Bootstrapping an environmental policy from an economic covenant: The teleological approach of the European court of justice

Cornell International Law Journal

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 571-605

  Lord, Kenneth M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

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EID: 77952455830     PISSN: 00108812     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (430)

1. Ian B. Bird & Miguel A. Veiga-Pestana, European Community Environmental Policy and Law, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AFTER 1992, at 219 (Ralph B. Folsom et al. eds., 1993).
2. Id.
3. E.g., A. David Demiray, The Greening of Free Trade, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 293, 293-96 (1993).
4. E.g., GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 1102 (1992).
5. Id.
6. Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 1, at 220.
7. In 1993, the original title, "European Economic Community," was officially discarded in favor of "European Community" (EC), a term which had, in practice, been in use since 1986. The term "European Union" (EU) was also adopted in 1993 to refer to new common policies introduced by the Treaty on European Union.
8. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text. The term "EC" remains valid for policy matters addressed by the community treaties prior to 1993, while the term "EU" applies only in the context of new common policies.
9. E.g., Jens Rosenkvist & Laurent M. Campo, Recent Legal Developments of the European Community, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 189, 189-90 (1994).
10. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18,1951,261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW pt. B2 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992).
11. See also JOHN A. USHER, PLENDER AND USHER'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1 (1993).
12. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Euratom], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 8, pt. B5.
13. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EC Treaty], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 8, pt. BIO (originally referred to as the "EEC Treaty").
14. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 14-16 (1987).
15. The six original states included the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Id. Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden have subsequently joined them.
16. Richard C. Visek, Implementation and Enforcement of EC Environmental Law, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 377, n.15 (1995).
17. In the next few years, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are also expected to join the EU. Id.
18. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 11, at 17-18.
19. Id. at 17.
20. The European Parliament is comprised of 626 representatives who are popularly elected by die citizens of the EU. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 137;
21. Visek, supra note 11, at 380.
22. Initially, the Parliament only served an advisory role; however, in recent years its power has been expanded to include the abilities to propose, amend, and veto certain types of legislation. Id. The European Court of Justice functions as die supreme judicial authority on matters of Community law. EC TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 171-73.
23. It is empowered to interpret the Community treaties, review the legality of Community acts, consider possible breaches of Community law by the other Community institutions, answer questions of Community law from the member state's national courts, and determine whether member states are fulfilling their Community obligations.
24. Id. at 382-83.
25. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 776 [hereinafter Merger Treaty].
26. The European Commission, which consists of twenty-one commissioners appointed by individual member states, serves a quasi-executive role. VISEK, supra note 11, at 381-82.
27. The Commission bears the responsibility of drafting, implementing, and enforcing Community law. Commissioners are expected to act in the general interests of the EU, rather than in the interests of their own countries. The European Council, which consists of one representative from each member state, is the EU's primary legislative body, although it also serves in an executive capacity with respect to the Community's general economic policies. Id. at 379.
28. In contrast to commissioners, Council members act on instructions from their respective governments.
29. Id.
30. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 11, at 29.
31. Id. at 28-29.
32. Although the legal systems of the Community and the individual member states exercise a great deal of mutual influence over each other, they do not yet constitute a unified and coherent legal system such that would define a federal state.
33. Id.
34. T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 10 (1994).
35. USHER, supra note 8, at 3.
36. HARTLEY, supra note 17, at 96-97.
37. Id. at 98-106.
38. Id. at 107.
39. Regulations are general statements of Community law that apply directly to every member state and citizen of the EC. That is, they have a "direct effect" upon EC citizens. Regulations are rarely used to address environmental concerns.
40. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 189.
41. Directives, on the other hand, are die principal legislative tool of the Community. They mandate a result to be achieved by the member states, but leave the mode of implementation up to the discretion of the individual state. Directives are commonly used for environmental matters.
42. Cliona J.M. Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Federalism in the United States and the European Union, 54 Mo. L. REV. 1658, 1675 (1995).
43. Finally, decisions, or general rulings, are generally issued by the Commission upon discovery of a violation of Community law. They only bind the party at which they are aimed.
44. See, e.g., Michael Scott Feeley & Peter M. Gilhuly, Green Law-Making: A Primer on the European Community's Environmental Legislative Process, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 667-68 (1991).
45. HARTLEY, supra note 17, at 137.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 165.
48. EC TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 164, 171-73.
49. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 173.
50. USHER, supra note 8, at 89.
51. EC TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 173-74.
52. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 175.
53. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 114.
54. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 184.
55. The term "regulation," as used here and throughout the remainder of this Note, refers to its plain meaning and not specifically to official Community regulations, which are rarely used in EC environmental matters.
56. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 118.
57. EC TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 178 & 215.
58. USHER, supra note 8, at 43.
59. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 168a (as amended 1987).
60. Id.
61. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 73.
62. Rosenkvist & Campo, supra note 7, at 191.
63. Id.
64. HARTLEY, supra note 17, at 86.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Matthew L. Schemmel & Bas de Regt, The European Court of Justice and the Environmental Protection Policy of the European Community, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 54 (1994).
68. E.g., BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1102.
69. Id. at 1101.
70. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 30.
71. Eg., Demiray, supra note 3, at 294-95.
72. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 36.
73. Id.
74. See case and discussion infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
75. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1102.
76. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 100.
77. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 429.
78. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 235.
79. Id.
80. See also HARTLEY, supra note 17, at 111-19 (discussing the procedural limitations on the invocation of article 235).
81. Visek, supra note 11, at 386.
82. E.g., Julie A. Harms, Note, The European Community's Development of an Environmental Policy: The Treaty of European Union, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 400-01 (1993).
83. There has since been a continuous sequence of such "Action Programmes," each lasting from three to eight years. In these programs, the Community sets a series of specific principles and objectives.
84. Id. at 400-03.
85. The Fifth Action Programme started in 1993 and extends until 2000. During this period, the EC plans to implement pollution reduction programs in five areas-industry, transport, energy, tourism, and agriculture-and work toward solving certain environmental issues in developing countries.
86. Id. at 405-06.
87. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 100.
88. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 429.
89. See cases, infra notes 108-16, in which the ECJ found that environmental regulation by the EC is singularly justifiable under article 100.
90. Id.
91. See EC TREATY, supra note 10, Tide VII (as amended 1987).
92. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 130r (as amended 1987).
93. Specifically, the article lists the Community's objectives as the preservation, protection, and improvement of the quality of the environment; making a contribution towards protecting public health; and ensuring a "prudent and rational" utilization of natural resources. Some of the factors deemed relevant to environmental regulation include the availability of scientific data, the environmental conditions of the various regions of the Community, the potential costs and benefits of action or inaction, and the economic and social development of the Community as a whole.
94. Id.
95. Id. art. 130s.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. art. 130t.
99. Id. art. 100a.
100. Id.
101. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 43-44.
102. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 100a (as amended 1987).
103. Id. See also BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 439-40.
104. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1102.
105. Id.
106. Tamara R. Crockett & Cynthia B. Schultz, The Integration of Emironmental Policy and the European Community: Recent Problems of Implementation and Enforcement, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 169, 175 (1991).
107. Id. at 181-82.
108. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU).
109. Rosenkvist & Campo, supra note 7, at 189-90.
110. Id.
111. TEU, supra note 77, art. 8. Union citizenship does not replace a person's national citizenship, but merely supplements it.
112. TEU, supra note 77, art. 109e-m;
113. HARTLEY, supra note 17, at 8-9.
114. The United Kingdom and Denmark have refused to accede to the approval of a common currency and are therefore not obligated to adopt the "European Currency Unit," or "ecu."
115. Id.
116. Because it routinely takes several years for any given dispute to come before the ECJ, the court has not yet heard an environmental case under the auspices of the TEU.
117. TEU, supra note 77, art. 130r.
118. TEU, supra note 77, art. 130s.
119. Id.
120. Visek, supra note 11, at 388.
121. TEU, supra note 77, art. 100a.
122. TEU, supra note 77, art. 189b.
123. The co-decision procedure is fairly complex. Its purpose is to incorporate and balance the views of all three legislative branches into each final decision, with the possibility of using a "Conciliation Committee" to resolve disagreements between the branches.
124. Id.
125. TEU, supra note 77, art. 130s.
126. TEU, supra note 77, art. 189c.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. TEU, supra note 77, art. 171.
130. See Detergents and Sulphur Content of Fuels, infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
131. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon].
132. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of article 30 et seq.
133. Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 662-63.
134. Id.
135. These "mandatory requirements" include "the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer."
136. Id.
137. Id. at 664.
138. See, e.g., Waste Oils I, II, III, infra notes 130-49 and accompanying text. In these cases, the court broadened the "rule of reason" approach to apply in environmental protection cases as well.
139. Id.
140. Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 660.
141. Id. at 661.
142. Id. at 662-63.
143. Id. at 663.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 664.
146. Id.
147. Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099 [hereinafter Detergents].
148. Case 92/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1115 [hereinafter Sulphur Content of Fuels].
149. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1101.
150. Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1117.
151. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1103;
152. Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1119.
153. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106;
154. Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.
155. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106;
156. Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.
157. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106;
158. Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.
159. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 100.
160. Case 272/80, Crim. Proc. Against Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij Voor Biologische Producten B.V., 1981 E.C.R. 3277 [hereinafter Plant Protection Products].
161. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying test for a summary of Cassis de Dijon.
162. Plant Protection Products, 1981 E.C.R. 3277 at 3278.
163. Id. at 3282.
164. Id. at 3290-01.
165. Id. at 3291-92.
166. Cases 30-34/81, Commission v. Italy, 1981 E.C.R. 3379 [hereinafter Italy Directives].
167. Id.
168. Id. at 3383-84.
169. Id. at 3384.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra part IV.A.1-2.
173. Case 172/82, Syndicat National des Fabricants Raffineurs d'Huile de Graissage and Others v. Groupement d'Interet Economique "Inter-Huiles" and Others, 1983 E.C.R. 555 [hereinafter Waste Oils I].
174. Case 173/83, Commission v. Fr., 1985 E.C.R. 491 [hereinafter Waste Oils II].
175. Case 240/83, Procureur de la République v. Association de Défense des Brûleurs D'huiles Usagées, 1985 E.C.R. 531 [hereinafter Waste Oils III].
176. Waste Oils I, 1983 E.C.R. at 557-58.
177. Id. at 564.
178. Id. at 564.
179. Of particular relevance was article 34, which prohibits all measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on trade.
180. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 34.
181. Waste Oils I, 1983 E.C.R. at 566.
182. Waste Oils II, 1985 E.C.R. at 503.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 507.
185. Waste Oils III, 1985 E.C.R. at 547-48.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 549.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 549-50.
190. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text for a summary of Cassis de Dijon.
191. E.g., Waste Oils I, 1983 E.C.R. at 566.
192. Waste Oils III, 1985 E.C.R. at 549.
193. Id.
194. Pascale Kromarek, Environmental Protection and the Free Movement of Goods: The Danish Bottles Case, 2 J. ENV. L. 89, 101 (1990).
195. Case 94/83, Crim. Proc. against Albert Heijn BV, 1984 E.C.R. 3263 [hereinafter Pesticides].
196. Id.
197. Id. at 3264.
198. Id. at 3266-67.
199. Interestingly, the apples over which the criminal charges were brought contained only 1.0 mg/kg of the pesticide, while other fruits, such as strawberries, could legally contain up to 10.0 mg/kg.
200. Id. at 3265-67.
201. Id. at 3277.
202. Although the defendant's argument was addressed by the court as presented, it is noteworthy that the Italian government submitted a statement indicating that, in fact, vinchlozoline is not authorized for use on apples in Italy.
203. Id. at 3269.
204. Id. at 3279.
205. Id. at 3280.
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for summaries of the Plant Protection Products case. In its 1983 Sandoz decision, the ECJ determined that the burden of proof in establishing the legitimacy of such a threat lies with the member state invoking the public welfare exception.
208. Case 174/82, Crim. Proc. Against Sandoz BV, 1983 E.C.R. 2445, 2464.
209. Pesticides, 1984 E.C.R. at 3279-80.
210. Case 247/85, Commission v. Belg., 1987 E.C.R. 3029 [hereinafter Wild Birds I].
211. Case 262/85, Commission v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 3073 [hereinafter Wild Birds II].
212. Case 412/85, Commission v. F.R.G., 1987 E.C.R. 3503 [hereinafter Wild Birds III].
213. E.g., Wild Birds I, 1987 E.C.R. at 3029.
214. The Council directive required member states to implement measures designed to protect listed birds from hunting or other disturbances and to prohibit the sale of those birds, whether alive or dead.
215. Id. at 3030.
216. Other cases include Case C-339/87, Commission v. Neth., 1990 E.C.R. 1-851 and Case C-169/89, Crim. Proc. Against Gouretterie Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2143.
217. See infra notes 214-21 and accompanying text.
218. Wild Birds I. 1987 E.C.R. at 3059.
219. Id. at 3033.
220. Id. at 3060.
221. Wild Birds II, 1987 E.C.R. at 3077.
222. Id. at 3098-3106.
223. Id. at 3097.
224. Wild Birds III, 1987 E.C.R at 3506-07.
225. Id. at 3516.
226. Id. at 3517.
227. Id. at 3517-18.
228. Id. at 3503.
229. See supra part IV.B.2.
230. Case 291/84, Commission v. Neth., 1987 E.C.R. 3483 [hereinafter Groundwater Directive].
231. Id. at 3484.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 3486-87.
234. Groundwater Directives, 1987 E.C.R. at 3485.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 3498.
237. Id.
238. Case 302/86, Commission v. Den., 1988 E.C.R. 4607 [hereinafter Danish Bottles].
239. Id.
240. Id. at 4608-09.
241. Id. at 4609.
242. Id. at 4615.
243. Id. at 4610.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 4610-11.
246. The "principle of proportionality" means that a governmental action must be both reasonably related and proportional to the public good intended. The ECJ accepted this principle as an inherent part of EC law in 1970.
247. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- Und Vorratsstelle Für Getreide Und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (commonly referred to as Solange I).
248. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4614-15.
249. This discussion of a "balancing of interests" refers to the "rule of reason" approach established in the Cassis de Dijon case. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text for a summary of that case.
250. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4615-16.
251. Id. at 4632.
252. Id. at 4630.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 4629.
255. Id. at 4629.
256. Id. at 4630, citing Case 240/83, Procureur de la République v. Association de Défense des Brûleurs D'huiles Usagees (Waste Oils III), 1985 E.C.R. 531, 549.
257. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4630.
258. Case 380/87, Enichem Base et al. v. Comune di Cinisello Balsamo, 1989 E.C.R. 2491, 2513 [hereinafter Plastic Bags].
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2513-14.
262. The plaintiffs raised another argument, but it was neither referred to nor addressed by the ECJ. They argued that the prohibition was not justified by a need to protect the environment and was therefore violative of the article 30 guarantee of free trade.
263. Id. at 2515-16.
264. The remaining questions were largely procedural and therefore are not discussed here.
265. Id. at 2515.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2515-16.
268. JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 233 (1993).
269. Case 57/89R, Commission v. F.R.G., 1989 E.C.R. 2849, 2852 [hereinafter The Leybucht Dikes].
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2851.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2850.
274. Id. at 2852.
275. Id. at 2855.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2855-56.
279. Id. at 2856.
280. Id.
281. Case C-169/89, Crim. Proc. against Gourmetterie Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I-2143 [hereinafter Red Grouse].
282. Id.
283. Id. at I-2164.
284. Id. at I-2146.
285. Even though the Council had previously issued a directive for the same purpose, the Vogelwet was permissible because the directive allowed member states to introduce stricter protective measures than provided for under EC regulations.
286. Id. at I-2145.
287. Id. at I-2147.
288. Id. at I-2146.
289. Id. at I-2147.
290. Id. at I-2150.
291. Id. at I-2164.
292. Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. I-2867, I-2870 [hereinafter Titanium Dioxide].
293. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant sections of the Single European Act.
294. Titanium Dioxide, 1991 E.C.R. at I-2870.
295. Id.
296. See also USHER, supra note 8, at 71.
297. Titanium Dioxide, 1991 E.C.R. at I-2871.
298. When adopting the Single European Act, the member states gave Parliament a stronger legislative voice by introducing a "parliamentary cooperation" procedure which applied to article 100a, but not to article 130. In Titanium Dioxide, the Council had intentionally circumvented this new procedure by adopting the directive under article 130s.
299. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 84-85.
300. Titanium Dioxide, 1991 E.C.R. at I-2899.
301. Id. at I-2901.
302. Id.
303. USHER, supra note 8, at 71.
304. Id. at 72.
305. Case C-2/90. Commission v. Belg., 21 The Proceedings of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the European Communities 14 (July 9, 1992); also 1 CMLR 365 (1993) [hereinafter Imports of Waste].
306. Id.
307. Id. at 15-16.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Damien Geradin, Free Trade and Environmental Protection in an Integrated Market: A Survey of the Case Law of the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice, 2 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 141, 190 (1993).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Case 5/77, Carlo Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale s.r.l., 1977 E.C.R. 1555, 1576-77.
319. This dispute involved an alleged violation of a Council directive by the Italian Government, which had stopped the importation of feeding-stuffs with a potassium nitrate content exceeding a certain level. The directive fixed maximum permissible levels of certain substances in feeding-stuffs and prohibited marketing restrictions on them. Although the court ultimately found that Italy had not violated the directive because the directive contained a provision allowing member states to adopt temporary provisions to protect animal or human health, the court remarked that "Where⋯ Community directives provide for the harmonization of the measures necessary to ensure the protection of animal and human health ⋯, recourse to article 36 is no longer justified."
320. Id.
321. Imports of Waste, 21 The Proceedings of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the European Communities, at 15-16.
322. E.g., EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 3g (specifying the establishment of a system "ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted" as an essential Community activity).
323. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 428.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Stephen C. Dwyer, When May a Member State Impose Environmental Restrictions Which Are Stricter Than Those Mandated by the European Community?, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1994).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. BENGOETXEA, supra note 208, at 98-101.
331. Id. at 233-34.
332. In Defrenne II, a former airline employee brought an employment discrimination suit under article 119 of the EC Treaty, which guarantees equal pay for equal work. The court stated that the issue of the provision's direct effect must be interpreted "in light of the principle of equal pay, the aim of this provision and its place in the scheme of the Treaty."
333. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 471.
334. See supra notes 201-8 and accompanying text for a summary of the Plastic Bags case.
335. See supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text for a summary of The Leybucht Dikes case.
336. HARTLEY, supra note 17, at 86.
337. Id. at 85.
338. Rather than limiting its role to "interpretation," however, the court's approach is perhaps more accurately described as "decision-making on the basis of judicial policy."
339. Id.
340. BENGOETXEA, supra note 208, at 234.
341. See infra notes 273-79 and accompanying text.
342. See infra notes 280-91 and accompanying text.
343. See infra notes 292-324 and accompanying text.
344. E.g., Gerard Hertig, Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 177, 177-78 (1994).
345. Id.
346. Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 662.
347. Id.
348. See also supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text for a summary of the Cassis de Dijon case.
349. Id.
350. Eg., Hertig, supra note 273, at 177-78.
351. Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 846, 857-58 (1994).
352. Id.
353. Under the amended EC Treaty, the base-levels in the fields of health, safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection are required to provide a "high level of protection."
354. EC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 100a(3) (as amended 1987).
355. Phillippe Sands, European Community Environmental Law: The Evolution of a Regional Regime of International Environmental Protection, 100 YALE L.J. 2511, 2513 (1991).
356. Id.
357. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text for a summary of the Detergents and Sulphur Content of Fuels cases.
358. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106;
359. Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.
360. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 679.
361. See Italy Directives, supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
362. See Wild Birds, supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text.
363. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 679.
364. Detergents, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106;
365. Sulphur Content of Fuels, 1980 E.C.R. at 1122.
366. Demiray, supra note 3, at 300.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 298-300.
369. See, e.g., Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 677-78.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 678-79.
372. Demiray, supra note 3, at 303.
373. Id.
374. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text for a summary of Cassis de Dijon.
375. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for a summary of the Plant Protection Products case.
376. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text for a summary of the Pesticides case.
377. E.g., Pesticides, 1984 E.C.R. at 3266-67 (the concentration of the pesticide on the apples over which the Dutch government brought criminal charges was so low (1.0 mg/ kg) that strawberries sold in the Netherlands could legally contain up to ten times as much without being considered a public health risk).
378. See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text for a summary of the Danish Bottles case.
379. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
380. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4629-30.
381. Eg., Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4629.
382. Schemmel & de Regt, supra note 43, at 78.
383. Demiray, supra note 3, at 318.
384. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text for a summary of those cases.
385. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text for a summary of the Italy Directives case.
386. Italy Directives, 1981 E.C.R. at 3384.
387. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text for a summary of these cases.
388. Case 172/82, Waste Oils I, 1983 E.C.R. 555, 565-66.
389. Id. at 566.
390. Id.
391. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text for a summary of Waste Oils III.
393. See also Demiray, supra note 3, at 306-08, for a discussion of this case.
394. Case 240/83, Waste Oils III, 1985 E.C.R. 531, 549.
395. Demiray, supra note 3, at 308.
396. See supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text for summaries of the Wild Birds cases.
397. See supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text for a summary of the Groundwater Directives case.
398. See supra notes 240-54 and accompanying text for a summary of the Imports of Waste case.
399. Eg., Wild Birds I, 1987 E.C.R. at 3060.
400. Id.
401. The only exception, which the court applied in the Imports of Waste case, is that member states may deviate from the requirements of a directive if compliance would result in a genuine threat to the public well-being.
402. Imports of Waste, supra notes 240-54 and accompanying text.
403. See Wild Birds II, supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text;
404. Italy Directives, supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text;
405. Groundwater Directive, supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
406. E.g., BERMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1102.
407. Visek, supra note 11, at 394;
408. Harms, supra note 57, at 410-11.
409. Although article 171 of the TEU now empowers the ECJ to impose fines on member states for failure to comply with Community law, the court must go through a prohibitively long and complex procedure before it can take such an action.
410. E.g., Cliona J.M. Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Federalism in the United States and the European Union, 54 MD. L. REV. 1658, 1680 (1995).
411. For this reason, perhaps, the court has never imposed a fine on any of the member states, despite the fact that they routinely fail to transpose environmental directives into national law in a timely manner.
412. Visek, supra note 11, at 394.
413. Harms, supra note 57, at 410-11.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Visek, supra note 11, at 399;
417. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 671.
418. It is noteworthy that the ECJ has never decided a case dealing with a member state's failure to adequately enforce a national statute adopted pursuant to an environmentally-related Council directive.
419. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 671.
420. In 1990, the Council created the European Environmental Agency. This agency is charged with gathering available data and analyzing the extent to which the member states are complying with EC environmental regulations. However, it lacks the power to enforce regulations or even to actively investigate suspected violations.
421. Kimber, supra note 316, at 1684.
422. Id.
423. Compounding the problem is the fact that some of the member states do not have the resources to fully implement and enforce Community law. The EU is making some effort to provide financial assistance to those countries, but the problem may become exacerbated if Eastern European countries become member states.
424. Visek, supra note 11, at 400.
425. Demiray, supra note 3, at 296.
426. Id.
427. E.g., Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4630 (imposing the nebulous requirement that the environmental benefits gained by a member state's action must outweigh the adverse effect on trade).
428. Feeley & Gilhuly, supra note 21, at 671.
429. Demiray, supra note 3, at 296.
430. Kimber, supra note 325, at 1678-85.