Two out of three ain't bad: A comment on the ambiguity aversion literature: A critical assessment

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 335-356

  Siniscalchi, Marciano ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 77949578488     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267109990277     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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