismissal 57-71 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the various competing constitutional frameworks in LaFleur).
138. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
139. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
140. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
141. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
142. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)
143. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
144. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 21 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Substance];
145. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107
146. YALE L.J. 1, 68-69 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship]
147. see Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1319 (1998). In a separate line of cases beginning with In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 694-96 (1975), the Burger Court and subsequent Courts have struggled with another way of constitutionalizing substantive criminal law: by imposing constitutional limits on the mental element required for certain crimes.
148. See, e.g., Ronald Jay Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269, 271 (1977);
149. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88
150. YALE L.J. 1325, 1367 (1979); Stuntz, Substance, supra, at 30-31 (discussing scholarly debates).
151. It may also have been due to concerns about federalism. As revealed in the 1968 case of Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968), at least some members of the Court believed that intervening into state substantive criminal law was a greater intrusion on a state's autonomy than regulating its criminal procedures.
152. Stuntz, Substance, supra note 83, at 6.
153. Of course, as Stuntz shows, the relationship between the substantive and the procedural is complex, nuanced, and hardly as bifurcated as the terms themselves would indicate.
154. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398, 404-05 (2001).
155. GOLUBOFF, supra note 58.
156. Vagrancy cases had also been challenged on a number of other grounds-under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendments-that influenced the Court's doctrine in a variety of ways beyond the scope of this brief Essay.
157. See id
158. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Dec. 30, 1971) (Brennan Papers, Box I-274);
159. see infra app. fig.3.
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)
162. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
163. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. Chief Justice Burger ordered reargument in Roe so that new Justices William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., could take part in their consideration. Hence, the case was not decided until 1973.
164. 405 U.S. at 438, 443.
165. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, First Draft, Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18, at 13-14 (May 18, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151);
166. see LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 87-90 (2005);
167. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT page 113-17; (1988) (quoting the first draft of Roe v. Wade). Vagueness had also been the main substantive issue in an abortion case the Court had decided earlier in 1971, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 64 (1971).
168. LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1973, at 237, 239 (1997)
169. Reva B. Siegel, Roe's Roots: The Women's Rights Claims That Engendered Roe (Feb. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
170. see also LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE (forthcoming 2010).
171. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Conference, Re: Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18 (May 18, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151);
172. see also GREENHOUSE, supra note 95.
173. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18 (May 18, 1972) (Brennan Papers, Box I-285)
174. Memorandum from Justice William O. Douglas to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18 (May 19, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1589).
175. Since Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the case, it has, of course, been noted that abortions and many of the activities in the sexuality cases are also not exactly private in critical ways. Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
176. see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 931-32 (1973).
177. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 30, 1971) (Brennan Papers, Box I-285).
178. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
179. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
180. 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905).
181. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
182. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
183. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
184. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
185. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
186. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
187. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
188. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 30, 1971) (Brennan Papers, Box I-285); see infra app. fig.4.
189. Id. at 5-6.
190. Douglas did mention the Ninth Amendment briefly. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
191. Of course, Douglas had never been particularly committed to the Ninth Amendment. Though Douglas mentioned the amendment in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484, it was Goldberg's concurrence that had most relied on it. 381 U.S. at 488-99.
192. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 213 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164
194. (1972)).
195. 381 U.S. at 527-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
196. 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); 405 U.S. 438, 439 (1972).
197. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Jan. 25, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558); see infra app. fig.5.
198. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Jan. 28, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558); see infra app. fig.6.
199. Only Thurgood Marshall signed on to Douglas's opinion immediately after Douglas circulated it. Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Jan. 4, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558). The rest of the Justices, including Brennan, waited until Douglas had responded to Stewart's comments. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Feb. 9, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558)
200. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Jan. 31, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558)
201. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Feb. 15, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558)
202. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Jan. 31, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558);
203. Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White to Justice William O. Douglas, Re: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 70-5030 (Feb. 8, 1972) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558).
204. Post, supra note 17, at 497-98.
205. With thanks to Mike Seidman for pointing out this irony.
206. Stuntz considers Griswold a criminal law case, and he describes how Alexander Bickel had also seen it as such. But he notes that subsequently it was treated as a privacy case rather than a criminal law case. Moreover, because Stuntz sees the 1960s, up until the Court retreated in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968), as the moment of real possibility for a substantive constitutional intervention into criminal law, he does not consider Roe in his discussion.
207. See Stuntz Uneasy Relationship, supra note 83, at 68-69 &n.237.
208. The Court was thus engaged in its way in ongoing scholarly discussions about the role of the criminal law in regulating morality. See, for example, the famous debates between H.L.A. Hart and Patrick Devlin. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965);
209. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963)
210. H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1964);
211. see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1 cmt. at 207 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) (We deem it inappropriate for the government to attempt to control behavior that has no substantial significance except as to the morality of the actor.).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 89, 111, 114-15.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
214. The most commented-upon collaboration between Douglas and Brennan occurred in Griswold.
215. See, e.g., BALL & COOPER, supra note 36, at 287
216. KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 231 (1993)
217. MURPHY, supra note 44, at 385
218. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 296 (1990).
219. Indeed, the themes in Douglas's opinions may remain more available to legal scholars who came of age around the time of Roe and Papachristou than to those who came to constitutional law only after such possibilities had been forgotten.
220. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet (concurring), in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 86-91 (Jack Balkin ed., 2005).
221. Between 1953 and Papachristou, the Court took a number of vagrancy cases but disposed of them without determining the constitutionality of the laws at issue. See Edelman
222. v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 358 (1953); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204 (1960);
223. Arceneaux v. Louisiana, 376 U.S. 336, 336 (1964)
224. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)
225. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 257 (1966)
226. Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596, 599 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392
227. U.S. 598 (1968).
228. In addition to Papachristou and Coates, the Court also struck down a suspicious persons law in Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 544-45 (1971).
229. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); 405 U.S. 156 (1971).
230. There is already a substantial literature on the relationship between the Warren and Burger Courts. The first wave viewed the Burger Court as clearly more conservative than its predecessor, but subsequent revisions have complicated that picture.
231. See, e.g., Martin H. Belsky, The Burger Court and Criminal Justice: A Counter-Revolution in Expectations, in THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION?
232. supra note 57, at 131. Revisionists point most frequently to the constitutional protection of women, which the Burger Court, not the Warren Court, developed.
233. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 57, at 132-33;
234. see also Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Tactics, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
235. supra note 57, at 62-63 (discussing criminal procedure decisions of the two Courts). Though scholars have explored the relationship between the two Courts on matters of fundamental rights, there is still much to be said.
236. See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 54, at 83-92;
237. SCHWARTZ, supra note 128, at 297
238. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE CONTINUITY OF CHANGE: THE SUPREME COURT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, 1953-1986, at 250-66 (1991).