Measuring inequality's badness: Does size matter? If so, how, if not, what does?

Theoria

Volumn 69, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 85-108

  Temkin, Larry S ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949500204     PISSN: 00405825     EISSN: 17552567     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2003.tb00755.x     Document Type: Note

References (9)

1. This volume, pp.60-84. All cites and page references to Rabinowicz are to this article unless noted othewise.
2. Oxford University Press, 1993.
3. For evidence supporting this see W. G. Runciman's classic work. Relatively Deprivation and Social Justice (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).
4. Reasons and Persons, section 143 (pp, 420-422).
5. In "Exploring the Roots of Egalitarian Concerns," this volume pp. 124-150. I discuss the scope and limitations of the "no fault or choice of their own clause." Though often crucial, the applicability of the "no fault or choice clause" is neither necessary nor sufficient for the egalitarian's fundamental concern about comparative fairness.
6. Parfit and I have been discussing prioritarianism, though not always by that name, for many years now. Parfit's classic presentation of the view can be found in his 1991 Lindley Lecture, "Equality or Priority" reprinted as chapter five in The Ideal of Equality (edited by Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams, MacMillan Press and St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp. 81-125."
7. Basil Blackwell. 1991.
8. John Broome and I have discussed this issue in various venues. See his Weighing Goods, pp. 165-169,
9. and my "Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection" (cited above, see especially section XI, pp. 146-151).