Persistent nonviolent conflict with no reconciliation: The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium

Law and Contemporary Problems

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 151-186

  Mnookin, Robert ^b   Verbeke, Alain ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b NONE

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EID: 77950778433     PISSN: 00239186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (173)

1. Monique Juquois-Delpierre, Fictional Reality or Real Fiction: How Can One Decide?: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Information Science Concepts and Methods in the Media World, 5 J. Info. Comm. & Ethics Soc'y 235, 237 (2007).
2. For political reactions reported the day after the program, see Reacties. Vlaanderen, de Standaard, Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://www.standaard.be/Artikel/Detail.aspx?artikelId=DMF13122006_098&word=RTBF. The TV program was followed by a book, released the following day. Philippe Dutilleul, Bye-Bye Belgium (Opération BBB): L'évenément Télévisuel (2006). The word "Flemish" is used as a noun both to denote the people and the language, which today is a variant of Dutch. It also can be used as an adjective, for example, the "Flemish Region" or "Flemish Community.".
3. In one small area of Belgium, the East Canton region obtained from Germany after World War I, German is the principal language of about 70,000 Belgians.
4. Belgian French is standard French, not a separate language, although there are some variations in vocabulary.
5. The official language spoken in Flanders is now standard Dutch, not a separate Flemish dialect, although several local dialects still exist.
6. See Kenneth D. MCRAE, 2 Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies 56-59 (1986).
7. Reflection Group "in de Warande," Manifesto for an Independent Flanders Within Europe (2005).
8. Id. at 35-100. See also generally Stefaan De Rynck & Karolien Dezeure, Policy Convergence and Divergence in Belgium: Education and Health Care, 29 W. Eur. POL. 1018 (2006).
9. Reflection Group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 101-06. 10. Id. at 132.
10. The report was "drawn up by" the "Reflection Group" of sixteen Flemish businessmen and academics who had studied Belgium's problems at the "Warande," the elite Flemish club in Brussels located next to the residence of the American Ambassador to Belgium. So it is not a report "of" the Warande. The Manifesto also carries the names of an additional fifty people who "subscribe[d] to [its] conclusions... and principles." Id. at 3, 17-18.
11. Luc Van Braekel, McKinsey CEO Calls for End of Belgium, Resigns, Brussels Journal, Dec. 13, 2005, http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/565/print.
12. See Liesbet Hooghe, Belgium: Hollowing the Center, in Federalism and Territorial Cleavages 62-66 (Ugo M. Amoretti & Nancy Bermeo eds., 2004) (noting that decentralization negatively correlates with frequency of violent protests).
13. The closest the country ever came to widespread violent strife was in 1951. The conflict concerned the "royal question"-whether King Leopold III, who was thought to have collaborated with the Nazis, should retain the throne. There was a general strike in which a few protesters were killed. Because it appeared the country might be on the brink of civil war, a compromise was engineered in which Leopold III abdicated in favor of his son.
14. See Mcrae, supra note 5, at 111-12.
15. See generally Jan Velaers & Herman van Goethem, Leopold III: de Koning, Het Land, de Oorlog (1994).
16. See E.H. Kossmann, the Low Countries 1780-1940, at 72-81, 686-87 (1978).
17. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 14.
18. The Belgian Constitution was arguably the most liberal in Europe. It recognized fundamental freedoms relating to speech, press, religion, education, assembly, and languages, and also included provisions relating to the separation of powers.
19. Leopold was to have close family connections to the monarchies in both Great Britain and France. Queen Victoria's mother was Leopold's sister. Leopold's first wife was Princess Charlotte Augusta, an heiress to the British throne as the only legitimate child of the British Prince Regent (later King George IV). She died, however, in 1817. In 1832, Leopold married Louise-Marie d'Orléans, daughter of King Louis-Philippe of France.
20. This is not to say that after the creation of Belgium, some historians did not attempt to reconstruct a Belgian history demonstrating the prior existence of some sense of peoplehood. For a discussion of the use of history to construct a Belgian identity, see generally Louis Vos, Reconstructions of the Past in Belgium and Flanders, in Secession, History and the Social Sciences 179 (Bruno Coppieters & Michel Huysseune eds., 2002).
21. There were 2.4 million Dutch-speakers and 1.8 million French-speakers in 1846. André Alen, Nationalism-Federalism-Democracy: The Example of Belgium, in 5 Revue Européene de Droit Public 41, 45 n.24 (1993) (citing E.H. Kossman, de Lage Landen 1780-1940, at 118 (2d ed. 1971)).
22. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 22. McRae translates the article in the original constitution as follows: "The use of the languages spoken in Belgium is optional (facultatif). It can be regulated only by law, and only concerning official acts and judicial matters." The Law of 19 September 1831 declared French to be the only official language for the proclamation of Laws and Resolutions.
23. See also André Alen & Koen Muylle, 1 Compendium Van Het Belgisch Staatsrecht § 266 (2008).
24. Kris Deschouwer, Kingdom of Belgium, in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries 48, 49 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Taylor eds., 2005).
25. M. Camille Huysmanns, The Flemish Question, 9 J. Royal Inst. Int'l Aff. 680, 680 (1930).
26. Reflection Group "In de Warande," supra note 7, at 63-64.
27. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 23-24.
28. See Reflection Group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 64. This explains the large number of Flemish-sounding family names in Wallonia. All Flemish immigrants "Frenchified" over one generation.
29. See Luc Huyse, Political Conflict in Bicultural Belgium, in Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium 107, 109-10 (Arendt Lijphart ed., 1981).
30. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 39-40 (referring to a "domestic colonialism" and stating that "[t]his socioeconomic dimension of the linguistic boundary within the Flemish region has incontestably heightened linguistic tensions").
31. This asymmetry persists. See Victor Ginsburgh & Shlomo Weber, La Dynamique Des Langues En Belgique [The Dynamics of Languages in Belgium], 42 Regards Economiques 1, 4 (2006).
32. Alen & Muylle, supra note 25, §§ 266-67.
33. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 24-25.
34. Dutch was legally permitted for use in administrative matters in 1878 and in secondary education in 1883. Alen, supra note 24, at 46 n.28 (citation omitted).
35. In 1893, the Belgian Constitution was amended to give non-property-owning men one vote, while allowing multiple votes to those who did own property. A 1920 amendment created universal male suffrage, by which all men had a single vote. Full suffrage was not extended to women until 1948.
36. There is a vast literature on the Flemish movement.
37. See generally Theo Hermans, Louis Vos and Lode Wils, The Flemish Movement: A Documentary History (1992).
38. Huysmanns, supra note 26.
39. François Nielsen, The Flemish Movement in Belgium After World War II: A Dynamic Analysis, 45 Am. Soc. Rev. 76 (1980).
40. See Alen & Muylle, supra note 25, § 266.
41. See Mcrae, supra note 5, at 150.
42. Huysmanns, supra note 26, at 688.
43. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 28.
44. Alen describes the emergence of what he calls the "principle of territoriality" in linguistic legislation in 1932 and 1935. Alen, supra note 24, at 49. The language frontier became firm and final with the Language Act of 8 November 1962. Alen & Muylle, supra note 25, § 271.
45. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 152-56.
46. Reflection Group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 51-53.
47. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 57.
48. ORG. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Oecd Economic Surveys 2005: Belgium 102 (2005), available at http://www2.vlaanderen.be/ned/sites/werk/documenten/euro_oecd_ec_sv.pdf. In 2003, Flanders' per capita GDP was 116.9% of the EU-25 average, while the Walloon region's was only 85%.
49. Ludo Beheydt, The Linguistic Situation in the New Belgium, in Languages in Contact and Conflict: Contrasting Experiences in the Netherlands and Belgium 48, 53-54 (Sue Wright & Helen Kelly eds., 1995).
50. ORG. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., supra note 48, at 100.
51. Reflection Group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 38.
52. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 56.
53. The Flemish Community governs the Dutch-language area but is also competent for the Flemish organizations (for example, schools, museums, and the orchestra) in the Brussels Capital Region. The same goes for the French Community, which covers the French-language area, and the French organizations in the Brussels Capital Region. de Belgische Grondwet, La Constitution Belge, Die Verfassung Belgiens [Constitution] art. 127-28 (Belg.). The German-speaking Community consists of the German-language area.
54. See Alen & Muylle, supra note 25, § 253.
55. The Flemish Region comprises the Dutch-language area; the Walloon Region consists of the French- and German-language areas; and the Brussels Capital Region includes the bilingual-language area.
56. See Alen & Muylle, supra note 25, § 254.
57. Flanders decided early on to combine the language-based "Flemish community" parliament with the Flemish regional parliament. The result is that there are a total of six, rather than seven, parliamentary-style elected legislatures, each of which has a government.
58. See Alen & Muylle, supra note 25, §§ 257-59.
59. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 78-79. The latest reform in 2000 (Lambermont) transferred revenues from the income tax and the value-added tax to regions and communities, using a formula that enables the Francophones to pay for their community's education deficit.
60. See Reflection Group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 110-12 (discussing "the Lambermont jungle" and the resulting transfer of taxation authority to the regions).
61. Jan Beyers & Peter Bursens, The European Rescue of the Federal State: How Europeanization Shapes the Belgian State, 29 W. Eur. Pol. 1057, 1060 (2006).
62. As early as the 1930s, the Catholic Christian Democratic party had divided into two linguistic "wings"-one Flemish and one French-speaking-over the issue of Flemish cultural autonomy, and later in 1967, the Christian Democrats formally split into two separate parties as a result of the conflict surrounding the Catholic University of Leuven/Louvain. Similarly, in the 1960s and '70s, as Walloon economic conditions declined, Walloon nationalist parties sprouted up, with federalist-socialist agendas, which threatened the larger Socialist Party and led to its division in the 1970s. The national Liberal Party also broke up along Flemish and francophone lines in 1968. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 59-61.
63. Kris Deschouwer, Falling Apart Together: The Changing Nature of Belgian Consociationalism: 1961-2001, 37 ACTA Politica 68, 79 (2002).
64. Deschouwer, supra note 25, at 60.
65. There is also a French-speaking right-wing nationalist party (the FN), but it has only one representative.
66. See LIESBET HOOGHE, A Leap in the Dark: Nationalist Conflict and Federal Reform in Belgium 6 (1991). Since 60% of the population is Flemish, the unstated presumption has been that the prime minister will be Flemish-not since the 1970s has a Walloon had the top position.
67. Except for the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde district, which includes both the Brussels Capital region and some surrounding suburbs, all of the electoral districts are monolingual.
68. Jules Destrée, Lettre au Roi Sur la Séparation de la Wallonie de la Flandre [Letter to the King on the Separation of Wallonia and Flanders], translated in Alen, supra note 25, at 47.
69. See Wilfried Swenden & Maarten Theo Jans, "Will It Stay or Will It Go?" Federalism and the Sustainability of Belgium, 29 W. Eur. Pol. 877, 889 (2006) (suggesting that the younger Flemish are more willing to identify with Belgium, possibly because they lack firsthand experience with linguistic discrimination).
70. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 65.
71. See generally KARL W. DEUTSCH, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (1953) (presenting a theory of nationalism as linked with and dependent on social communication).
72. Because of promises of confidentiality involved in this and other interviews referenced in this article, Law and Contemporary Problems is unable to independently verify their content. These sources are on file with the authors.
73. See RUDY AERNOUDT, Vlaanderen Wallonië, Je T'aime, Moi Non Plus 17-35 (2006).
74. See Marleen Brans, Christian De Visscher & Diederik Vancoppenolle, Administrative Reform in Belgium: Maintenance or Modernisation?, 29 W. Eur. Pol. 979, 992-95 (2006) (discussing the evidence on cultural differences between Flanders and Wallonia regarding organizational reforms in government).
75. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 65-71.
76. See id. at 249-51 (discussing the history of the press in Belgium).
77. Deschouwer, supra note 25, at 50.
78. see also MCRAE, supra note 5, at 237-49 (discussing the history of Belgian broadcasting).
79. Belgian newspapers, however, are self-regulated by a single association, the Federation of Editors, BBC News, Country Profile: Belgium, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_pro files/999709.stm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
80. The vast majority (about 90%) of all commuting is toward Brussels. Commuting between Flanders and Wallonia is very limited (about 1% of all commuting). Reflection Group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 63.
81. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
82. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 57.
83. Deschouwer, supra note 25, at 51.
84. See Reflection Group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 63.
85. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 76-77.
86. Early in March 2007, the francophone socialist leader Elio di Rupo argued in favor of creating bilingual schools in Brussels and surroundings. This measure was opposed by the Flemish Minister of Education.
87. See Frans De Smet, Di Rupo wil tweetalige scholen langs taalgrens, HET Nieuwsblad, Mar. 11, 2007, http://www.nieuwsblad.be/Article/Detail.aspx?articleID=do19fctr.
88. Ginsburgh & Weber, supra note 32, at 4.
89. Dutilleul, supra note 2, at 53 (quoting the journalist Guido Fonteyn).
90. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 59.
91. The fifth of five Flemish Resolutions of March 3, 1999, emphasizes the principle of language territoriality, as well as a demand for supervision rights for the regions on appointments in several federal institutions.
92. See Op 3 maart 1999 worden er vijf resoluties i.v.m. de volgende staatshervorming aangenomen, Mar. 3, 1999, available at http://www.vlaamsparlement.be/vp/informatie/informatheek/informatiedossiers/vlaamsegrondwet/vijf_resoluties.htm.
93. This devolution involved a series of trades over time. The Walloons typically agreed to grant more authority to the regions and communities only if the Flemish agreed to provide greater subsidies for the Walloon region and francophone community. The 1993 Saint Michael Agreement and the 2000 Lambermont Agreement followed this pattern.
94. See ELS Witte, Jan Craeybeckx & Alain Mennen, Politieke Geschiedenis Van België: Van 1830 Tot Heden 447-53 (2005).
95. Reflection Group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 110-12.
96. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 150-51.
97. For a summary of the history of the language conflict from the Flemish perspective, see the official site of the Flemish Government, http://www2.vlaanderen.be/taalwetgeving/eeuw_taalwetten .html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
98. See Brendan O'Leary, Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments, in from Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies 3, 26 (Sid Noel ed., 2005) (surveying "consociational thinking" and suggesting that Belgium is an example of a state successfully managing its consociational difficulties).
99. see also Brendan O'Leary, An Iron Law of Nationalism and Federation: A (Neo-Diceyian) Theory of the Necessity of Federal Staatsvolk and of Consociational Rescue, 7 Nations and Nationalism 273, 288-91 (2001) (constructing a Herfindahl-Hirschman index to measure the number of politically effective cultural groups in various countries, and noting a similarity between Belgium's score and the scores of other nations often described as having consociational institutions).
100. See generally Deschouwer, supra note 60.
101. George Tsebelis, Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Democracies, 2 J. Theoretical Pol. 5 (1990).
102. Kris Deschouwer, Consociational Democracy and Belgian Politics in the Twenty-First Century, 29 W. Eur. Pol. 895, 906-07 (2006).
103. For example, social insurance, including health insurance, is a federal matter, but public-health policies are said to be a community competence. The communities govern education but the regions control school transport, while the national government controls teachers' pensions and sets standards for professional qualifications. The main social-policy instruments relating to income redistribution (social security, the welfare system, and the personal-income tax) remain with the federal government.
104. See Swenden & Jans, supra note 66, at 886-88.
105. Alen & Muylle, supra note 25, §§ 347-49.
106. Alen, supra note 24, at 49.
107. As noted, within the Brussels capital region, 85% of the population is French-speaking and only about 15% speak Flemish at home. Today, a substantial fraction of the population of Brussels is made of immigrants, many from North Africa and Turkey. This population is largely francophone. Brussels is becoming more and more a multilingual city where languages such as English and Arabic are of increasing importance.
108. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 73-76.
109. See the official website of the Flemish Government, supra note 89.
110. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 60-61.
111. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 150-152.
112. See the official website of the Flemish Government, supra note 89.
113. Grondwettelijk Hof van België, Cour Constitutionnelle de Belgique, Verfassungsgerichtshof Belgien, Feb. 26, 2003, No. 30/2003.
114. Grondwettelijk Hof van België, Cour Constitutionnelle de Belgique, Verfassungsgerichtshof Belgien, May 26, 2003, No. 73/2003.
115. see also ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 225.
116. See Persbericht: Unanimiteit op staten-generaal, Splits Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde, May 20, 2005, http://www.splits-bhv.be/startpagina.htm.
117. See "Bruxelles-Halle-Vilvoorde," un épineux sujet de discord ["Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde," A Thorny Subject of Discord], Journal Des Finances (Fr.), Jan. 26, 2008, http://www.jdf.com/dossier/2008/01/26/04007-20080126ARTHBD00406-bruxelles-halle-vilvorde-un-epineux-sujet-de-discorde.php.
118. Alen & Muylle, supra note 25, §§ 502-06.
119. Reflection group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 146-51.
120. For precise numbers, see Bea Cantillon et al., Social Redistribution in a Federalised Belgium, 29 W. Eur. Pol. 1034, 1040-43 (2006).
121. In 1999 the Flemish Parliament passed resolutions calling for tax autonomy and for broader and more-coherent or homogeneous authority in areas such as employment policy, health care, children's allowances, collective labor agreements, railways, traffic regulation, and some aspects of penal-law enforcement.
122. See Resolutions of March 3, 1999, available at http://www.vlaamsparlement.be/vp/informatie/informatheek/informatiedossiers/vlaamsegrondwet/vijf_resoluties.htm.
123. Professor Giuseppe Pagano has called the combination of "profound cultural resentment" and expensive transfers an "explosive cocktail." Dutilleul, supra note 2, at 167.
124. Aernoudt, supra note 70, at 175.
125. For an argument that regionalization is inconsistent with the provision of social services, see the official website of the francophone socialist party, http://www.ps.be (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
126. The monarchy provides a strong glue, however, not in itself, but as an important mechanism in the creation and continuation of a strong Belgian establishment. See infra IV.B.3.
127. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
128. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
129. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
130. Reflection group "in de Warande," supra note 7, at 132-55.
131. See id. at 201-12 (laying out a plan for reorganizing Brussels as a region separate from Flanders and Wallonia, borrowing from the example of Washington, D.C.).
132. Trends Redaktie, Brussel, Washington AAN de Zenne. Een Pleidooi Voor Brussel Als Europese Hoofdstad 9 (1989) (comparing Brussels to Washington, D.C.).
133. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
134. ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, §§ 247-349.
135. Swenden & Jans, supra note 66, at 891. This may also be explained by the increasing importance of Europe, which has led to a strengthening of the position of the federal government. See infra IV.B.4.
136. Stefaan Fiers, Partijvoorzitters in België of "Le Parti, C'est Moi"? 106 (1998).
137. Lieven De Winter & Patrick Dumont, Do Belgian Parties Undermine the Democratic Chain of Delegation?, 29 W. Eur. Pol. 957, 964-69 (2006).
138. Deschouwer, supra note 93, at 901-04.
139. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
140. On this lack of legitimacy and procedural justice, see Tom Tyler, Governing Pluralistic Societies, 72 LAW & Contemp. Probs. 187 (Spring 2009).
141. See Jaak Billiet, Bart Maddens & André-Paul Frognier, Differences in Political Culture Between Flemings and Walloons, 29 W. Eur. Pol. 912, 930-31 (2006) ("[A]n over-arching Belgian political and economic elite still exists, which uses its... power to maintain the unity of the country.").
142. B. Guy Peters, Consociationalism, Corruption and Chocolate: Belgian Exceptionalism, 29 W. Eur. Pol. 1079, 1081 (2006).
143. It is therefore not so surprising that in Belgium the splitting up of national political parties into regional parties has preceded the regionalization of the country.
144. See Swenden & Jans, supra note 66, at 880.
145. Peters, supra note 135, at 1086-87.
146. See JOOST BALLEGEER, de Vlamingen: EEN Volk Zonder Bovenlaag 194 (2005).
147. See Beyers & Bursens, supra note 57, at 1064.
148. For many concrete examples, see id. at 1062-73.
149. See generally Jeroen Maesschalck & Steven Van de Walle, Policy Failure and Corruption in Belgium: Is Federalism to Blame?, 29 W. Eur. Pol. 999 (2006).
150. Some Francophones describe confederalism as "le fédéralisme des cons [the federalism of idiots].".
151. See Dutilleul, supra note 2, at 42, 161-62.
152. ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 414.
153. Even a general national referendum is problematic from a constitutional point of view. Indeed, although the Constitution is silent in this respect, Alen points out that both legal scholarship as well as a constant position of the Department of Legislation of the Council of State hold that a referendum, binding or not, is unconstitutional. Since 1999, as amended in 2005, article 41 of the Constitution provides for one exception: a nonbinding referendum on the municipal and provincial level.
154. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 108-13. There has been one national referendum in Belgian history, on the fate of King Leopold III after World War II, in 1950. Although there was a majority vote in favor of the King, unraveling the result shows pronounced regional differences. The pro votes were 72% in Flanders against 58% in Wallonia and only 52% in Brussels. This led to mass protests, riots, even one death; and to avoid the risk of a civil war, the King resigned and passed the throne upon his son, the young Baldwin (Boudewijn/Baudouin). The present King Albert II (since 1993) is his brother.
155. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 111.
156. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
157. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995).
158. The Final Act of Helsinki lays out an expanded view of self-determination: The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to selfdetermination, acting at all times in conformity with [governing principles]... including those related to the territorial integrity of States. By virtue of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status.... Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, art. 1(a)(VIII), Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (emphasis added). Cassese argues that the term "peoples" does not refer to internal minorities but to entire populations of states.
159. See CASSESE, supra note 148, at 59. This conclusion is supported by the clause affirming the importance of territorial integrity. What the Final Act of Helsinki authorizes is separation (or unification, since the unification of Germany was what most states had on their mind when this was drafted) when it is decided by the entire population of a state through a democratic procedure. Therefore a referendum held just in Flanders would not meet the requirement.
160. Some European countries opposed the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, which had relatively undeveloped political institutions and little internal capacity to maintain local order. This would not be true if the Flemish region seceded. Spain (worried about Basque secession) did not recognize Kosovo's independence.
161. Cf. Swenden & Jans, supra note 66, at 892 (predicting a gradual "unravel[]ing of the Belgian cent[er])").
162. See Robert H. Mnookin, Ethnic Conflicts: Flemings & Walloons, Palestinians & Israelis, 136 Daedalus 103, 119 (2007).
163. Compare CIA World Factbook: Israel (2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html
164. with CIA World Factbook: Gaza Strip (2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html.
165. Peters, supra note 135, at 1085.
166. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
167. Peters, supra note 135, at 1086.
168. Tom Tyler suggests that it is superordinate identification that is important in shaping people's political attitudes and actions. See Tyler, supra note 133.
169. See Is Democracy Viable Without a Unified Public Opinion? The Swiss Experience and the Belgian Case (Dave Sinardet & Marc Hooghe eds., 2009), available at http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-ebooks/ebook-3-democracy-without-unified-publicopinion.
170. Martin Euwema & Alain Verbeke, Negative and Positive Roles of Media in the Belgian Conflict: A Model for De-escalation, 93 MARQ. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009).
171. See KRIS DESCHOUWER & PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, Electoral Engineering for a Stalled Federation: A Country-Wide Electoral District for Belgium's Federal Parliament (2009), available at http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-ebooks/ebook-4-electoral-engineering-stalled-federation.
172. ELEANOR MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, Dividing the Child 276-78 (1992). 164. Cf. Deschouwer, supra note 93, at 908-09 (explaining that one scenario for the future could be a learning process in which the new political elite sees the benefits of a more accommodating attitude).
173. For an example of how such a constructive dialogue might be implemented, see Jennifer Pratt Miles, Examining the Applicability of the Concepts of Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation to Multi-Stakeholder, Collaborative Problem-Solving Processes, 72 law & Contemp. Probs. 193 (Spring 2009). Pratt Miles suggests using the Transitions Framework of William Bridges, articulating the Flemish past and the Wallonian present as losses, and thinking through potential ways to replace, restore, or address those losses.