"Ought," "Can," and practical reasons

American Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 363-372

  Littlejohn, Clayton ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77950266147     PISSN: 00030481     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Davidson, D. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events (New York: Oxford University Press)
2. Foot, P. 1985. "Utilitarianism and the Virtues," Mind, vol. 94, pp. 196-209
3. Goldman, A. 1971. "The Individuation of Action," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, pp. 761-764
4. Howard-Snyder, F. 2006. "'Cannot' Implies 'Not Ought, '" Philosophical Studies, vol. 130, pp. 233-246
5. Kenny, A. 1975. Will, Freedom, and Power (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell)
6. Ross, W. 1930. The Right and the Good. (New York: Oxford University Press)
7. Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press)
8. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 1984. "'Ought' Conversationally Implies 'Can,'" The Philosophical Review, vol. 93, pp. 249-261
9. Stocker, M. 1990. Plural and Conflicting Values (New York: Oxford University Press)
10. Streumer, B. 2003. "Does 'Ought' Conversationally Implicate 'Can'?" European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 11, pp. 219-228
11. -. 2007. "Reasons and Impossibility," Philosophical Studies, vol. 136, pp. 351-384
12. Vranas, P. 2007. "I Ought, Therefore I Can," Philosophical Studies, vol. 136, 167-216