Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and trends

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 303-326

  Masciandaro, Donato ^a   Nieto, Maria J ^b   Prast, Henriette ^c,d  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

^b BANCO DE ESPAÑA   (Spain)

^c DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK   (Netherlands)

^d TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Banking; Financial management; Governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951617149     PISSN: 13581988     EISSN: 17400279     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/13581980710762291     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Abrams, R.K. and Taylor, M. (2000), “Issues in the unification of financial sector supervision”, IMF Working Paper WP/00/213, Washington, DC.
2. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. (2001), “The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation”, American Economic Review, Vol. 91 No. 5, pp. 1369-401.
3. Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (2004), “Bureaucrats or politicians?", CEPR Discussion Paper Series, WP N. 5242, mimeo.
4. Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (2005), “Why do politicians delegate?", NBER Working Paper Series, WP N. 11531, mimeo.
5. Arnone, M. and Gambini, A. (2006), “Architecture of financial supervisory authorities and the Basle core principle”, in Masciandaro, D. and Quintyn, M. (Eds), Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, (forth.).
6. Arnone, M., Darbar, S. and Gambini, A. (2005), Public Sector Governance in Banking Supervision:Theory and Practices, mimeo.
7. Bebchuk, L.A. and Roe, M.J. (1999), “A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governance”, Stanford Law Review, November.
8. Beck, D-K. and Levine, R. (2001), “Law, politics and finance”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, April, No 2585, Washington, DC.
9. Bini Smaghi, L. (2006), “Independence and accountability in supervision: general principles and European setting”, in Masciandaro, D. and Quintyn, M. (Eds), Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
10. BIS (1997), Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision, BIS, Basle.
11. Bjerre-Nielsen, H. (2004), Financial Regulatory and Supervisory Authority: A Principal and an Agent, The Danish Financial Services Authority, mimeo.
12. Boot, A. and Thakor, A. (1993), “Self-interested bank regulation”, American Economic Review, Vol. 83, pp. 206-12.
13. Cihàk, M. and Podpiera, R. (2006), “Experience with integrated supervisors: governance and quality of supervision”, in Masciandaro, D. and Quintyn, M. (Eds), Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, (forth.).
14. Clark, G.L. and Wojcik, D. (2003), Path Dependence and the Alchemy of Finance: The Economic Geography of the German Model: 1997-2003, mimeo.
15. Cramer, J.S. (2003), Logit Models, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
16. Crockett, A. (2001), “Market discipline and financial stability”, FSR, No. 10, June.
17. Das, U.S., Quintyn, M. and Chenard, K. (2004), Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System Stability? An Empirical Analysis, IMF Working Paper, May, No. 89, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
18. Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Levine, R. (1999), Bank Based and Market Based Financial Systems:Cross Countries Comparisons, Development Research Group, Finance Department, World Bank, Washington, DC.
19. Demirguç-Kunt, A., Laeven, L. and Levine, R. (2003), The Impact of Bank Regulations, Concentration and Institutions on Bank Margins, World Bank Policy Researh working Paper, April, No. 3030, Washington, DC.
20. Di Giorgio, G., di Noia, C. and Piatti, L. (2000), Financial Market Regulation: The Case of Italy and a Proposal for the Euro Area, The Warthon School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
21. Frisell, L., Roszbach, K. and Spagnolo, G. (2004), Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks, mimeo.
22. FSA (2006), Regulatory Fees and Levies 2006-2007, Financial Services Authority, London.
23. Goodhart, C.A.E. (2004), “Financial supervision from an historical perspective: was the development of such supervision designed, or largely accidental?", The Structure of Financial Regulation, Bank of Finland Conference.
24. Gourieoux, C. (2000), Econometrics of Qualitative Dependent Variables, Cambrdige University Press, Cambridge.
25. Grunbichler, A. (2005), “Austria”, in Masciandaro, D. (Ed.), Handbook of Central Banking and Financial Supervision in Europe, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
26. Hupkes, E., Quintyn, M. and Taylor, M.W. (2005), The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice, IMF Working Paper, March, No 51.
27. IMF (2003), Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes. Banking Supervision: Japan, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, September.
28. Kahn, C.M. and Santos, J.A.C. (2004), “Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision”, paper presented at The Structure of Financial Regulation, Bank of Finland Conference, mimeo.
29. Kane, E. (1990), “Principal agent problems in S&L salvage”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, pp. 764-75.
30. Kaufmann, D. (2003), “Rethinking governance”, Discussion Draft, The World Bank, mimeo.
31. Lanoo, K. (2002), “Supervising the European financial system”, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 23.
32. Lasta, R. and Shams, H. (2001), “Public accountability in the public sector”, in Ferran, E. and Goodhart, C.A.E. (Eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century, Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp. 165-88.
33. Lybek, T. and Morris, J. (2004), “Central bank governance: a survey of board and management”, IMF Working Paper, December, no 226.
34. Maddala, G.S. (1983), Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
35. Masciandaro, D. (2004), “Unification in financial sector supervision: the trade off between central bank and single authority”, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 151-69.
36. Masciandaro, D. (2005), “E Pluribus Unum? Authorities’ design in financial supervision: trends and determinants”, Open Economies Review, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 73-102.
37. Masciandaro, D. (2007), “Divide et Impera: financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 285-315.
38. Masciandaro, D. and Quintyn, M. (2007), “Helping hand or grabbing hand? Supervisory architecture, financial structure and market view”, paper presented at Bocconi University Conference, June 18-19, mimeo.
39. Masciandaro, D., Nieto, M. and Prast, H. (2007), “Budgetary governance of banking supervision:a primer”, in Masciandaro, D. and Quintyn, M. (Eds), Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, (forth.).
40. Nieto, M. and Peñalosa, J. (2004), “The European architecture of regulation, supervision and financial stability: a central bank perspective”, Journal of International Banking Regulation., Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 228-42.
41. OSFI (2005) Performance Report, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Canada, mimeo.
42. Prast, H. (2005), “The Netherlands”, in Masciandaro, D. (Ed.), Handbook of Central Banking and Financial Supervision in Europe, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
43. Quintyn, M. (2007), “Robust regulators and their political masters: independence and accountability in theory”, in Masciandaro, D. and Quintyn, M. (Eds), Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, (forth.).
44. Quintyn, M. and Taylor, M.W. (2002), “Regulatory and supervisory independence and financial stability”, IMF Working Paper, March, No 46.
45. Quintyn, M. and Taylor, M.W. (2003), “Regulatory and supervisory independence and financial stability”, CESIFO Economic Studies, Vol. 49 No. 2, pp. 259-94.
46. Quintyn, M. and Taylor, M.W. (2004), “Should financial sector regulators be independent?", IMF Economic Issues, No. 32, March 11-10.
47. Repullo, R. (2000), “Who should act as lender of last resort? An incomplete contracts model”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 32, pp. 580-605.
48. Schuler, M. (2005), “Germany”, in Masciandaro, D. (Ed.), Handbook of Central Banking and Financial Supervision in Europe, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
49. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1998), The Grabbing Hand, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
50. Stigler, G.J. (1971), “The theory of economic regulation”, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 114-41.
51. Taylor, M. (1995), Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Struture for the New Century, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, London.
52. World Bank (2003), World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC.
53. Courtis, N. (2006), How Countries Supervise their Banks, Insurers and Securities Markets, Central Banking Publications, London.
54. Garcia, G. and Nieto, M. (2005), “Banking crisis management in the European Union: multiple regulators and resolution authorities”, Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 206-26.
55. Garcia, G. and Prast, H. (2004), Depositor and Investor Protection in the EU and the Netherlands:A Brief History, Research Series Supervision 54, Netherlands Central Bank, Directorate Supervision.
56. Nieto, M.J. and Wall, L.D. (2006), “Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors’ prompt corrective action: is there a case for a banking standard in the EU?", Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 17, pp. 191-220.
57. Potts, G.T. and Luckett, D.G. (1978), “Policy objectives of the federal system”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 92, pp. 525-34.
58. Richmond (2005), Global Financial Services Regulators, Richmond Law & Tax Ltd, Richmond upon Thames.