The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Mandik, Pete ^a  

^a WILLIAM PATERSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Concepts; Consciousness; Experiences; Subjectivity; Subjectivity eliminativism; Subjectivity reductionism

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949299356     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0025     Document Type: Chapter

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