The irreducibility of personal obligation

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 307-323

  Ross, Jacob ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Deontic paradoxes; Impersonal obligation; Meinong Chisholm reduction; Ought; Personal obligation

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952309557     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-010-9125-7     Document Type: Article

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