Coping rationally with ambiguity: Robustness versus ambiguity-aversion

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 303-334

  Nehring, Klaus ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77949619310     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267109990265     Document Type: Article

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