Political economy of antitrust

The International Handbook of Competition

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 173-209

  Rowley, Charles ^a   Rathbone, Anne ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Locke Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949913691     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781845423520.00011     Document Type: Chapter

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