Elite perceptions of anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine

Global Crime

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 237-260

  Grødeland, Åse Berit ^a  

^a CHR MICHELSEN INSTITUTE   (Norway)

Author keywords

Anti corruption; Corruption; Elites; Perceptions; Ukraine

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951711901     PISSN: 17440572     EISSN: 17440580     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17440571003669241     Document Type: Article

References (108)

1. For an in-depth account of corruption and election fraud in Ukraine prior to the Orange Revolution, see Andrew Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005).
2. See also Jan Neutze and Adrian Karatnycky, Corruption, Democracy and Investment in Ukraine (Policy Paper; Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, October 2007), 18-19.
3. Ukraine's score in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) improved by only 0.4 points from 2001 (score 2.1) to 2008 (score 2.5). While its score increased from 2001 (2.1) to 2002 (2.4), it decreased in 2003 (2.3) and 2004 (2.2). In 2005 - i.e. after the Orange Revolution - Ukraine's score went up to 2.6, continued to increase in 2005 (2.8), but has since decreased (2.7 in 2007 and 2.5 in 2008), www.transparency.org (accessed July 23, 2009).
4. MSI/KIIS, Corruption in Ukraine. 2007 Baseline National Survey for the MCC Threshold Country Program (Kyiv: MSI, May 10, 2007).
5. Åse Berit Grødeland, 'Cultural Constants, Corruption and the Orange Revolution', in Ukraine on Its Way to Europe. Interim Results of the Orange Revolution, ed. Juliane Besters-Dilger (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag, 2009), 79-101.
6. MSI, Survey on Corruption within the Judicial System in Ukraine: Courts of the General Jurisdiction (Kyiv: MSI, 2008).
7. Grødeland, 'Cultural Constants, Corruption and the Orange Revolution'.
8. Neutze and Karatnycky, Corruption, Democracy and Investment in Ukraine.
9. General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, 'Combating Corruption in Ukraine', http://www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue32eng/button5.htm (accessed April 30, 2009).
10. For an analysis of some of these causes, see Grødeland, 'Cultural Constants, Corruption and the Orange Revolution'.
11. Alternative terms used to describe legal transplants include legal transfers, the circulation of legal models, legal influence, legal inspiration, legal cross-fertilisation, and reception. See Michele Graziadei, 'Comparative Law and the Study of Transplants and Receptions', in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, ed. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 441-76.
12. David Nelken and Johannes Feest, eds., Adapting Legal Cultures (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2001)
13. Gunther Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences', in The Europeanisation of the Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration. European Law, ed. Francis Snyder (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 243-68.
14. John Stanley Gillespie, Transplanting Commercial Law Reform. Developing the 'Rule of Law' in Vietnam (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 1-6.
15. Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974)
16. Pierre Legrand, Fragments on Law as Culture (Deventer: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1996)
17. Pierre Legrand, 'European Legal Systems are not Converging', International & Comparative Law Quarterly 45, no. 1 (1996): 52-81.
18. Gary Goodpaster, 'The Rule of Law. Economic Development in Indonesia', in Indonesia: Law and Society, ed. Tim Lindsey (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1998), 21-24.
19. Gunther Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law ends up in New Divergences', Modern Law Review 61, no. 11 (1998): 24. Development experts acknowledge that the transfer of anti-corruption measures tend to produce different outcomes than those intended.
20. See, for instance, Lili Di Puppo, 'Anti-Corruption Interventions in Georgia: From Rhetoric to Practice' (paper prepared for Changing Europe Summer School III, Central and Eastern Europe in a Globalized World, Bremen, July 28-August 2, 2008), http://www.changing-europe.org/download/ Summer_School_2008/Di_Puppo.pdf (accessed July 22, 2009).
21. Michael, quoted in Diana Rucinschi, 'The Flourishing Anticorruption Industry', originally appearing in Jurnalul National, http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/96022/industria-anticoruptie, users.ox.ac.uk/~scat1663/anticorruption_good.doc (accessed January 10, 2008).
22. Michael, quoted in Rucinschi, 'The Flourishing Anticorruption Industry'.
23. Legal culture may be defined as a 'way of describing relatively stable patterns of legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes'. David Nelken, 'Using the Concept of Legal Culture', Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 29 (2004): 1-28, at 1.
24. Åse Berit Grødeland and Aadne Aasland, Informality and Informal Practices in East Central and South East Europe [Working Papers Series, no. 3/2007, Contemporary Europe Research Centre, University of Melbourne (CERC)].
25. Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
26. Åse Berit Grødeland, 'Public Perceptions of Non-Governmental Organisations in Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia', Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39 (2006): 221-46.
27. The unintended consequence of creating civil society NGOs which are reliant on external support has been that they are never forced to build their own base of popular support or take on the arguments or political programmes of the nationalists...' Adam Fagan, 'Civil Society in Bosnia Ten Years after Dayton', International Peacekeeping 12, no. 3 (2005): 406-19, at 410.
28. Grødeland, 'Public Perceptions of Non-Governmental Organisations'.
29. Michael, quoted in Rucinschi, 'The Flourishing Anticorruption Industry'.
30. For an overview of low-level corruption in Ukraine in the late 1990s, see William L. Miller, Åse B. Grødeland, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post-communist Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).
31. GRECO, Joint First and Second Evaluation Rounds. Evaluation Report on Ukraine. Adopted by GRECO at its 32nd Plenary meeting (Strasbourg, March 19-23, 2007), 4.
32. OECD, Fighting Corruption in Transition Economies. Ukraine (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005), 15.
33. Amongst other, it recommended that Ukraine (i) update its national anti-corruption strategy with a focus on prevention; (ii) identify systemic gaps facilitating corruption; and (iii) utilise law enforcement capacity more effectively to combat corruption. ACN, Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine. Ukraine. Update on Actions to Implement Recommendations. June 2006 (Paris: OECD, 2006).
34. The article also acknowledges the need for new legislation, revamped administrative structures, new accountability and control structures, codes of conduct and training.
35. GRECO, Joint First and Second Evaluation Rounds, 5.
36. Neutze and Karatnycky, Corruption, Democracy and Investment in Ukraine, 24-9.
37. The Cabinet of Ministers adopted a Decree on Measures Plan on the Implementation on the Concept on a Way to Integrity (Measures Plan) in August 2007. The Plan formulates several concrete benchmarks to be reached by 2010. In addition, it established the aims of the concept, defined the responsible state bodies, and created an implementation timetable for each of the measures. Freedom House in its assessment of corruption for 2008 notes that 'despite the adoption of the Measures Plan, corruption remains dominant in Ukrainian society', Freedom House Report on Ukraine, 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=472&year=2008 (accessed May 2, 2009).
38. Author's interview with political officer Dimitri Gorchakov and JSF Project Manager Andriy Spivak, Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine, Kyiv, June 14, 2007.
39. GRECO, Joint First and Second Evaluation Rounds, 9.
40. For an assessment of the level of independence of the Ukrainian judiciary, see Walter H. Rechberger, 'Judicial Independence in Ukraine', in Ukraine on its Way to Europe. Interim Results of the Orange Revolution, ed. Juliane Besters-Dilger (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), 61-78.
41. Michael, quoted in Rucinschi, 'The Flourishing Anticorruption Industry'.
42. UPAC provides funding for 'national conferences, expertise, work-shops, round tables and in-country training activities, study visits, surveys, awareness raising activities, translations and publications, risk analyses, development of the terms of reference for a grant program and IT equipment & advice'. European Commission. Council of Europe. 'Support to good governance: Project against corruption in Ukraine' - UPAC. 'Revised project summary' (Working Draft, March 18, 2008), http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/legalcooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/UPAC/344-UPAC-Summary-Eng_March08-updated.pdf (accessed February 10, 2010).
43. For details, see www.abanet.org/rol/europe_and_eurasia/ukraine_programs.html#... (accessed May 10, 2009).
44. Åse Berit Grødeland, 'The "Greening" of Ukraine: An Assessment of the Political Significance of the Ukrainian Green Movement 1986-1994' (PhD-thesis, IREES, University of Glasgow, October 1996).
45. Wilso, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, 73-6.
46. For details, see USAID, Ukraine Country Profile (Washington, DC: USAID, November 2008), www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_asia/countries/ua/ukraine.pdf (accessed May 10, 2009).
47. www.pace.org.ua (accessed May 10, 2009).
48. http://www.transparency.org/publications/newsletter/2007/march_2007/anti_corruption_work/ ukraine (accessed May 10, 2009).
49. See Business Anti-corruption Portal, http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/en/country-profiles/europe-central-asia/ukraine/initiatives/private-anti-corruption-initiatives/ (accessed May 10, 2009).
50. Stewart suggests that 'the EU's expectation that Ukrainian NGOs would serve both as democratising agents and as supporting actors to achieve ENP goals has turned out to be overly ambitious in the current environment'. Susan Stewart, 'NGO Development in Ukraine since the Orange Revolution', in Ukraine on Its Way to Europe. Interim Results of the Orange Revolution, ed. Juliane Besters-Dilger (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), 177-93, at 192.
51. Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina, Culture of Corruption?.
52. The survey was carried out by Management Systems International (MSI) and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) for USAID and with funds from the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Threshold Country Program in Ukraine.
53. KIIS, Final Report. Survey on Corruption and Service Delivery in the Justice System in Ukraine (Kiev: KIIS, 2006)
54. http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/ upac/upac_en.asp (accessed May 10, 2009).
55. Ideally we would have liked to conduct interviews in Northern Ukraine, Southern Ukraine, and the Crimea as well. For financial reasons, however, we were not able to do so.
56. Lviv is the largest city in West Ukraine, fairly ethnically homogeneous; ruled by the 'Orange' forces, historically and culturally rather distinct from other Ukrainian cities, and frequently referred to as the 'cultural capital' of Ukraine. Lviv has been a part of Kievan Rus, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish half of the Commonwealth, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Second Polish Republic, and the USSR after the Yalta Conference. According to the 2001 census, Lviv had a population of 725,000 people. The large majority of these, 88%, were ethnic Ukrainians, 9% were ethnic Russians, and 1% was ethnic Poles. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lviv (accessed February 10, 2010).
57. See also http://www.lvivbest.com/uk (accessed February 10, 2010).
58. In contrast, Donetsk is a much younger city than Lviv, ethnically more diverse, primarily Russian speaking, heavily industrialised, and controlled by the 'Blue' forces. Donetsk is also the base of former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and one of Ukraine's most powerful oligarchs, Rinat Akhmetov. In 2007 Donetsk had a population of 1,100,000 people, making it the fifth largest city in Ukraine. The majority of its population is Russian speaking and composed of 56.9% ethnic Ukrainians, 38.2% ethnic Russians, as well as a number of other ethnic groups. Donetsk was founded in 1869 by Welsh businessman John Hughes, who established a steel plant and several coalmines in the region. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donetsk (accessed February 10, 2010).
59. See also http://encyclopedia.stateuniversity.com/pages/6076/Donetsk.html (accessed February 10, 2010).
60. Indices created based on findings from the MCC survey, suggest that in terms of perceptions of corruption, differences between Lviv and Donetsk are fairly small. Personal exposure to corruption, however, appears to be more common in Donetsk than in Lviv. See MSI/KIIS, Corruption in Ukraine.
61. Interviewing was conducted between February and April 2008 as part of project no. 182628 located at CMI and funded by the Research Council of Norway. A total of 16 interviews were carried out at national level (Kyiv), 28 at capital level (Kyiv), 20 in Lviv and 20 in Donetsk.
62. All representatives of foreign businesses interviewed, are Ukrainian nationals. The samples with elected representatives and non-elected political party representatives are composed of party representatives both from the position and opposition. Within each elite category we conducted a total of 14 interviews.
63. Tables were constructed from the total number of answers to questions - or text units - coded at each node (coding-category). Quotes from interviews with elected representatives are marked ER, interviews with non-elected political party representatives are marked PP, interviews with judges are marked J, interviews with public prosecutors are marked PR, interviews with local business representatives are marked LB, and interviews with foreign business are marked FB. N refers to national level, K refers to Kiev, L refers to Lviv, and D refers to Donetsk. The respondent number is also given. Thus ER-N-3 refers to elected representative at national level number 3.
64. Transparency International defines corruption as 'misuse of entrusted power for private gain'. See http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (accessed May 16, 2009).
65. The 1995 Law on Combating Corruption defines corruption as 'the unlawful active or passive use, reception or granting of advantages, privileges by a person of authority'. GRECO, Joint First and Second Evaluation Rounds, 8.
66. The presidential framework 'On the Way to Integrity', for instance, was stalled for almost a year in the Ukrainian parliament before being approved by the cabinet in August 2007. Business Anti- Corruption Portal. Ukraine. Country Profile, p. 1 of 22, www.business-anti-corruption.com/normal.asp?pageid=250 (accessed August 29, 2008).
67. As a result of political stalemate, the 2nd session of the Ukrainian parliament (6th convocation), considered no more than 45 of 245 bills proposed by the coalition agreement between BYuT and OUPSD. Only 11 of these were approved. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research. Research Update: The 2008 Political Year: Review without Lessons...
68. The Cabinet of Ministers also passed a resolution to speed up customs clearance procedures from 12-15 to 1-3 days. A 24 hour telephone hotline to accept complaints against customs officials from Ukrainian importers was established somewhat earlier. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko claimed that due to previous steps taken by the Cabinet to clean up customs, state earnings had increased 3.5 times. See 'Ukrainian Government endorses Comprehensive "Stop Contraband!" Programme', http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.au/eu/en/publication/print/2214.htm (accessed May 10, 2005).
69. For an assessment of anti-corruption efforts in Ukrainian customs, see Yuriy Skolotiany, 'Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy: Prychyna vsomu - useloglynaiucha, systema koruptsia', Dzerkalo tyzhnia, no. 41 (720), listopada 1-8, 2008, http://www.dt.ua/1000/1550/64564/ (accessed February 10, 2010).
70. At a session with Carnegie Endowment's Senior Associate, Andrew Kuchins, in February 2006, Ukrainian Minister of the Interior, Yuriy Lutsenko claimed that 3500 police officers had failed an examination and that 600 corruption cases had been launched against police. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 'Establishing the Rule of Law and Fighting Corruption. Yurii Lutsenko, Andrew Kuchins', Friday, February 10, 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=852&&pro... (accessed May 10, 2009).
71. Yuriy Lutsenko was one of the key people orchestrating the Orange Revolution. He served as Minister of the Interior under Yanukovych (2005-2006), but was dismissed on allegations of corruption. Lutsenko was later cleared in court and appointed Minister of the Interior in December 2007, by Yulia Tymoshenko. For details on the corruption scandal, see Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine's Elites remain above the Law', The Jameston Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor 4, no. 147 (July 30, 2007).
72. Until recently, a vehicle inspection without an inspector was typically charged $50, while obtaining a driver's license without a test would be somewhat more expensive at $200-500. Should one be so unfortunate as to run down and kill a pedestrian, charges could be avoided by paying a $5000 bribe - split between the prosecutor and the judge - provided that the deceased had no important friends or that his/her family had no money. See Kiev Ukraine News Blog, November 21, 2007. 'Yushchenko: Ukraine's Roads are Europe's most Corrupt and Dangerous', compiled by an American ex-pat based on Ukrainian newspaper reports, http://blog.kievukraine.info/2007/11/yush- chenko-ukraines-roads-are-europes.html (accessed May 10, 2009).
73. DAI translates as 'give!' in Russian, and jokes were frequently made about traffic police flagging down cars and instructing the drivers to 'give' them something.
74. Valentinas Mite, 'Ukraine: Yushchenko Orders Law-Enforcement Overhaul', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 19, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1060025.html (accessed May 10, 2009)
75. Andrew Osborn, 'Ukraine Scraps Traffic Police to End Corrupt Fines', The Independent, July 20, 2005, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-scraps-traffic-police-to-end-corrupt-fines-499464.html (accessed February 10, 2010).
76. Oksana Bondarchuk, 'Europe's Deadliest Roads', Business Ukraine, November 17, 2008, http:// www.businessukraine.com.ua/europe-s-deadliest-roads (accessed May 10, 2009).
77. See 'Financial Fraud: Corruption Scandal over Ukraine's Emission Money', Global Research, December 20, 2008, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11451 (accessed May 10, 2009).
78. Former State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko held a press conference in September 2005 at which he declared his resignation and alleged that several key officials close to President Yushchenko were corrupt. The press conference brought about a political crisis. The mentioned officials either resigned or were dismissed by Yushenko, while Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko and her cabinet were fired. Zinchenko served as Secretary of State for President Yushchenko in 2005. He resigned in protest against alleged corruption amongst officials close to the President. His resignation triggered a set of dismissals, and Tymoshenko's government was fired.
79. Ukrainian businessman and politician Petro Poroshenko was appointed Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council in 2004. He was dismissed in September 2005, following allegations made by Former Secretary of State, Oleksandr Zinchenko. Poroshenko was re-elected to parliament in March 2006 and currently chairs the parliamentary committee on finance and banking.
80. Former Minister of Transport, Mykola Rudkovsky, was arrested in February 2009 on allegations that he had misappropriated some $200,000 to fund three chartered flights abroad. The Ministry of the Interior in addition filed criminal charges against him for allegedly having pilfered ministry property worth some $1.7 million. 'Former Minister jailed in Probe', Ukrainians, February 14, 2008, www.ukrainians.ca/political-news/403-former-minister-jailed-in-probe.html (accessed May 10, 2009).
81. Former first aide to the president, Oleksandr Tretiakov, was one of the high-ranking officials whom Former Secretary of State, Oleksandr Zinchenko accused of corruption. The Ukrainian parliamentary commission on organised crime and corruption declared the accusations against Tretiakov and former Minister of Transport, Yevhen Chervonenko, as 'groundless' in late 2005. 'UkraineParliament-Commission-Corruption-Power', Ukraine News, November 30, 2005.
82. The Parliamentary Committee on the Struggle against Organized Crime and Corruption, for instance, recently assessed the performance of the SBU's Main Directorate on the Struggle against Corruption and Organised Crime as 'unsatisfactory' due to staff shortages, inexperienced staff, poor staff recruitment procedures, incorrectly set priorities, and insufficient interaction between national and foreign law enforcement bodies. Eurasian Security Services Daily Review, October 12, 2008, www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1668 (accessed May 4, 2009).
83. Grødeland, 'Cultural Constants, Corruption and the Orange Revolution'. Freedom House in its 2008 Assessment of Ukraine note that the Ukrainian judiciary suffer from the following weaknesses: (i) lack of public respect for court decisions and the judicial system as a whole; (ii) insufficient funding of the court system; and (iii) an inefficient and non-transparent process of appointing judges. According to the report 'these problems remained untouched during 2007. The dismissal of the prosecutor general in May, along with the Constitutional Court decision revoking the president's right to appoint and dismiss heads and deputy heads of courts, led to imbalances in the overall judicial framework and raised broad public discussion over the need to reform the judicial system. Unfortunately, preoccupation with the election campaign and the subsequent process of creating a coalition drew main political players away from creating real initiatives'.
84. Freedom House report on Ukraine, 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=472&year=2008 (accessed May 2, 2009).
85. Michael, quoted in Rucinschi, 'The Flourishing Anticorruption Industry'.
86. Rechberger, 'Judicial Independence in Ukraine', 76.
87. Grødeland, 'Cultural Constants, Corruption and the Orange Revolution', 85-6.
88. Grødeland, 'Cultural Constants, Corruption and the Orange Revolution'.
89. Rechberger, 'Judicial Independence in Ukraine', 76.
90. Legal culture may be defined as a 'way of describing relatively stable patterns of legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes'. Nelken, 'Using the Concept of Legal Culture'.
91. Measures listed to facilitate stronger government include the 'improvement of the power vertical', 'a strong power vertical', 'a united power vertical', 'unified political power', 'reconsidered government functions', 'state regulation', and 'less high level power groups'.
92. Paulo Mauro, Why Worry About Corruption? (Washington, DC: IMF, Economic Issues 6, 1997), 3-5.
93. Åse Berit Grødeland, 'Political Lobbying in Post-Communist States' (Article currently being reviewed by Slavic Review - and available from the author upon request.)
94. Rechberger, 'Judicial Independence in Ukraine', 72-3.
95. See, for instance, Serhii Rakhmanin, 'Dobri namiry?', Dzerkalo tyzhnia, no. 20 (649), travnia 26-chervnia 1, 2007, http://www.dt.ua/1000/1550/59415/ (accessed February 10, 2010)
96. Liudmyla Shangina, '... I rik pry tsiy vladi, abo den' lososia', Dzerkalo nedeli, no. 28 (657), serpnia 4-10, 2007, http://www.dt.ua/1000/1550/60021/ (accessed February 201010,); Ukrainian academic
97. Yevhen Nevmerzytskiy and political scientist, Andriy Saphonenko have also written on corruption, but their works are not publicly accessible on the internet. See Halyna Kokhan, 'The Challenges of Political Corruption in Ukraine' (paper prepared for the Changing Europe Summer School III. Central and Eastern Europe in a Globalized World, Bremen, July 28-August 2, 2008), http://www.changing-europe.org/download/Summer_School_2008/Kokhan.pdf (accessed July 22, 2009).
98. Although judges also received a reasonably good score for high trust, most of the statements suggesting that judges may be trusted, were generated by the judges themselves. Four judges, two prosecutors and one elected official expressed high trust in judges.
99. Martin Tisne and Daniel Smilov, From the Ground Up. Assessing the Record of Anticorruption Assistance in Southeastern Europe (Budapest: CPS Policy Studies Series, 2004).
100. Grødeland, 'Public Perceptions of Non-Governmental Organisations'; 'Russia extends Deadline for Obligatory NGOs Registration', Moscow News, October 26, 2006, http://www.mosnews.com/ news/2006/10/26/deadline.shtml (accessed December 5, 2006).
101. Grødeland, 'Public Perceptions of Non-Governmental Organisations'.
102. Home-grown Ukrainian NGOs receiving limited funding from abroad and having properly committed activists in their midsts appear to have been more successful than 'donor-created' NGOs - with the exception of NGOs such as 'Pora!' that were actively engaged in the Orange Revolution and also fairly heavily supported from abroad. Grødeland, '"Greening" of Ukraine'; Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, 183-9
103. Katalin E. Koncz, ed., NGO Sustainability in Central Europe: Helping Civil Society Survive (Budapest: Opoen Society Institute, 2005).
104. Grødeland and Aasland, Informality and Informal Practices.
105. For an overview of the anti-corruption platforms of Ukrainian political parties ahead of the 2007 parliamentary elections, see Neutze and Karatnycky, Corruption, Democracy and Investment in Ukraine, 24-9.
106. Wilson refers to estimates suggesting that 300 out of the 450 Ukrainian MPs who entered parliament in 2002 were dollar millionaires. Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, 149.
107. Grødeland, 'Cultural Constants, Corruption and the Orange Revolution', 97: some 49% of all statements given in response to the question 'do you think there is sufficient political will in this country to reduce the level of corruption?' suggested that such will is absent, though 32% suggested the opposite.
108. Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina, Culture of Corruption?