Leibniz on freedom and necessity : Critical notice of robert adams, leibniz: Determinist, theist, and idealist

Philosophical Review

Volumn 108, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 245-277

  Sleigh Jr , R C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

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EID: 77950039207     PISSN: 00318108     EISSN: 15581470     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2998302     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. See the Appendix (277) for a list of abbreviations used in citations and quotations.
2. The papers to which Margaret Wilson refers are "Leibniz's Theories of Contingency," Rice University Studies 63 (1977): 1-41
3. Reprinted in Leibniz: Critical and Inteipretive Essays, ed. Michael Hooker (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 243-83
4. "Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz," in contemporary Perspectives on the History of Philosophy, ed. P. A. French, T. E. Uehling Jr., and H. K. Wettstein, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 217-57.
5. C.D. Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 28.
6. See R. C. Sleigh Jr., "Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge," Faith and Philosophy 11(1994): 547-71, esp. 557-58.
7. In the most detailed discussion of this passage to date, R. Cranston Paull argues that NCT expresses an incompatibilist, nondeterministic account of human freedom that, surprisingly, is consistent with various Leibnizian theses with which it may initially appear to be inconsistent-for example, the doctrine of spontaneity, the pre-established harmony; and the principle of sufficient reason (R. Cranston Paull, "Leibniz and the Miracle of Freedom," Noûs 26 (1992): 218- 35).
8. By contrast, Jack Davidson, in "Imitators of God: Leibniz on Human Freedom" (Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (1998): 387-412), argues ingeniously that NCT is consistent with a compatibilist, deterministic account of human freedom.
9. See, for example, Leibniz's convoluted remarks in a piece presented in Gaston Grua, Leibniz: Textes Inédits (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948; reprinted by Garland, 1985), 384-88, which concludes: "No creature can foresee infallibly what [a person] will choose."
10. The nature/essence distinction is an important component of Leibniz's account of individual substances; more about it is included in what follows. For more detail, see section 6 of chapter 4 of my work, Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their correspondence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press; 1990)
11. Donald Rutherford, "Natures, Laws, and Miracles: The Roots of Leibniz's Critique of Occasionalism," in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 135-58. In footnote 18 Rutherford offers a welcome emendation to the account I had offered.
12. See for example, A1.7.46-47 and T, 249.
13. See for example, T 249 and G 7.418 (LC, 93).
14. See, for example, DM 7, G 7.418 (LC, 93) and G 7.419 (LC, 95), and G 6.64 (Huggard, 88).
15. See, for example, T, 414.
16. See, for example, DM 13.
17. See section 35 of Louis Loeb's From Descartes to Hume (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
18. Note that the notion of an intrinsic property or state utilized here is not the same as an intrinsic denomination. Both notions play significant roles in Leibniz's scheme. The notion of intrinsicality that I am trying to capture here is that which Leibniz employed in the correspondence with Arnauld in order to explain, for example, the connection between Adam and human events, a connection he claimed was "intrinsic, but not necessary" (see LA, 50-51).
19. De Potentia, question 6, the rcsponse to article 4. Leibniz took note of the latter variety of miracles, "cooperative miracles," in the Theodicy, preliminary dissertation 3.
20. Summa Theologica, part 1, question 110, article 4; the first part of part 2, question 5, article 6; and Summa Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 102.
21. For a penetrating and balanced account of these matters see Mark Kulstad, "Two Interpretations of the Pre-established Harmony in the Philosophy of Leibniz," Synthese 96 (1993): 477-504.
22. I also recommend David Blumenfeld's article, "Leibniz on Contingency and Infinite Analysis," Philosophy and Phenomenological Rrsearch 45 (1985): 483-514
23. John Carriero's two-part study "Leibniz on Infinite Resolution and Intra-mundane Contingency," in Studia Leibnitiana 25 (1993): 1-26, and 27 (1995): 1-30.
24. On page 81 of Leibniz and Arnauld, I tried characterizing the notion this way: Proposition p is per se possible just in case there is no set of sentences S such that: (i) every sentence in S expresses a proposition that is metaphysically necessary; and (ii) no sentence in S contains a device of singular reference referring to some individual not referred to by the devices of singular reference in sentences expressing p; and (iii) the conjunction of the sentences in S with a sentence expressing p formally implies a formal contradiction. Adam Elga pointed out to me that this characterization hasn't a chance. The interesting case is where p is metaphysically impossible in the unqualified sense, but per se possible. But if p is metaphysically impossible, then its negation is metaphysically necessary; which will produce havoc for my characterization. Obviously, in clause (ii) I needed to exclude the negation of p and formal equivalents thereto. There are other difficulties. An alternative is to follow Robert Adams's lead and characterize per se possibility in terms of what would be metaphysically possible but for certain necessary features of the necessary being, that is, God. I had thought that a more general idea is involved that is worth trying to capture; Jonathan Bennett's comments on an earlier draft of this paper have convinced me not to hold my breath.
25. See LDTI, 13 n. 6 and 20 n. 20.
26. The Confessio Philosophi is published in A 6.3.115-149. There is no published translation into English. I aim to remedy that soon.
27. See Fabrizio Mondadori, "Reference, Essentialism, and Modality in Leibniz's Metaphysics," Studia Leibnitiana 5 (1973): 74-101.
28. Margaret Wilson., "Possible Gods," Review of Metaphysics 32 (1979): 717-33, at 724.
29. The literature on this topic is large. Here are some of the significant items in that literature: Benson Mates, "Individuals and Modality in the Philosophy of Leibniz," Studio Leibnitiana 4 (1972): 81-118.
30. Fabrizio Mondadori, "Reference, Essentialism, and Modality in Leibniz's Metaphysics," Studia Leibnitiana 5 (1973): 74-101.
31. Graeme Hunter, "Leibniz and the 'Super-Essentialist' Misunderstanding," Studia Leibnitiana 17 (1985): 162-90
32. Fabrizio Mondadori, "Understanding Superessentialism," Studia Leibnitiana 17 (1985): 162-90.
33. I tried my hand at the topic in chapter 4, "Freedom and Contingency;" of Leibniz and Arnauld. For a withering excoriation of what he took me to be asserting there see.
34. Fabrizio Mondadori, "On Some Disputed Questions in Leibniz's Metaphysics," Studia Leibnitiana 25 (1993): 153-73. Adams's position, with which I agree in the main, may be gleaned from the second section of the first chapter of LDTI.
35. David Blumenfeld's article, "Freedom, Contingency; and Things Possible in Themselves" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1988): 81-101) helped me see the error of my earlier ways. Of course, he is not to be held responsible for my current excesses, if such there be. The question arises whether Leibniz intended the contingency requirement to be construed in an analogous fashion in the case of human freedom. That is a complicated matter, not addressed here.