Estimating the option value of a non-firm electricity tariff

Energy

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1609-1614

  Moore, J ^a   Woo, C K ^a,b   Horii, B ^a   Price, S ^a   Olson, A ^a  

^a Energy and Environmental Economics Inc   (United States)

^b HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Demand response; Electricity economics; Option valuation

Indexed keywords

COSTS; ECONOMICS; ELECTRICITY; INVESTMENTS; NATURAL GAS;

CALIFORNIA; COST SAVING; CUSTOMER PARTICIPATION; DEMAND RESPONSE; ELECTRICITY DEMANDS; ELECTRICITY TARIFF; END-USES; HIGHLY SENSITIVE; INCENTIVE PAYMENTS; LOCAL DISTRIBUTIONS; MONTHLY MARKET; NATURAL GAS PRICE; OPTION VALUATION; OPTION VALUE; RESOURCE ADEQUACY; SERVICE PROGRAM; SIMULATION EXERCISE; SPECIFIC DESIGN; SPOT PRICE; TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION; WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS;

ELECTRIC LOAD FORECASTING;

CLIMATE CONDITIONS; DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT; ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY; ENERGY MARKET; INCENTIVE; NATURAL GAS; PRICE DETERMINATION; VALUATION;

CALIFORNIA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 77949262393     PISSN: 03605442     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2009.04.013     Document Type: Article

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