China's policies towards myanmar: A successful model for dealing with the myanmar issue?

China: An International Journal

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 255-287

  Chenyang, Li ^a   Fook, Lye Liang ^b  

^a YUNNAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951250112     PISSN: 02197472     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0219747209000351     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. "Worldwide Protests Mark Birthday of Jailed Suu Kyi", AFP, 19 June 2009 and "Britain Wants More Myanmar Sanctions over Suu Kyi", Reuters, 18 June 2009.
2. "UN Chief Criticises Burma's 'Slow' Response to Cyclone", VOA, 12 May 2008.
3. "Bush Appeals to China to Pressure Myanmar", Reuters, 27 Sept. 2007
4. Such a perception has lingered since the military junta took power after suppressing the large scale democratic movement in 1988.
5. China changed its policy towards the BCP following its reform and opening up in 1978. Substantive assistance gave way to moral support. By 1985, China stopped all economic and military assistance to the BCP. The change in China's policy towards the BCP is an important reason for its collapse in 1989.
6. Some Taiwan scholars think that the ultimate objective of China's policy towards Myanmar is to gain access to the Indian Ocean, make Myanmar the land-bridge between Southeast Asia and South Asia and serve as a buffer state for China.
7. See Yuh-Ming Tsai, "Liangyang tuwei: zhongguo dui miandian waijiao zhengce zhi yanjiu" (Two Oceans Breakout: A Study on China's Foreign Policy towards Myanmar), Feng Chia Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 8 (May 2004): 302-325
8. "China Signs Burmese Gas Deal for 30-year Supply", The Irrawaddy, 26 Dec. 2008 at [June 2009]
9. In the past, the total length of the Myanmar-China border was estimated at 2,185 km. At present, the military government believes it is 2,204 km. See [June 2009]
10. China became a net oil importer in 1993.
11. "China Oil Dependence Sparks Concern", Radio Free Asia, 5 Jan. 2009 at [June 2009].
12. See also "China's Dependence on Imported Oil Increases", China Daily, 22 June 2007.
13. "India Targeting China's Oil Supplies", Telegraph (UK), 22 Sept. 2008.
14. This may be due to non-traditional security factors such as terrorist attacks, piracy, maritime collisions, oil leakages, limited navigation capacity and overcrowding of sea routes. The "Malacca Dilemma" advocated by Chinese scholars in recent years is based on the premise that a confrontation would occur between China and the US. However, the US navy can attack Chinese oil tankers at any location and need not confine such attacks to the Straits of Malacca. Therefore, the "Malacca Dilemma" based on a China-US confrontation has little validity. This dilemma is more applicable to non-traditional security issues.
15. "Zhengqu miandian tianranqi zhongguo zhan shangfeng" (Securing Myanmar's Natural Gas, China Has Upper Hand), Lianhe zaobao, 15 Mar. 2007
16. Yunnan shares a boundary of about 2,000 km with Myanmar.
17. Poon Kim Shee, "The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions", Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies 1, no.10 (2002): 35.
18. Liu Xing, "Retrospect and Reflection on China-Myanmar Land-and-Water Coordinated Transport Construction", Collection of Papers at the Dehong Forum on Yunnan-Myanmar Harmonious Development\50th Anniversary of China-Myanmar Border People (Dehong: Dehong Minority Press, 2007), p. 114.
19. "Beijing's ' Two Oceans Policy' Looms Large", The Irrawaddy, 9 Mar. 2009 at [June 2009].
20. Yuh-Ming Tsai, "Liangyang tuwei: zhongguo dui miandian waijiao zhengce zhi yanjiu" (Two Oceans Breakout: A Study on China's Foreign Policy towards Myanmar), Feng Chia Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 8 (May 2004): 317
21. The national interests of China in Pakistan are mainly to ensure the security of northwest China, especially the Xinjiang region and respond to India's threat.
22. "Myanmar to Hold National Referendum in May and General Election in 2010", People's Daily, 10 Feb. 2008.
23. "State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan Meets with Special Envoy of SPDC Chairman of Myanmar", China's Foreign Ministry Website, 13 Sept. 2007 at.
24. Yu Jiang and Wang Chaozuo, "Dui zhongmian bianjing guanli zhong yu miandian difang minzu wuzhuang shili kaizhan jingwu hezuo de sikao" (Reflection on Policy Cooperation with Myanmar Local Minority Armed Forces in China-Myanmar Border Management), Journal of Yunnan Public Security College 1 (2001): 67-68
25. This agreement is known as The Agreements on China-Myanmar Border Management and Cooperation between the Governments of People's Republic of China and the Union of Myanmar".
26. Staff at the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar and Aung San Suu Kyi frequently met before her first house arrest in July 1989. It is also said that the Chinese Embassy had contact with her during a second round of talks between her and the military government in 2000. Such contacts would not have been possible without permission from the military government.
27. China attaches importance to energy cooperation with Myanmar. According to the signed contracts among China Datang Corporation, China Power Investment Corporation and the military government, the total installed capacity of Myanmar's hydropower stations built by Chinese companies will exceed 20 million kilowatts in 15 years. The total investment is expected to exceed RMB 200 billion. In addition, it has been reported that China National Petroleum Corporation will invest US$2.55 billion to build the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines
28. As a result of this, more than 20,000 Chinese workers returned to China from Myanmar.
29. China, together with Russia, vetoed a Myanmar resolution put forward by the US and Britain in the UN Security Council. The resolution would have called on the military junta to "cease military attacks against civilians in ethnic minority regions and begin a substantive political dialogue that would lead to a genuine democratic transition". See UN News dated 12 Jan. 2007 at. Myanmar was most gratified with the Chinese veto. Its official TV station made a rare interruption in the normal news programme on 13 January 2007 to broadcast a message of thanks to China. Separately, China blocked an effort by the US and European countries to have the UN Security Council condemn Myanmar's violent crackdown on protestors in September 2007.
30. See "China Blocks Move to Condemn Crackdown", New York Times, 27 Sept. 2007.
31. Yu Jiang and Wang Chaozuo, "Dui zhongmian bianjingguanli zhong yu miandian difang minzu wuzhuang shili kaizhan jingwu hezuo de sikao" (Reflection on Policy Cooperation with Myanmar Local Minority Armed Forces in China-Myanmar Border Management), p. 69.
32. This is according to the Economic and Trade Office document (no.287) issued by the General Office of China's State Development Planning Commission in February 2000
33. This working group comprised 10 departments and agencies including the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Public Security.
34. However, the Ministries of Public Security and Commerce have different opinions about the concept and management of substitute cultivation. The Ministry of Public Security prefers substitute cultivation to be confined to the original opium poppy planting areas and holds the view that substitute cultivation must be separate from the economic and trade cooperation between the Chinese and Myanmar or Laos. In contrast, the Ministry of Commerce views substitute cultivation as an integral part of China's "going out" strategy of encouraging Chinese enterprises to invest abroad. Hence, substitute cultivation ought to be elevated to a higher level of "alternative industries" or "alternative economy". Only in this way can poppy cultivation be eradicated. Therefore, substitute cultivation should not be confined to the areas where opium poppy is planted
35. In recent years, a large number of online gambling networks have surfaced in northern Myanmar. This has complicated the task of the Chinese central government to curb illegal gambling.
36. During the visit of Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun to Myanmar in March 2009, Lieutenant General Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo (First Secretary of Myanmar's State Peace and Development Council) said that actively developing friendly cooperation in all fields between Myanmar and China and persevering in the "One China" policy are the basic points in Myanmar's policies towards China. See"Li Changchun yu Miandian heping fazhan weiyuanhui diyi mishuzhang huitan" (Li Changchun Holds Talks with Myanmar's Peace and Development Council First Secretary), Xinhua News, 27 Mar. 2009 at [June 2009].
37. According to the Vice General Manager of the Myanmar Forestry Company, the export value of the company in financial year 2005-2006 was US$479 million. In comparison, over the same period, the estimated value of logs entering China illegally over the border reached US$300 million.
38. See "Mianbao baodao zhongfang jinzhi Miandian mucai jinru Zhongguo Yunnan bianjing" (Myanmar Newspaper Reports that Chinese Side Has Banned Timber from Myanmar to Cross Yunnan's Border), news article at the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar's website, 16 June 2006 at [June 2009]. It is also worth noting that Chinese enterprises never take part in the twice yearly public bidding for logs by the military government
39. This will provide a means for the military government to earn precious foreign exchange.
40. "Sino-Myanmar Bilateral Trade up 60%", The China Post, 4 Nov. 2008
41. Some scholars and relevant Chinese government departments believe that there were about 800,000 Chinese in Myanmar before the present government assumed power in September 1988. According to statistics provided by the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar, there are presently 2.3 million Chinese in Myanmar. Other estimates put the figure at 3 million. We expect a significant proportion of these Chinese are illegal immigrants
42. The Myanmar army also often attacks Chinese workers in areas under the jurisdiction of the armed ethnic minority groups. Without proper travelling documents, these workers often land in prison for many years for illegal entry and residence. After serving time they are then sent back to China. The military government is fearful that if the influx of illegal immigrants from China is not controlled, the social and economic tensions and conflicts between these immigrants and the local people will worsen.
43. It was the biggest producing area for opium and heroin in the world from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. It tailed Afghanistan in 2000, but re-assumed top spot in 2001 and 2002
44. The military government supports developing substitute planting only in areas con trolled by it.
45. Chen Qiaozhi, A Study on ASEAN Countries' Policy towards China since the Cold War (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2001), p. 22.
46. "Chinese Influx Stirs Age-old Hatred in Burma", Reuters, 12 Mar. 2008 at [June 2009].
47. "Zhongmei miandian jiaoli zhongguo shengchu" (China Tussles with the US in Myanmar and China Wins) at [June 2009].
48. In a separate incident in 2005, university students in Yangon protested against the destructive lumbering and mining done by the armed ethnic minority groups in northern Myanmar, the corrupt and incompetent military government and the plundering of resources by Chinese merchants. The Chinese government was embarrassed by this protest. See Yin Hongwei, "Zhongmian daji feifa muyemaoyi" (China and Burma Co operate to Crack Down on the Illegal Wood Trade) at [June 2009].
49. Interview with Mr. Zou Huaiqiang, the Burmese teacher of Yunnan Nationalities University in December 2007 in Kunming.
50. Interview with Mr. Liu Dageng, former head of the Sub-Office of the World Food Programme (WFP) based in the Wa region in June 2008 in Kunming.
51. Rong-Yung King, "Dilemma and Prospect International Community Facing towards Myanmar Confrontation between the Government and the Public", Issues and Studies 42 no.3 (May and June 2003): 115.
52. Christopher B. Roberts, "Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities", Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Working Paper no.108 (Mar. 2006).
53. Downer was then responding to a decision by the military regime to put Aung San Suu Kyi under "protective custody" after her supporters reportedly clashed with opponents in northern Myanmar which left several dead. See "Myanmar: The Case against Sanctions", Asia Times Online, 20 June 2003 at [June 2009].
54. "Australia Announces Sanctions on Myanmar Leaders", Reuters, 24 Oct. 2007.
55. In October 2007, the EU Foreign Ministers agreed to broaden sanctions that include visa bans and asset freezes on generals, government officials and their relatives, and to take new steps targeting Myanmar's key timber, metals and gemstone sectors. See "EU Agrees to Strengthen Myanmar Sanctions", Reuters, 15 Oct. 2007.
56. "EU Split over Tougher Sanctions against Myanmar", EU Business, 12 June 2009 at [June 2009].
57. Apart from the US government, doubts have also been expressed in the scholarly community about the efficacy of US sanctions against Myanmar which have generally tightened over the years.
58. See Ian Holliday, "Rethinking the United States' Myanmar Policy", Asian Survey 45, no.4 (July-Aug 2005): 603-621
59. Clinton added that the US is looking "at what steps we could take that might influence the current Burmese government and we are also looking for ways that we could more effectively help the Burmese people".
60. See "US Taking Fresh Look at Myanmar Policy: Clinton", Reuters, 17 Feb. 2009.
61. Jurgen Haacke, "'Enhanced Interaction' with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?", Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no.2 (Aug. 2005): 189.
62. ASEAN members now generally consider it legitimate for the association as a whole to take an active interest in members' intra-state developments should these threaten the credibility of the grouping (particularly as regards relations with the dialogue partners) or the security of the wider region. Yet, this practice does not constitute ASEAN's abandonment of its non-interference principle.
63. See "Jurgen Haacke Enhanced Interaction", pp. 189-192
64. On 26 June 2007, Eric John (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) and Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan (Minister of Information) and Nyan Win (Minister of Foreign Affairs) held a meeting in Beijing. The meeting involved a free exchange of ideas but failed to yield any result.
65. "Yuanzhu mudi hezai, miandian weihe ruci Yanzhong yilai zhongguo" (What Is the Purpose of Aid, Why Burma Is Heavily Dependent on China) at [June 2009].
66. He Shengda, "Myanmar's Political and Economic Status Quo and Its Trends", Asia-Pacific Data 37 (1994): 4
67. Interview with Robert Taylor in Ruili (on border), 16 Dec. 2008.
68. "Dongmeng mishuzhang tan miandian wenti, jinggao xifang guojia shenshen chuli" (ASEAN Secretary-General Talks about Myanmar Issue, Warns Western Countries to be Prudent), Guangdong News (Nanfangwang), 15 June 2003 at [June 2009].
69. Wang Jianwei was interviewed by VOA on 11 June 2005 at [June 2009].