The basis of human moral status

Journal of Moral Philosophy

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 159-179

  Liao, S Matthew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Moral agency; Moral standing; Moral status; Personhood; Sentience; Speciesism

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949995475     PISSN: 17404681     EISSN: 17455243     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/174552409X12567397529106     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. T. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998), p. 185
2. B. Williams, 'The Human Prejudice', in A. W. Moore (ed.), Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 135-154 (142)
3. See e.g., P. Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1993). There is conceptual space for a position, according to which all human beings as well as some other animals are rightholders. Such a position would not necessarily be speciesist. In fact, the account I shall develop may be an example of such a position. As far as I am aware, such a position has not been advanced in the literature
4. J. Feinberg and B. B. Levenbook, 'Abortion', in T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Death (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), pp. 195-234
5. G. Vlastos, 'Justice and Equality', in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 41-76
6. R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf(1993)
7. H. J. McCloskey, 'Respect for Human Moral Rights Versus Maximizing Good', in R. G. Frey (ed.), Utility and Rights (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 121-36
8. R. Nozick, 'About Mammals and People', New York Times Book Review, 27 November, II, pp. 29-30
9. Williams 'The Human Prejudice'
10. J. Finnis, 'A Philosophical Case against Euthanasia', in J. Keown (ed.), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical, and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 48. Readers will notice that Finnis is talking about persons, whereas I have been discussing right-holders. In this paper, I understand the terms 'rightholding' and 'personhood' interchangeably. Some people who equate rightholding with personhood also hold a particular conception of personhood, namely, all and only those who are actual moral agents are persons. Consequently, they believe that all and only those who are actual moral agents are rightholders. I do not hold this view. Others equate personhood with actual moral agency, but not with rightholding. As many of them also believe that some non-moral agents, e.g. animals, can also be rightholders, these people argue that personhood is only a suffi cient but not a necessary condition for right-holding. Since my equating rightholding with personhood is a stipulation, nothing substantive follows from it. If animals are rightholders, then, as I understand these terms, they would be persons, even if they are not actual moral agents
11. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 186
12. McMahan used the term 'species norm account' to describe something different, namely, a view about the nature of fortune and misfortune. This term is useful, though, for capturing the ideas advanced by writers such as Finnis and Scanlon. See J. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 146-149, 209-217
13. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, pp. 146-149 Some might question whether the Superchimp would still be a chimpanzee if in fact it has rational capacities. This is a diffi cult issue as it involves knowing the nature of being a chimpanzee. I do not know of a good answer to this question at present. Hence, at least for now, I think we should give McMahan the benefits of the doubt and allow for the disjunction between having rational capacities and being a chimpanzee
14. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), has cautioned that we should not try to derive an Ought from an Is. It is not possible to do justice to this important question here, but arguably, empirical attributes in the world play some role in giving moral agents certain moral reasons for action (whether these empirical attributes do so directly, as, e.g., when one derives an Ought directly from an Is, or indirectly via some other means, seems to be another matter). For example, it seems that an empirical phenomenon such as pain does play some role in giving moral agents moral reasons to avoid causing it and to alleviate it if and when they can. If the empirical phenomenon of pain did not exist, there would not be a moral reason to alleviate it. If this is right, we can begin to understand how internal, empirical attributes can play some role in determining what we ought to do
15. J. Griffi n, Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), for this point
16. See, e.g., Singer, Practical Ethics
17. J.J. Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971), pp. 47-66 (48-49)
18. In S. Matthew Liao, 'Rescuing Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: The Blastocyst Transfer Method', American Journal of Bioethics 5.6 (2005), pp. 8-16, I argue that even if embryos were rightholders, there are still permissible ways of pursuing embryonic stem cell research
19. See, e.g., C. Wellman, Real Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 113
20. Piaget's work in human cognitive development, for example, supports the idea that rationality develops according to a fairly predictable schedule. For the claim that the development of empathy in human beings also follows certain prescribed progression, see M.L. Hoffman, 'Moral Development', in M.H. Bornstein and M.E. Lamb (eds.), Developmental Psychology: An Advanced Textbook (Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum, 1988), pp. 497-548
21. G.B. Martin and R.D. Clark, III, 'Distress Crying in Neonates: Species and Peer Specifi city', Developmental Psychology 18 (1982), pp. 3-9
22. Other environmental factors include undiagnosed diabetes; hypervitaminosis A; high temperatures of 102 degrees or higher for more than five hours; anticonvulsant medication, especially valporic acid (valporate); or environmental/chemical exposure. See, e.g., Center for Disease Control and Prevention 'Effectiveness in Disease and Injury Prevention: Use of Folic Acid for Prevention of Spina Bifida and Other Neural Tube Defects, 1983-1991', Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 40 (1991), 513-516
23. MRC Vitamin Study Research Group, 'Prevention of Neural Tube Defects: Results of the Medical Research Council Vitamin Study', Lancet 338 (1991), pp. 131-137
24. About 3-4 percent of the mentally retarded population is severely retarded, and only 1-2 percent of the mentally retarded population is classified as profoundly retarded. See, e.g., American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, Inc., 4th edn, 1994)
25. M.L. Batshaw and B.K. Shapiro, 'Mental Retardation', in M.L. Batshaw (ed.), Children with Disabilities (Baltimore: Paul H. Brookes, 4th edn, 1997)
26. V.A. McKusick, Mendelian Inheritance in Man. Catalogs of Human Genes and Genetic Disorders (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 11th edn, 1994)
27. There are other kinds of genetic defects that involve more than a single gene. As far as I know, either those defects are so severe that the fetuses typically die before birth, or individuals with these defects typically only have mild mental retardation. See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 'Prenatal Diagnosis of Fetal Chromosomal Abnormalities', ACOG Practice Bulletin 27 (May 2001)
28. A.I. Melden, 'Do Infants Have Moral Rights', in William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (eds.), Whose Child? (Totowa, NJ: Littlefied, Adams &Co., 1980), pp. 199-220 (210-11)
29. See, e.g., J. Harris, The Value of Life (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 11-12
30. L.W. Sumner, 'Abortion', in D. Van DeVeer and T. Regan (eds.), Health Care Ethics: An Introduction (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), pp. 162-183 (174)
31. M. Warnock, 'Do Human Cells Have Rights?' Bioethics 1.1 (1987), pp. 1-14 (12)
32. See, e.g., J. Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977)
33. See, e.g., M. Reichlin, 'The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal', Bioethics 11.1 (1997), pp. 1-23
34. S. Buckle, 'Arguing from Potential', Bioethics 2 (1988), pp. 227-53
35. R. Hursthouse, Beginning Lives (London: Blackwell 1987)
36. K. Young, 'The Zygote, the Embryo, and Personhood: An Attempt at Conceptual Clarification', Ethics &Medicine 10.1 (1994), pp. 2-7 (4)
37. F. Wade, 'Potentiality in the Abortion Discussion', Review of Metaphysics 29.2 (1975), pp. 216-255 (245)
38. G. Gillett, 'Women and Children First', in K. Fulford, G. Gillett and J. Soskice (eds.), Medicine and Moral Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 131-143 (132)
39. See, e.g. Sumner, Abortion, p. 173
40. M. Freeden, Rights (Milton Keynes: Open University Press(1991), p. 59, who argues that the potentiality account has this implication
41. See also D. Marquis, 'Why Abortion is Immoral', Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989), pp. 183-203
42. See, e.g., J. Rachels, The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 6
43. Marquis, 'Why Abortion is Immoral', p.189
44. See, e.g., S. Matthew Liao, 'The Embryo Rescue Case', Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27.2 (2006), pp. 141-147
45. The concept of time-relative interest comes from McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, pp. 80, 170-74, 183-88
46. See also S. Matthew Liao, 'Time-Relative Interests and Abortion', Journal of Moral Philosophy 4.2 (2007), pp. 242-256
47. I develop this point in greater detail in Liao, 'The Embryo Rescue Case'
48. J. Feinberg, 'The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations', in Rights, Justice, and Bounds of Liberty (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 159-184
49. For philosophers who have argued that Feinberg's notion of interest is too narrow and that some nonsentient entities such as plants can also have interests, see, e.g., G. Varner, In Nature's Interests? Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)
50. K. Goodpaster, 'On Being Morally Considerable', Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978), pp. 308-325
51. See, e.g., Varner, In Nature's Interests?
52. Goodpaster, 'On Being Morally Considerable'
53. Feinberg, 'Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations'
54. Ying Chen, Zhi Xu He, et al., 'Embryonic Stem Cells Generated by Nuclear Transfer of Human Somatic Nuclei into Rabbit Oocytes', Cell Research 13.4 (2003), pp. 251-263