Social lending

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 335-344

  Chen, Ning ^a   Ghosh, Arpita ^b   Lambert, Nicolas ^c  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Internet auctions; Peer to peer lending; Social lending

Indexed keywords

ANALYSIS AND CHARACTERIZATION; BIDDING STRATEGY; GENERAL CLASS; INTEREST RATES; INTERNET AUCTIONS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; PEER TO PEER; TIGHT BOUND; UNIFORM PRICE; VCG MECHANISM;

ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; INTERNET; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS; WORLD WIDE WEB;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 77950586619     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566422     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (16)

1. www.lendingclub.com.
2. www.prosper.com.
3. www.zopa.com.
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