Clearing conceptual space for cognitivist motivational internalism

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 148, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 343-367

  Bromwich, Danielle ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Belief; Cognitivist motivational internalism; Desire; Humean theory of motivation; Moral motivation

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952036944     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9331-0     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook (pp. 5-27). Chicago: Rand McNally.
2. Aronson, E. (1992). The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback. Psychological Inquiry, 3(4), 303-311. doi: 10. 1207/s15327965pli0304_1.
3. Aronson, E. (1999). Dissonance, hyprocrisy and the self-concept. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 103-126). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
4. Aronson, J., Cohen, G., & Nail, P. (1999). Self-affirmation theory: An update and appraisal. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 127-148). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
5. Audi, R. (1994). Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe. Nous (Detroit Mich), 28, 419-434. doi: 10. 2307/2215473.
6. Baker, L. R. (1995). Explaining attitudes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Beauvois, J., & Joule, R. (1996). A radical dissonance theory. London: Taylor & Francis.
8. Beauvois, J., & Joule, R. (1999). A radical point of view on dissonance theory: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 43-70). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
9. Beck, A. T. (1963). Thinking and depression: I. Idiosyncratic content and cognitive distortions. Archives of General Psychiatry, 9, 324-333.
10. Beck, A. T. (1987). Cognitive models of depression. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 1, 5-37.
11. Braithwaite, R. B. (1932-1933). The nature of believing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 33, 129-146.
12. Burris, C., Harmon-Jones, E., & Tarpley, R. (1997). "By Faith Alone": Religious agitation and cognitive dissonance. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 19(1), 17-31.
13. Cohen, J. (1992). An essay on belief and acceptance. New York: Oxford University Press.
14. Cooper, J., & Fazio, R. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 229-264). Orlando: Academic Press.
15. Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms. Cambridge: MIT.
16. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
17. Elkin, R., & Leippe, M. (1986). Physiological arousal, dissonance, and attitude change: Evidence for a dissonance-arousal link and a "don't remind me" effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5(1), 55-65.
18. Ellis, A. (1987). A sadly neglected cognitive element in depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 11, 121-145. doi: 10. 1007/BF01183137.
19. Elliott, A., & Devine, P. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance and psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 382-394. doi: 10. 1037/0022-3514. 67. 3. 382.
20. Fazio, R., & Cooper, J. (1983). Arousal in the dissonance process. In J. T. Cacciopo & R. E. Petty (Eds.), Social psychophysiology. New York: Guildford.
21. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
22. Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203-210. doi: 10. 1037/h0041593.
23. Gerrard, H. (1967). Choice difficulty, dissonance and the decision sequence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 44-59.
24. Harmon-Jones, E. (1996). Cognitive dissonance and affect. Unpublished Manuscript. University of Texas.
25. Harmon-Jones, E. (2000a). A cognitive dissonance theory perspective on the role of emotion in the maintenance and change of beliefs and attitudes. In N. H. Fryda, A. R. S. Manstead, & S. Bem (Eds.), Emotions and beliefs (pp. 185-211). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. Harmon-Jones, E. (2000b). The role of affect in cognitive dissonance process. In J. Forgas (Ed.), Handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 237-255). Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
27. Harmon-Jones, E. (2000c). An update of dissonance theory with a focus on the self. In A. Tesser, R. Felson, & J. Suls (Eds.), Psychological perspectives on self and identity (pp. 119-144). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
28. Harmon-Jones, E., Brehm, J., Greenberg, J., Simon, L., & Nelson, D. (1996). Evidence that the production of aversive consequences is not necessary to create cognitive dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 5-16. doi: 10. 1037/0022-3514. 70. 1. 5.
29. Harmon-Jones, E., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2007). Cognitive dissonance theory after fifty years of development. Zeitschrift fur Sozial Psychologie, 38(1), 7-16. doi: 10. 1024/0044-3514. 38. 1. 7.
30. Joule, R., & Beauvois, J. (1998). Cognitive dissonance theory: A radical view. European Review of Social Psychology, 8, 1-32.
31. Kiesler, C., & Pallak, M. (1976). Arousal properties of dissonance manipulation. Psychological Bulletin, 83, 1014-1025. doi: 10. 1037/0033-2909. 83. 6. 1014.
32. Losch, M., & Cacioppo, J. (1990). Cognitive dissonance may enhance sympathetic tonus, but attitudes are chanced to reduce negative affect rather than arousal. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 6, 245-254.
33. Marcus, R. B. (1990). Some revisionary proposals about belief and believing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50, 132-153. doi: 10. 2307/2108036.
34. McDermut, J. F., Haada, D. A. F., & Bilek, L. A. (1997). Cognitive bias and irrational beliefs in major depression and dysphoria. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 21, 459-476. doi: 10. 1023/A: 1021936427625.
35. Mele, A., & Moser, P. (1994). Intentional action. Nous (Detroit, Mich), 28(1), 39-68. doi: 10. 2307/2215919.
36. Miranda, J., & Person, J. B. (1988). Dysfunctional attitudes are mood-state dependent. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97(1), 76-79. doi: 10. 1037/0021-843X. 97. 1. 76.
37. Miranda, J., Person, J. B., & Byers, C. N. (1990). Endorsement of dysfunctional beliefs depends on current mood state. Abnormal Psychology, 99(3), 237-241. doi: 10. 1037/0021-843X. 99. 3. 237.
38. Nagel, T. (1970). The possibility of altruism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
39. Price, H. H. (1969). Belief. London: Allen & Unwin.
40. Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
41. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). The foundations of mathematics, and other logical essays. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
42. Rhodewalt, F., & Comer, R. (1979). Induced-compliance attitude change: Once more with feeling. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15, 35-47. doi: 10. 1016/0022-1031(79)90016-7.
43. Roberts, J. E., & Kassel, J. D. (1996). Mood-state dependence in cognitive vulnerability to depression: The roles of positive & negative affect. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20(1), 1-12.
44. Russell, D., & Jones, W. (1980). When superstition fails: Reactions to disconfirmation of paranormal beliefs. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 6, 83-88.
45. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Barnes & Noble.
46. Shaffer, D. (1975). Some effects of consonant and dissonant attitudinal advocacy on initial attitude salience and attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 160-168.
47. Schwitzgebel, E. (2001). In-between believing. The Philosophical Quarterly, 51, 76-82. doi: 10. 1111/1467-9213. 00215.
48. Schwitzgebel, E. (2002). A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief. Nous (Detroit, Mich), 36, 249-275. doi: 10. 1111/1468-0068. 00370.
49. Simon, L., Greenberg, J., & Brehm, J. (1995). Trivialization: The forgotten mode of dissonance reduction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 247-260. doi: 10. 1037/0022-3514. 68. 2. 247.
50. Smith, M. (1987). The Humean theory of motivation. Mind, 96(381), 36-61. doi: 10. 1093/mind/XCVI. 381. 36.
51. Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Oxford: Blackwell.
52. Solomon, A., Haaga, D. A., Brody, C., Kirk, L., & Friedman, D. G. (1998). Priming irrational beliefs in recovered-depressed people. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107(3), 440-449. doi: 10. 1037/0021-843X. 107. 3. 440.
53. Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT.
54. Steele, C. (1988). The psychology of self affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261-302). San Diego: Academic Press.
55. Stocker, M. (1979). Desiring the bad: An essay in moral psychology. The Journal of Philosophy, 76, 738-753. doi: 10. 2307/2025856.
56. Stone, J., Wiegand, A., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997). When exemplification fails: Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(1), 54-65. doi: 10. 1037/0022-3514. 72. 1. 54.
57. Travis, C. (2003). Unshadowed thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
58. Roojen, Van. (1995). Humean motivation and humean rationality. Philosophical Studies, 79, 37-57. doi: 10. 1007/BF00989783.
59. Worchel, S., & Arnold, S. (1974). The effect of combined arousal states of attitudes changes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 549-560. doi: 10. 1016/0022-1031(74)90078-X.
60. Zanna, M., & Cooper, J. (1974). Dissonance and the pill: An attribution approach to studying the arousal properties of dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 703-709. doi: 10. 1037/h0036651.