Military intervention and humanitarian assistance

Global Change, Peace and Security

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 243-254

  Smith, Michael G ^a  

^a Asia Pacific Civil Military Centre of Excellence   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77950733178     PISSN: 14781158     EISSN: 14781166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14781150802390426     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 214.
2. Chris Seiple, The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (Carlisle, PA: US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996), 9.
3. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines a complex emergency as: 'a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme'.
4. OCHA, 2007, http://ochaonline.un.org/ (accessed January 5, 2008).
5. History records that in almost 50% of cases, countries emerging from conflict have reverted within five years. Refer Human Security Centre, Human Security Report, 2005, www.humansecurityreport.info (accessed August 16, 2007).
6. From September 2007, the Human Security Centre has been located at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada. From 2002 to 2007, it was located at the Liu Institute for Global Issues and the University of British Columbia in Canada.
7. See Michael G. Smith and Jacqueline Whelan, 'Advancing Human Security: New Strategic Thinking for Australia', Security Challenges 4, no. 2 (2008): 1-22.
8. Colin Powell, 'Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations', October 26, 2001, http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5762.htm (accessed November 20, 2007).
9. US Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006), 2-1.
10. See http://www.afp.gov.au/international/IDG.html (accessed November 20, 2007).
11. For an analysis of the role and capabilities of the AFP in international deployments, see John McFarlane 'The Thin Blue Line: The Strategic Role of the Australian Federal Police', Security Challenges 3, no. 3 (2007): 91-108.
12. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'UN Peacekeeping: The Capstone Doctrine' (UNDPKO, January 2008), www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/ (accessed January 20, 2008).
13. OCHA, UN-CMCoord Officer Field Handbook, Version E1.0, (OCHA, November 2007), 16, http://ochaonline.un.org/CMCS (accessed January 5, 2008).
14. For a fuller analysis of humanitarian and military space, see Sarah Jane Meharg, ed., Helping Hands and Loaded Arms: Navigating the Military and Humanitarian Space (Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2007), 1-7.
15. 'A rights-based approach to development is a conceptual framework for the process of human development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights'. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, 'Human Rights in Development' (UNHCR, 2002), http://www.unhchr.ch/development/approaches.html (accessed January 29, 2008).
16. Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, Final Report (CHS, 2003), http://www.humansecuritychs.org/finalreport/index.html (accessed August 16, 2007).
17. APEC 2007 Leader's Declaration, 2008, http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders__declarations/2007.html (accessed January 2, 2008).
18. See Australian Government Department of Defence, http://www.defence.gov.au/; Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/
19. Australian Government AusAid, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/
20. Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php (accessed January 15, 2008).
21. For an analysis of failing states based on social, political and economic indicators, see the Fund for Peace, 'Failed State Index', http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option1/4com_content&task1/4view&id1/4229&Itemid1/4366.
22. OECD, OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007).
23. Pritchett and Woolcock argue that 'the common structure of the solution created the common conditions for its failure - namely, the lack of feedback mechanisms and modes for engagement of citizens in either controlling the state or directly controlling providers allowed systemic problems of organizational design to overwhelm logistics. But the logic of the solution is so seductive to governments (and donors) alike that it has taken decades of painful expensive failures in sector after sector to see that the problem is not just a few "mistakes" here and there, but that as an approach to development, it can be fundamentally wrong-headed from top to bottom'. L. Pritchett and M. Woolcock, 'Solutions when the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development', World Development 32, no. 2 (2004): 191-212.
24. V.K. Holt and T.C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 183.
25. Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php (accessed January 15, 2008).
26. To date, seven UN missions have been mandated to protect civilians; see Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?, Annex 1.
27. S.G. Caverzasio, Strengthening Protection in War - A Search for Professional Standards: Summary of Discussions among Human Rights and Humanitarian Organisations (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2001).
28. H. Slim and A. Bonwick, Protection: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005).
29. For example, see James Dobbins et al., The RAND History of Nation-Building (Washington DC: RAND, 2005), which contends that UN-led peacekeeping has been more successful than US-led interventions, and at far less financial cost
30. William Durch and Tobias Berkman, Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-First- Century. Peace Operations (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), who emphasise the need for the UN to be resourced more adequately to undertake peacekeeping tasks.
31. General Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia, 2nd ed. (London: Warner Books, 1999), 14.
32. Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], A/55/305-S/2000/809 (UN General Assembly Security Council, August 2000).
33. The CERF was launched on 9 March 2006 and aims to have a fund of US$500 m to commit to emergencies. Refer http://ochaonline.un.org/FundingFinance/CERF/tabid/1109/Default.aspx
34. Holt and Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?, 193.
35. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/contributors/2007/Feb07_1.pdf (accessed March 4, 2007).
36. Michael G. Smith, 'Peacebuilding in East Timor', From Civil Strife to Civil Society: A Report on the Conference Held at the United Nations University, Tokyo, 5 February 2004 (European Commission and United Nations University, May 2004), 16.
37. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare, Theory and Practice (London: Paladin, 1970), 29.
38. For an analysis of NGO/military interaction in Afghanistan, see William Maley, 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Some Reflections', NATO Review, no. 3 (2007). Maley identified a diverse range of 25 provincial reconstruction teams, about half led by the United States and the remaining led by NATO and non-NATO states (including Australia and New Zealand).