In Vino Veritas: The effects of different management configurations in German viniculture

Journal of Wine Research

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 199-208

  Dilger, Alexander ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MÜNSTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

Cooperative; Quality preference; Vineyard; Viniculture; Wine

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949357495     PISSN: 09571264     EISSN: 14699672     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09571260903471936     Document Type: Article

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