Divine omniscience and knowledge de se

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 73-82

  Nagasawa, Yujin ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951904142     PISSN: 00207047     EISSN: 15728684     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1023317625835     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. Patrick Grim, 'Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience', American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1983), pp. 265-276;
2. Patrick Grim, 'Against Omniscience: The Case from Essential Indexicals', Noûs 19 (1985), pp. 151-180;
3. Patrick Grim, 'The Being That Knew Too Much', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000), pp. 141-154.
4. The term 'knowledge de se' was introduced by Lewis. See David Lewis, 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se', Philosophical Review 88 (1979), pp. 513-543.
5. Perry uses a more general term 'essential indexicals' in his original paper, 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', Noûi 13 (1979), pp. 3-21.
6. Grim also provides an argument against divine omniscience from knowledge de presenti; namely, knowledge of 'now'. Since that argument involves enormously controversial issues concerning divine timelessness, I focus on his argument from knowledge de se in this paper.
7. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Thomas Gilby (trans.) (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967);
8. Campbell Brown and Yujin Nagasawa 'Anything You Can Do God Can Do Better', manuscript (2002);
9. René Descartes, Philosophical Letters, Anthony Kenny (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970);
10. Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso, 'Maximal Power', in Alfred J. Freddoso (ed.), The Existence and Nature of God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 81-113;
11. Harry G. Frankfurt, 'The Logic of Omnipotence', Philosophical Review 73 (1964), pp. 262-263;
12. Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz, 'Omnipotence Redux', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1988), pp. 283-301;
13. Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz, The Divine Attributes (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002);
14. E. J. Khamara, 'In Defense of Omnipotence', Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1978), pp. 215-228;
15. Richard R. La Croix, 'The Hidden Assumption in the Paradox of Omnipotence', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (1977), pp. 125-127;
16. George I. Mavrodes, 'Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence', Philosophical Review 72 (1963), pp. 221-223;
17. C. Wade Savage, 'The Pardox of the Stone', Philosophical Review 76 (1967), pp. 74-79;
18. Richard Swinburne, 'Omnipotence', American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973), pp. 231-237.
19. Grim (1983), p. 272;
20. Grim (1985), p. 151;
21. Grim (2000), p. 142.
22. A precise interpretation of the phrase 'what I know in knowing (1)' raises a further issue in the philosophy of language. Grim uses this phrase to denote an object of knowledge. But if objects of knowledge are Russellian propositions, then what I know in knowing (1) just is what I know in knowing (2). It follows that Grim cannot think that objects of knowledge are Russellian propositions. Beyond this, however, Grim remains neutral on the nature of objects of knowledge.
23. Hector-Neri Castañeda, 'Omniscience and Indexical Reference', Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), pp. 203-210.
24. In the text I treat Castañeda's objection as a criticism of Grim's argument, but in fact, Castañeda's objection, which is older than Grim's argument, is intended to undermine Norman Kretzmann's argument from which Grim derived his basic idea. Kretzmann argues that no one other than Jones can know what the statement 'Jones knows that he is in a hospital' describes Jones as knowing. Kretzmann also writes, 'Anyone could have proved that Descartes existed, but that is not what Descartes proved in the Cogito, and what he proved in the Cogito could not have been proved by anyone else'.
25. See Norman Kretzmann, 'Omniscience and Immutability', Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966), pp. 409-421.
26. Castañeda (1967), p. 201.
27. Grim argues against Castañeda as follows. Someone may well know that Yujin Nagasawa knows that he (himself) is making the mess and yet not know what I know in knowing (1). S/he may not know it, according to Grim, if s/he does not know that I am Yujin Nagasawa. See Grim (1985, pp. 162-168).
28. John Abbruzzese contends that Castañeda's argument is unsuccessful because (P) is subject to counter-examples. For instance, Abbruzzese argues, even if the sentence 'I know that Dr. Lawless of the Classics Department knows that vis consili expers mole ruit sua' formulates a true statement for someone s/he cannot be said to know that vis consili expers mole ruit sua unless s/he knows Latin (pp. 26-28).
29. John E. Abbruzzese, 'The Coherence of Omniscience: A Defense', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 41 (1997), pp. 25-34.
30. I am indebted to Daniel Stoljar on this point.
31. Perry, for example, argues that know-how is a unique form of know-that, which involves a special kind of representations, namely, executable schemas. See John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). For arguments against the know-that/know-how distinction
32. see also Fred Dretske, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988);
33. William G. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996);
34. Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, 'Knowing How', Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001), pp. 411-444;
35. Alan R. White, The Nature of Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Roman and Littlefield, 1982).
36. Of course, this is not a knockdown argument against Castañeda's strategy. One may coherently hold that the inapplicability of (P) to know-wh is the very reason that we should not identify know-wh with know-that.
37. Abbruzzese (1997), p. 28.
38. Grim (2000), p. 143.
39. For an attempt to define omniscience in terms of power that is slightly different from mine, see Charles Taliaferro, 'Divine Cognitive Power', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 18 (1985), pp. 133-140.
40. For the application of the second principle to the paradox of the stone see Brown and Nagasawa (2002), and Mavrodes (1963).
41. Aquinas (1967), p. 167.
42. Nick Trakakis, 'The Absolute Theory of Omnipotence', Sophia 36 (1997), pp. 55-78.
43. Wierenga similarly remarks, 'it has long been realized that in order to be omnipotent God need not be able to do exactly everything; for example, an omnipotent being need not be able to do what is logically impossible' (p. 363). Edward Wierenga 'Omnipotence Defined', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1983), pp. 363-375.
44. See also Mavrodes (1963), p. 221.
45. Mavrodes (1963), p. 221.
46. Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
47. Here I simply mean that the proposition expressed by (20) is necessarily false.
48. See Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like To Be a Bat', Philosophical Review 83 (1974), pp. 435-450;
49. Yujin Nagasawa, 'Thomas vs. Thomas: A New Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument', Inquiry (forthcoming).
50. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for International Journal for Philosophy of Religion on this point.
51. It does not follow, however, that my strategy is applicable to any possible argument against the doctrine of divine omniscience. Suppose, for example, that there is an argument that allegedly shows that while God can know that p, He just does not. Since this argument does not commit to a claim that God cannot know that p my argument is not applicable to it.
52. Many philosophers claim that Descartes does believe that God can do what it is necessarily impossible to do . See Harry G. Frankfurt (1964, 1977);
53. Peter Geach, 'Omnipotence', Philosophy 48 (1973), pp. 7-20;
54. D. Goldstick, 'Gould God Make a Contradiction True?', Religious Studies 26 (1990), pp. 377-387;
55. Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquett University Press, 1980). For example, the following passage by Descartes is said to prove it: 'I do not think that we should ever say of anything that it cannot be brought about by God. For since everything involved in truth and goodness depends on His omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God cannot make a mountain without a valley, or that one and two should not be three. I merely say that He has given me such a mind that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, or an aggregate of one and two which is not three, and that such things involve a contradiction in my conception'. Descartes (1970), pp. 236-237. See also pp. 11-12, 14-15, 150-151, 236-237, 240-241. La Croix argues, however, that Descartes does not really mean to contend that God can turn necessary impossibilities into possibilities.
56. See Richard R. La Croix, 'Descartes on God's Ability to Do the Logically Impossible', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), pp. 455-475.
57. For the debates on the coherence of the trinity see James Cain, 'The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative Identity', Religious Studies 25 (1989), pp. 141-152;
58. Richard Cartwright, 'On the Logical Problem of the Trinity', in his Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987);
59. John Macnamara, Marie Reyes, and Gonzalo Reyes, 'Logic and the Trinity', Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), pp. 3-18;
60. Trakakis (1997);
61. John Zeis, 'A Trinity on a Trinity on a Trinity', Sophia 32 (1993), pp. 45-55;
62. on the coherence of the incarnation see Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986);
63. Thomas V. Morris, 'Reduplication and Representational Christology', Modern Theology 2 (1986), pp. 319-326;
64. Trakakis (1997);
65. KeithE. Yandell, 'A Gross and Palpable Contradiction?: Incarnation and Consistency', Sophia 33 (1994), pp. 30-45.
66. Indeed, Francks argues that cases similar to Grim's entail a pantheism that is close to Spinoza's. See Richard Francks, 'Omniscience, Omnipotence and Pantheism', Philosophy 54 (1979), pp. 395-399.
67. Throughout this paper I have assumed, for the sake of argument, that Grim is right in contending that God cannot know what I know in knowing (1). It is important to emphasise, however, that my argument is consistent with the claim that ultimately God can know what I know in knowing (1). I am indebted to Thomas Sullivan on this point.
68. Versions of this paper were read at the Pacific Regional Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers in Spokane in 2002 and the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Philadelphia in 2002. I would like to thank all in the audiences. I would also like to thank the American Philosophical Association and the Philosophy Program at the Australian National University for their financial support. I am grateful to Harriet Baber, Karen Bennett, Lisa Bortolotti, Campbell Brown, Frank Jackson, Peter Ludlow, Karen Riley, Laura Schroeter, Charles Taliaferro and Keith Wyma for helpful discussion. I am particularly grateful to Martin Davies, Graham Oppy, Daniel Stoljar, Thomas Sullivan, and an anonymous referee for International Journal for Philosophy of Religion for their useful comments and constructive suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank Patrick Grim, who opened my eyes to the interesting issues of divine omniscience.