Attention and intentionalism

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 60, Issue 239, 2010, Pages 325-342

  Speaks, Jeff ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77950008166     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: 14679213     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.617.x     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. T. Warfield Against Representational Theories of Consciousness Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6 (1999 pp. 66 69
2. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness: a Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind (MIT Press, 1995)
3. J. Searle, Intentionality (MIT Press, 1983)
4. N. Block, Mental Paint, in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 165-200
5. C. Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their Relations (Oxford UP, 1983), ch. 1
6. A.J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (Oxford UP, 1940)
7. Peacocke, Sense and Content; A.D. Smith, The Problem of Perception (MIT Press, 2002)
8. Peacocke, A Study of Concepts (MIT Press, 1992), ch. 3
9. B. Nickel Against Intentionalism Philosophical Studies, 136 (2007 pp. 279 304
10. S. Shoemaker Phenomenal Character Noûs, 28 (1994 pp. 21 38
11. E. Marcus Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum The Philosophical Quarterly, 56 (2006 pp. 321 339
12. N. Block Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness Philosophical Topics, 26 (1999 pp. 39 70
13. E. Schwitzgebel The Unreliability of Naïve Introspection Philosophical Review, 117 (2008 pp. 245 273
14. A. Noë, Action in Perception (MIT Press, 2004), ch. 2
15. B.A. Eriksen and C.W. Eriksen Effects of Noise Letters upon the Identification of a Target Letter in a Nonsearch Task Perception and Psychophysics, 16 (1974 pp. 143 149
16. The Unreliability of Naïve Introspection, vi. The quotation is from Schwitzgebel, p. 256
17. S. Palmer, Vision Science (Cambridge UP, 1999), p. 546
18. The perceptual representation of perceptual prominence is also discussed in Nickel, Against Intentionalism; I discuss the central example of that paper below
19. C. Hill, Sensations (Cambridge UP, 1991), p. 128
20. T. Horgan and U. Kriegel Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It So Well? Philosophical Issues, 17 (2007 pp. 123 144
21. M. Tye Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience Noûs, 36 (2002 pp. 137 151
22. M. Johnston The Authority of Affect Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63 (2001 pp. 181 214
23. Johnston, pp. 196-9
24. G. Harman The Intrinsic Quality of Experience Philosophical Perspectives, 4 (1990 pp. 31 52
25. A. Byrne Intentionalism Defended Philosophical Review, 110 (2001 pp. 199 240
26. J. Speaks, Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming)
27. C. OCallaghan, Sounds: a Philosophical Theory (Oxford UP, 2007), ch. 11
28. F. Macpherson Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience Noûs, 40 (2006 pp. 82 117
29. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968)
30. W. Lycan, Consciousness (MIT Press, 1987)
31. J. Campbell, Reference and Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2002)
32. S. Siegel Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience Philosophical Review, 115 (2006 pp. 355 388
33. Tye, Ten Problems and Consciousness, Color, and Content
34. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind (MIT Press, 1995)
35. M. Tye Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 18 (1995 pp. 268 269
36. Casey OCallaghan and the participants in my graduate seminar on mental content at Notre Dame in the spring of 2007