Informational overhead of incentive compatibility

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 88-97

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Blumrosen, Liad ^a   Naor, Moni ^b   Schapira, Michael ^c  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (Israel)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Communication complexity; Ex post implementation; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

AMOUNT OF INFORMATION; CHOICE FUNCTION; COALITIONAL GAME; COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY; COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; LOWER BOUNDS; POST-IMPLEMENTATION;

ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN;

COMMUNICATION;

EID: 77950893077     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1386790.1386807     Document Type: Conference Paper

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