Twinning, inorganic replacement, and the organism view

Ratio

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 59-72

  Liao, S Matthew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77950954227     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: 14679329     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00450.x     Document Type: Review

References (41)

1. See, e.g., W. R. Carter, 'Do Zygotes Become People?', Mind 91 (1982): 77-95
2. Warren Quinn, 'Abortion: Identity and Loss', Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 24-54
3. P. F. Snowdon, 'Personal Identity and Brain Transplants', In Human Beings, D. Cockburn. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 109-26
4. Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990)
5. Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)
6. S. Matthew Liao, 'The Organism View Defended', The Monist 89, no. 3 (2006): 334-350
7. See, e.g., Liao, The Organism View Defended, pp. 336-337
8. Olson, The Human Animal, pp. 126-131
9. The concept 'permanent' is not easy to define. We can avoid some confusion though if we distinguish between a metaphysical and an epistemic understanding of this term. Metaphysically, permanent organismic discontinuity for an organism occurs when in fact the organism will forever not be able to coordinate its life processes. Epistemically though, we can of course be wrong about when this point has occurred for an organism. For a further discussion of this concept, see Lawrence C. Becker, 'Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept', Philosophy and Public Affairs 4:4 (1975): 334-359
10. Norman Ford, The Prenatal Person: Ethics from Conception to Birth (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002)
11. Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard, 'Sixteen Days', Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28, no. 1 (2003): 45-78
12. G. Damschen, A. Gomez-Lobo, and D. Schoenecker, 'Sixteen Days? A Reply to B. Smith and B. Brogaard on the Beginning of Human Individuals', Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2006): 165-75
13. Patrick Lee, 'The Pro-Life Argument Form Substantial Identity: A Defence', Bioethics 18, no. 3 (2004): 249-63
14. van Inwagen, Material Beings, 18, no. 3 (op. cit.2004): 249-63
15. See, e.g., Lynne Rudder Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 72-73, who echoes this point
16. Smith and Brogaard, 'Sixteen Days,' p. 60
17. van Inwagen's example is a group of cheerleaders coordinating to form a pyramid (Material Beings, op. cit60. )
18. See also Damschen, Gomez-Lobo, and Schoenecker, 'Sixteen Days?,' 60. op. cit
19. See, e.g., R. L. Gardner, 'Specification of Embryonic Axes Beings before Cleavage in Normal Mouse Development', Development 128 (2001): 839-47
20. W. Larsen, Human Embryology (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1997), p. 17
21. B. Carlson, Human Embryology and Developmental Biology (St. Louis, MO: Mosby, 1994), p. 33
22. K. Piotrowska, F. Wianny, R. A. Pedersen, and M. Zernicka-Goetz, 'Blastomeres Arising from the First Cleavage Division Have Distinguishable Fates in Normal Mouse Development', Development 128, no. 19 (2001): 3739-48
23. See also K. Deb, Sivaguru, M., Yong, H. Y. and R. M. Roberts, 'Cdx2 Gene Expression and Trophectoderm Lineage Specification in Mouse Embryos', Science 311 (2006): 992-996
24. K. Piotrowska-Nitsche, A. Perea-Gomez, S. Haraguchi, and M. Zernicka-Goetz, 'Four-Cell Stage Mouse Blastomeres Have Different Developmental Properties', Development 132, no. 3 (2005): 479-90
25. For a defense of this as the starting point of our existence, see, e.g., Damschen, Gomez-Lobo, and Schoenecker, 'Sixteen Days?,' 132, no. 3 (op. cit479-90
26. Peter Unger, Identity, Consciousness, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
27. David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980)
28. Alan Shewmon has argued that the brainstem has merely a regulative role that presupposes the integration characteristics of life rather than constitutes it ('The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating Brain Death with Death', Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001): 457-78)
29. See, e.g., H. P. Grice, 'Personal Identity', Mind 50 (1941): 330-50
30. John Perry, 'Can the Self Divide?' Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972): 463-88
31. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)
32. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981)
33. Mark Johnston, 'Human Beings', Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 59-83
34. Harold Noonan, Personal Identity (London: Routledge, 1989)
35. Unger, Identity, Consciousness, and Value, op. cit.1989)
36. Raymond Martin, Self Concern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
37. and Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
38. See, e.g., Ted Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
39. Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
40. Hud Hudson, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001)
41. Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life, pp. 72-73