Elinor Ostrom and the "just right" solution

Public Choice

Volumn 143, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 269-273

  Aldrich, John H ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Common pool resources; Market failure; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952423927     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9630-9     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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